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Twenty-five years ago, in 1984, the then Chairman of the Aboriginal Development
Commission, Charles Perkins, referred to the tensions between mining interests
and Aboriginal opinion. These, he said, ‘… date back to those times of notoriety,
not so long ago, when certain Aboriginal groups resisting European pressures
on their land were simply swept aside … The deep and degrading cultural
disruption, the assault of noise, dust and lost privacy, the loss of social integrity
of Aboriginal groups, and the outrageously low return in the way of royalties,
employment and other benefits, have all formed part of the picture of the
Australian development “frontier”’ (Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984: xii–xiii).
Despite the great rise in mining’s share of Gross Domestic Product from 1.7 per
cent in 1960–61 to 6.1 per cent in 1980–81, a study in 1984 found that Aboriginals
then played only a small part in the operations of major mining companies;
occupied mainly unskilled or semi skilled blue collar jobs; and had available to
them only limited training opportunities, almost all of which were restricted to
narrow job classifications (Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984: 12–13).
What has happened in the quarter of a century since those findings were made?
In Power, Culture, Economy: Indigenous Australians and Mining, edited by Jon
Altman and David Martin, an excellent set of chapters enriches and broadens
our understanding of this issue. A specially pleasing aspect of the project has
been that PhD scholars have been included, and guided not only to completion
of their degrees but also to the attainment of a prestigious publication.
It is however disappointing to learn that, after yet another major mineral boom
in Australia, when in the five years to 2006 mining export revenues rose by
over $100 billion (or around 70 per cent), Indigenous people still do not share
equitably in the vast incomes which are generated from their lands in the remote
regions of Australia. The words of Minister Jenny Macklin in 2008 that the
potential of ‘… millions of dollars to be harnessed for economic and social
advancement of native title holders, claimants and their communities …’ remained
to be realised are also a sorry reflection on events in the last twenty-five years.
In this comment, Minister Macklin was echoing former Minister Amanda
Vanstone, who asked why land rich Indigenous people were ‘dirt poor’, and
why the traditional owners of the land were the most disadvantaged living upon
it.
If way to the better there is, it exacts a good look at the worst—after Thomas
Hardy—and the authors provide a sobering set of analyses of difficulties and
uncertainties in the path ahead. They also ponder the classic question of the
development economics literature: does economic growth in poorer societies
automatically require a new social and cultural order, or can transformation to
prosperity co-exist with at least some traditional ways of living?
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The answers to the questions are intractable, and a theme of the volume is the
contestation of ideas and possible policy paths. Whereas a simple solution or
proposal, if accepted, is presumably easier for communities and governments to
act on, the scholarly review provided in this book is essential in canvassing the
various options. This is the major contribution of the volume, coupled with the
immense amount of new information and the broadening of the topics rightly
considered relevant to the outcome.
It is a special pleasure to welcome the publication of this book, since plans for
it were hatched by my former colleague at the University of Melbourne, Professor
Jon Altman, in association with Rio Tinto, through the redoubtable Bruce Harvey,
and the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) where I was
employed at the time. With CEDA’s enthusiastic support, Jon and Bruce
succeeded in arranging a successful combined Linkage Grant application to the
Australian Research Council (ARC), which was coupled with substantial, generous
matching funding from Rio Tinto.
There can be no doubt that the ARC Linkage Grant system, which provides
incentives for industry to back up research funds from the Commonwealth, is
an excellent vehicle for furthering essential enquiry effort and output. This
project, under the leadership of Professor Jon Altman and the prodigiously
productive Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research at The Australian
National University, is a prime example of the importance of the ARC Linkage
Grant scheme. It is also a very favourable reflection on the enlightened attitude
to funding of research by Rio Tinto, which showed absolute respect for the
independence of the scholars in designing and undertaking their work and in
reaching conclusions.
I therefore warmly congratulate the editors and authors on their work. They
have provided material and analysis which is essential to consider in improving
the longstanding unsatisfactory relationship between mining activity and the
plight of the Indigenous people from whose lands the mineral wealth is being
extracted.
Professor John Nieuwenhuysen AM
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1. Contestations over development
Jon Altman
Australia is a rich first world nation. In 2007–08 it had a $1 trillion economy as
measured by nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with per capita income of
over $A50 000. In recent years mining sector revenue has constituted a growing
share of the national economy, reaching about 11 per cent of GDP in 2007–08
with a value of $A119 billion (Reserve Bank of Australia 2009). The Minerals
Council of Australia (2007) estimated that in 2007–08 the value of mineral exports
would reach over $A90 billion and constitute 40 per cent of Australia’s
commodity exports. Before the global financial crisis of late 2008, the Australian
mining sector was in boom driven in large measure by the rapid industrialisation
of China and India: employment in the sector had reached over 80 000 jobs by
2005–06 and was growing. Royalties paid to Commonwealth and State
governments totalled $A7 billion in 2007–08; gross operating surplus in that
year was $A63 billion; and in 2005–06 net profit return on average shareholder
funds was 24 per cent. While some of this economic gloss may have declined in
the last year, the overall significance of the mining sector to the world’s fifteenth
largest economy is likely to continue in the immediate future—it is as yet unclear
if the current global recession is just a cyclical downturn of the business cycle
or a more fundamental and structural change to economic liberalism and
globalisation.
While this mining sector boom has been occurring, the share of the Australian
continent owned by Indigenous Australians, what is termed the Indigenous
estate, has grown to over 20 per cent of the continent (Altman, Buchanan and
Larsen 2007). The areas ‘owned’ in various ways under land rights and native
title laws are generally extremely remote and have low commercial value, except
for mineral extraction. Restitution of land has come on the state’s terms and
excludes ownership of minerals. These lands are occupied by an estimated 20
per cent of the Indigenous population that was estimated to total just over 500 000
people in the 2006 Census.
Indigenous people, who constitute 2.5 per cent of the population, do not share
equitably in the wealth of the mining sector, much of which is generated from
their land in remote regions. The key issue raised in this monograph is why not?
This is a question that has also recently taxed the Minister for Indigenous Affairs
the Hon. Jenny Macklin (2008) when she delivered the 2008 annual lecture to
commemorate the 1992 Mabo No. 2 Australian High Court native title judgment
titled ‘Beyond Mabo: Native title and closing the gap’. Using language reminiscent
of an earlier federal minister Amanda Vanstone she referred to ‘the great
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Australian paradox’. Vanstone (2007) has asked why lands-rich Aborigines were
‘dirt poor’ and pondered why traditional owners of land are the poorest people
living on it.
Such terminology has been used in concerns raised elsewhere both internationally
and with reference to Australia. For example, Karl (1997) examined ‘the paradox
of plenty’ that haunts many mineral dependent states where production of
enormous wealth coexists with extraordinary economic inequality. The paradox
of plenty has similarity to the resource curse thesis (Auty 1993) that similarly
queries the form of political economy (Ross 1999) that allows the existence of
poverty in the midst of plenty especially during mining booms (see Langton and
Mazel 2008). There is a significant literature that has explored the issue of mining
and Indigenous peoples in Australia (see Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984;
Howitt, Connell and Hirsch 1996; Weiner and Glaskin 2007 among others, as
well as Ballard and Banks 2003 for a broad anthropological sweep of the
literature).
Like politicians before her, Macklin (2008) notes that ‘native title is critical to
economic development’ and that ‘properly structured property rights to land
are a key component in expanding commercial and economic opportunity’. Her
comments indicate she may be overlooking the issue of resource ownership
under Australian law. She notes ‘the potential for millions of dollars to be
harnessed for economic and social advancement of native title holders, claimants
and their communities’, and states, ‘we must not allow this potential to go
unrealised’. Minister Macklin concludes: ‘native title is a right which must be
used as a tool to bring about positive change for social, cultural, economic
purposes … it must be part of our armoury to close the gap between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous Australians’. More recently, in late November 2008, her
views have been echoed by a Native Title Payments Working Group (2008) with
membership drawn from a diversity of interest groups. The Working Group
was convened by the Australian Government to recommend ways to ensure that
resource agreements optimise financial and non-financial benefits to ensure
wealth creation for traditional owners of land and the wider Indigenous
community for both this and future generations.
The Minister’s concerns—shared by many—do not directly tackle the inability
of land rights and native title, and mining activity on these lands over the last
30 years, to rapidly reduce the socioeconomic gap between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians, although there has been steady improvement in
most socioeconomic outcomes (Altman, Biddle and Hunter 2008).
In August 2008 mining magnate Andrew ‘Twiggy’ Forrest proposed the
Australian Employment Covenant, a plan to provide opportunity for 50 000
Indigenous people to obtain full-time permanent work (not limited to the mining
sector) within two years. The Australian Prime Minister threw his support behind
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the plan committing to fund the pre-employment training for all potential
workers; Aboriginal rights campaigner Noel Pearson referred to the plan as ‘a
revolutionary breakthrough’; while Warren Mundine lauded the fact that mining
companies have already come on board (‘Forrest Plan to create 50 000 jobs’,
L. Shanahan, The Age, 4 August 2008). Commentators not only failed to observe
that there are currently less than 50 000 Indigenous Australians in this
employment category but also that only 2500 are employed Australia-wide in
mining at present (Brereton and Parmenter 2008).
This monograph presents key findings from an Australian Research Council
(ARC) Linkage project ‘Indigenous Community Organisations and Miners:
Partnering Sustainable Regional Development?’ that was undertaken between
2002 and 2007 at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research at The
Australian National University. Industry partners for this research were Rio
Tinto and the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA). The
research was undertaken over a number of years and at a number of sites.
The key question the research sets out to address is whether major long-life
extractive mines located on Aboriginal-owned land and near Aboriginal
communities have the capacity to fundamentally alter the marginal socioeconomic
status of Indigenous Australians in a sustainable manner. This is a question with
much history both in Australia and internationally. There is considerable
empirical evidence that Indigenous people rarely benefit equitably when major
extractive activities occur on their customary land—indeed it is far more common
for such activities to impact negatively on the livelihoods and cultures of
Indigenous communities (Sawyer and Gomez 2008). Certainly in Australia there
is considerable historical evidence that Aboriginal people residing in mine
hinterlands in remote Australia have been socioeconomically disadvantaged
(Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984). At the heart of this volume is a significant
policy and discourse contest between those who support the policy goal of
addressing socioeconomic inequality via enhanced engagements between
Indigenous Australians and miners, mediated by the state; and others who see
inherent value in a livelihood approach that might be incompatible with mining,
where Indigenous aspirations to live fundamentally different lifestyles play an
ongoing role.
Central to this research is a growing national awareness of the dysfunction
associated with inactivity and welfare dependence in remote Aboriginal
communities (Pearson 2000a), and statistical evidence that the populations of
remote Indigenous communities are growing quickly rather than declining
(Taylor 2003). There is also growing awareness that the raft of national changes
associated with ‘globalisation’ or ‘economic liberalisation’ has impacted adversely
on regional Australia while simultaneously facilitating the role of corporations
in providing government-like services (Gray and Lawrence 2001).
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Associated with the restructuring of Australian capitalism in the late twentieth
century, there has been some retreat of the state in terms of public investments
in remote regions and a growing state view that profitable mining corporations
have a responsibility to provide social services to remote communities, including
Indigenous communities. Similarly, there has been a view expressed that
Indigenous beneficiaries from agreements with mining companies should commit
payments provided as compensation or benefit sharing to community purposes
(Macklin 2008).
Also in the late twentieth century there were two waves of optimism that mining
might provide a significant plank for what Li (2007) terms the state’s ‘project of
improvement’ in the cases examined here for remote-living Aboriginal people.
The first wave was linked to the passage of land rights legislation especially the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) (ALRA), and the
establishment of institutions to allow payment of mining monies both to people
in areas affected by mining and, more broadly, to the Northern Territory
Aboriginal community. It was anticipated that the leverage provided by free
prior informed consent provisions, that constitute a de facto and weak form of
property right in minerals because they can be traded for consent, might result
in both beneficial agreements and beneficial development outcomes (Altman
1983; Industry Commission 1991). The second wave was linked to the passage
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth) (NTA) and anticipation that right to negotiate
provisions in this law would similarly facilitate negotiation for development
even though de facto rights in minerals were much weaker under the NTA
(McKenna 1995).
A core question raised in this monograph is whether mining has delivered
improvement as a consequence of three major agreements, spread across Western
Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland, which are at the empirical
heart of our investigations. Without pre-empting our more detailed findings
presented in later chapters, the answer to this question seems to be that
outcomes—at least as measured by standard social indicators from the five-yearly
census—are disappointing. Dependence on the state remains high and indicators
have improved marginally at best. This of course all depends on how one
measures development. At present there is a hegemonic view of development
favoured by the Australian state that narrowly construes development within
the domain of the market: in accord with the strictures of neo-liberalism,
development is measured with a focus on individual employment and wealth
accumulation (Harvey 2007). This view is favoured by the Australian state with
its focus on closing the gap in a variety of indicators including formal
employment. There is an alternate view of development (Ferguson 1994; Li 2007;
Scott 1998; among many others) that focuses more broadly on improvement in
subjects’ lives and livelihoods, but this view is currently subordinated in
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Australian public discourse and policy narrative and receives limited attention.
This alternate view receives considerable attention in this volume.
Part of the reason for disappointing development outcomes, whether defined in
terms of social indicators or livelihoods, is linked to the limited capacity of many
Indigenous organisations and communities to respond to the social impacts of
mining while at the same time taking advantage of employment and other
commercial opportunities. This, as we shall see, is linked in part to the
ambivalence that many Aboriginal traditional owners have to mining on their
land. In the three cases that we examine, land rights and/or native title laws
have provided limited opportunity to actually control mining on Aboriginal
lands and its social impacts on Aboriginal people. Instead, the leverage provided
by new laws can best be exercised by opposing mining initially, something that
is structurally facilitated by the right to negotiate provisions of the relatively
new native title statutory regime. Whether opposition is fundamental or strategic
(or in some cases both), when beneficial agreements are signed and mining goes
ahead, relations of conflict suddenly need to transform to relations of cooperation.
This switch can be difficult to manage on a community-wide or regional scale
if agreements are to be beneficial (Altman 2001a).
Another reason for disappointing development outcomes is that mining companies
and the Australian state (governments and bureaucracies) seem to have limited
capacity to recognise the deeply-entrenched levels of disadvantage experienced
by communities adjacent to remote mines and the strain on their social fabric
created historically by settler or state colonisation and now, potentially, by
mining. Both parties clearly see mine site engagement as providing opportunities
for the state project of improvement of Indigenous people, but it is only when
concerted action is taken by both parties in unison and in collaboration with
Indigenous interests that positive outcomes are generated.
One of the central concerns of chapters in this monograph is the complex
triangulated relationship between Indigenous people, mining companies and
the state in the Australian context, an issue that has attracted some attention
internationally (see Rumsey and Weiner 2004; Sawyer and Gomez 2008). Given
the growing interdependence of the state and the mining sector—the former
increasingly dependent on the mining sector for revenue, the latter needing
licence to operate from the state—to what extent does the state operate as a
neutral arbiter in its dealings with Indigenous people? This is of particular
concern in situations where Indigenous people oppose mining, and the state
operates as a ‘broker state’ (Urteage-Crovetto 2008). Another key issue raised is
the proper division of responsibility for funding the services needs of Aboriginal
communities adjacent to major mines. As noted above, the particular logic of
the Australian state is resulting in a reduction of public expenditures on the
disadvantaged living in regional and remote areas and cost shifting onto
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multinational corporations. While there is a growing recognition that good
corporate citizenship requires major mining companies to act as catalysts for
sustainable regional development, especially in the absence of other commercial
options, one can also ask how far corporate social responsibility can and should
stretch. Has economic liberalisation created new forms of competition for global
shareholder capital that will only allow profit sharing to the minimum required
to secure a licence to operate? Assuming that some share of profits can be secured
for Indigenous groups, a central concern of several chapters in this monograph
is what form such benefit sharing should take, and what are the mechanisms by
which such benefits can be sustainably managed.
These are the sorts of questions that have animated the research reported here.
This is a complex field of inquiry replete with paradoxes, like the ‘paradox of
plenty’ referred to above and the triangulated political economy whereby the
state allies with the most, rather than the least, powerful. Ultimately, this
monograph seeks to address the paradox of disappointing sustainable
improvement. Using the terminology of Ferguson (1994) and Li (2007) it appears
that the quest for Indigenous improvement linked to mining has been ‘rendered
technical’, as all parties have become bound up in legal agreements that are
themselves frequently deficient (O’Faircheallaigh 2006). All too often as will be
demonstrated, complicated social, cultural and political considerations that
influence improvement have been rendered invisible. So we set out to ask what
have mining companies, the state, and Indigenous regional organisations done
to enhance community capacity to cope with the impacts of mining. What focus
has there been on building institutional capacity to facilitate sustainable regional
development and to ameliorate regional political division and conflict that is
inevitably associated with mining? And what learnings have been adopted from
evidence of key factors that might explain relative success or failure?
Theoretical framing
Chapters in this monograph take a variety of approaches that seek to integrate
theory with detailed ethnography and local histories from the three case study
sites associated with the Ranger Uranium Mine in the Northern Territory, the
Yandicoogina Mine in Western Australia and the Century Mine in north
Queensland.
In my view, the overarching framework of this volume is heavily influenced by
the Foulcauldian concept of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991) although
individual chapters do not explicitly engage with this high level theory.
Governmentality is concerned with rationalities of government or as Dean
(1999: 209) puts it ‘how we think about governing others and ourselves in a
wide variety of contexts’. The term government is used here in a broad sense
which Foucault revived from the sixteenth century to denote ‘any more or less
calculated or rational activity … that seeks to shape our conduct’ (Dean
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1999: 209). It highlights the fact that modern political power is not simply
exercised by the state, even though the state looms very large in the lives of
Indigenous Australians. As will become apparent in later chapters when different
authors examine the empirical messiness of the three cases from a variety of
perspectives, there is a network of other actors, organisations, and enterprises
that seek to guide the behaviour and decision-making of individuals. As Sawyer
and Gomez (2008: 5) observe there are multiple movements of governance, both
state and non-state, that aspire to fashion the conduct of people, both individually
and collectively, in connection to resource extraction using various strategies,
tactics and authorities. However, because the state looms so large in the lives of
Indigenous Australians it plays a central role in the project to constitute
Aboriginal people in the vicinity of mines as what Lawrence (2005: 40) terms
‘neoliberal and job ready subjects’. It is perhaps not surprising that neoliberal
governmentality (see Dean 2002) seeks to use opportunities provided by mining
to convert Indigenous subjects to autonomous, responsible, employed and
entrepreneurial individuals, sometimes in a paternalistic, even coercive manner
(Lawrence 2005: 42).
My analysis here is framed with reference to three Australian concepts that, in
my view, provide some theoretical background to the chapters in this volume.
The first is Merlan’s (1998) notion of interculturality, recently updated in Hinkson
and Smith’s (2005) edited volume; the second is Altman’s (2005b) notion of
economic hybridity that is evident in the articulations (and emerging tensions)
between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of production in situations where a
state sector looms large; and the third is Wolfe’s (1999) notion of ‘repressive
authenticity’ and Povinelli’s (2002) term ‘cunning of recognition’ that I have
found especially useful to understand the historical processes that have
marginalised Indigenous subjects.
I say little about interculturality and economic hybridity here. Readers of this
monograph would most likely have little difficulty accepting the view that
contemporary Aboriginal social norms, even in the remotest parts of Australia,
comprise a mix of customary and western (global) social norms and values. In
recent years, cultural analysis in Australia has increasingly rejected false
essentialised distinctions between modernity and tradition. Instead, there is a
recognition of the intercultural circumstances of contemporary Indigenous life
everywhere (Hinkson and Smith 2005). Clearly the precise nature of this
interculturality varies enormously across the continent. It has, however, been
directly influenced by the need for the codification of custom required by land
rights and native title laws. Importantly, because of interculturality the nature
of relations between miners and Indigenous people cannot be predetermined—in
some situations mining will be embraced, in others rejected, and in most cases
there is a mixed and highly contested response.
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A corresponding framework for understanding contemporary Indigenous
economic relations in remote regions is evident in a distinct form of intercultural
economy that includes the customary (that is non-market) alongside the market
and state sectors as a core element of many Indigenous peoples’ livelihoods
(Altman, Buchanan and Biddle 2006). Elsewhere, I have termed this the ‘hybrid
economy’ (Altman 2005b) and it has similarities to the community economy
model developed by Gibson-Graham (2002, 2005). Just as interculturality varies
from place to place, so does the significance of the customary non-market
sector—it is clearly most evident where people retain a close association with
their customary lands and least significant where people live in urban centres
and engage fully with the market economy. Economic hybridity is highly variable
and greatly influenced by colonial history, environmental factors and commercial
options. What is significant about the hybrid economy is not so much the size
of relative sectors, but their interactions and the distinctiveness of Aboriginal
economic modes informed by an amalgam of Indigenous and western norms that
motivate diverse aspirations.
The hybrid economy framework is an evolving construct that seeks to explain
the articulations between capitalist or market-based and non-capitalist or
kin-based forms of production in situations where there is a state sector (Altman
2005b). What is important to note is that while it is based on a model of the
economy with state, market and customary non-market components, it emphasises
that empirically these three sectors are not only highly interdependent but also
that none actually exists in isolation in some ‘pure form’ the overlaps between
sectors are where significant productive activity occurs. In a diagrammatic
representation of the model (Altman 2005b), economic activity in the four
segments of sectoral overlap are illustrated to be more significant than within
any discrete sector (see Altman, Chapter 2). The model also reflects the reality
of a high level of contemporary Indigenous spatial and occupational mobility
in remote Australia. Just like interculturality, this model does not presuppose
any particular form of production and so can readily accommodate any of a range
of possibilities including mine site employment.
The processes for gaining de jure rights to land involve an institutional
codification of ‘traditions and customs’ for making claims over unalienated
Crown land. For example, s.3 of the ALRA requires that Aborigines demonstrate
that they are a local descent group with primary spiritual responsibility for land
and sacred sites and are entitled to ‘a right to forage over the land claimed’. And
s.223 of the NTA requires claimants to demonstrate continuity of rights and
interests under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed,
and to demonstrate the maintenance of connection with lands and waters since
colonisation. Through these requirements Indigenous Australians have become
trapped in a western legal definition of authenticity to gain formal title to their
ancestral lands. The onus is on them to prove their ‘authenticity’.
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These processes can be explicated with reference to the work of Wolfe (1999)
and his notion of ‘repressive authenticity’. Wolfe provides a critical interpretation
of the history of settler colonialism and its role in transforming Indigenous
Australians. He notes that the Australian settler-colonial formation was premised
on displacing Indigenous people from the land rather than on any need to extract
surplus value from their labour (Wolfe 1999: 1). In settler-colonies like Australia,
the colonisers came to stay and so invasion is a structure—an ongoing process
and not an event that occurred in distant 1788. Settler colonial societies are
premised, Wolfe argues (1999: 3), on the elimination of native societies.
Wolfe’s view is that expropriation of land continues as a foundational
characteristic of the settler colonial society. Without going into detail about the
historical state policy phases of confrontation, incarceration (on specially
designated reserves) and assimilation, the state preference in recent decades has
been to move Indigenous people into the settler society by ‘privileging’ them
with the same opportunities, in theory, as those available to non-Indigenous
people and thus eliminating the Aboriginal ‘problem’. What is of particular
relevance to this monograph is how following historical moments of social justice
progressiveness (born of the failure of the Gove land rights case as well as broader
shifts in Australian attitudes) in 1972 and of High Court activism in the Mabo
No. 2 judgment of 1992, the Australian state has sought to define and then
delineate Aboriginal entitlements to land and resources. In both land rights and
native title laws, while there is some recognition that traditions and customs
change, claimants’ entitlements to land have required conformity to a set
authenticity, as if relatively untouched by colonial history. The state, however,
never seriously countenanced the provision of commercially valuable resources
to claimants mainly because this would constitute a form of sovereignty, an
unfathomable challenge to the logic of settler-colonial society and the Australian
nation state.
‘Repressive authenticity’ has seen the legal recognition of land rights for some,
but it has been predicated on a particular reading of colonial history and a
conceptual false binary. Either Indigenous claimants are frozen in some
pre-contact fiction as ‘tribal’ or ‘traditional’ (that qualifies them to claim land
where unalienated and available) or else they are modern and hence are
insufficiently different from other Australians to qualify for land rights. Such
categorisation is misplaced. Indigenous Australians today live in an intercultural
manner that can be described neither in terms of some essentialised traditionality
nor essentialised modernity. The lack of recognition of this interculturality—that
Indigenous people who are traditional owners of land increasingly abide by two
sets of values and have aspirations that comprise aspects of both—is at the heart
of the highly problematic relationship between the state and mining companies,
on the one hand, and Indigenous traditional owners of land, on the other, that
is the focus of this monograph.
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There is a growing legal and anthropological literature that highlights the
problems associated with constraining Indigenous tradition and Law to mainly
accord with western legal requirements (see for example Kolig 2005; Pearson
2004; Strelein 2006; Weiner and Glaskin 2006, 2007). Consequently, even in
situations where people can demonstrate continuity of tradition and custom and
continual connection to unalienated land, the restrictive definitions of traditional
owners means that there are winners and losers and much contestation sometimes
involving the mobilisation of ‘repressive authenticity’ by Indigenous actors
themselves (Altman 2008). There is clear empirical evidence that attachment to
land remains of fundamental importance to many Indigenous people for livelihood
and/or reasons of symbolic politics and identity, hence the almost total coverage
of the available parts of the Australian continent by registered native title claims.
As Wolfe (1999: 206–7) demonstrates, the Australian state has been effective in
limiting the category of native title beneficiaries. This has effectively excluded
the majority of the Indigenous population living in settled Australia from ‘land
rights’. As chapters in this monograph will demonstrate at a more local level,
even when land rights has been granted or native title claims successfully lodged
or determined, there are tensions between traditional owners as recognised by
western law as ‘winners’ and other Aboriginal people without land rights as
‘losers’.
A similar point from a somewhat different perspective is made by Povinelli
(2002) using the term ‘cunning of recognition’ in her exposition of how the
multicultural legacy of settler colonialism perpetuates unequal systems of power.
Povinelli suggests that the colonised subjects are not required to identify with
colonizers—something that is increasingly contestable today—but that they
must instead identify with a difficult standard of authentic tradition. On one
hand legislation caricatures culture as static, bounded, homogeneous and
uncontested, and so laws end up shaping what they seek to
recognise—Aboriginal rights to land (see Weiner and Gaskin 2007). On the other
hand the state looks to atone for its past misdeeds by transforming itself into
the judge of the form of (inter)cultural authenticity needed to get back land. As
Sawyer and Gomez (2008: 15) note in this process the state is ‘bestowing,
decertifying and negating a land rights based identity to aborigines depending
on whether they demonstrate appropriate, insufficient or excessive
indigenousness’. This is Povinell’s ‘cunning’ of liberal multiculturalism—it at
once acknowledges difference while simultaneously disciplining, regulating and
constraining otherness. It is not just the state that does this. Indigenous people
too get caught up in self-monitoring and regulating who and what they are.
Social struggles channelled through a discourse of identity-based rights and law
can be highly problematic for ‘the project of improvement’ (Li 2007) as several
chapters in this monograph demonstrate.
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Conduct of research and the focus of contributions
The ARC Linkage project’s initial aim was to look at six case studies where
significant benefit sharing agreements have been signed for major extractive
mines, but we ended up with only three cases, Yandicoogina, Ranger and
Century. This demonstrates two things. First, the challenges that researchers
face in successfully negotiating access for research purposes in what are often
highly politicised environments. Second, it demonstrates the sensitivities that
surround such issues at all levels—for Indigenous individuals and groups, mining
corporations and the state. Our industry partner was Rio Tinto, a multinational
corporation that has been at the forefront of efforts, at least in Australia and in
recent times, to address how sustainable regional development might be delivered
to Indigenous communities in its mine hinterlands. And yet even this powerful
corporation was unable to facilitate our research in some locations like at the
Argyle Diamond Mine in the East Kimberley or at the Comalco bauxite mine on
western Cape York where agreements were respectively being renegotiated (see
Doohan 2008) or recently implemented (see Crooke, Harvey and Langton 2006).
We did not venture where unwelcome.
The resulting less ambitious focus on three major mines and associated mining
agreements in three different State/Territory jurisdictions was fortuitous because,
given the challenges inherent in multi-locale research, it allowed for more dense
analysis. While the obvious proviso must be made that we are only examining
three situations, these are nevertheless iconic sites of development contestation
in the Australian context. In the chapters that follow a diversity of social sciences
perspectives on these places is provided although not all authors focus on all
mine sites. Nevertheless, what is provided here is unusual in the Australian
context: a detailed analysis of different aspects of the economic and social impacts
of mining at three different places. Such an approach has historically been
undertaken by, for example, the Social Impact of Uranium Mining study
(Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies 1984) in relation to only one region
(the Alligator Rivers region) but two mines (the Ranger and Nabarlek uranium
mines) and two agreements.
The contributors to this volume were all involved as members of the ARC Linkage
project team at various stages between 2002 and 2007; the chapters were
completed at different times over the past two years and can be read either as
individual essays or as part of a coherent volume. The unifying feature is that
all chapters seek to provide ethnographically-grounded perspectives that
complement and problematise theoretical perspectives, some of which have been
outlined above.
Chapters 2 and 3 are overview chapters. In Chapter 2, Jon Altman provides
analysis of the development situation of Indigenous people in Australia and their
relations with the state and miners. The chapter teases out some of the structural
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tensions in this triangulated relationship before outlining development outcomes
at the three mining regions assessed using official statistics, on one hand, and
local perspectives, on the other. The chapter highlights how outcomes are
differentially interpreted and contested and seeks to offer a possible solution to
this problem by reconciling differing culturally-informed views of development,
using case material. Rather than privileging one view of development over
another, Altman optimistically argues that a model of development that can
accommodate hybridity and diversity is likely to generate outcomes that are
more acceptable to all parties in agreement making.
In Chapter 3, John Taylor outlines approaches to the collection of statistical data
and conceptual issues that are essential to profiling the socioeconomic situation
of Indigenous populations living in the vicinity of major resource extraction
projects. Such data are essential to demarcate and document Indigenous
populations that might be impacted by major mines, but also for ensuring that
goals for Indigenous engagement with mine sites in employment and enterprise
are based on a degree of statistical rigour. Most importantly, Taylor highlights
that if the development impacts of mines are to be measured in any meaningful
way over time, then a statistical base line is needed for comparative purposes.
Ultimately, Taylor asks two crucial questions: What sustainable regional
development outcomes, however measured, can be linked to a major mine, or
what are the limits of mining as a driver of regional development? And what
body of statistics might be needed to assess possibilities and achievements?
In Chapters 4 and 5, Robert Levitus and David Martin provide perspectives on
the role of Aboriginal organisations as agents for development and as the
managers of mining agreements. Both ask how a more favourable engagement
between Indigenous community organisations and miners can be facilitated from
different perspectives. In his contribution, Levitus considers the important role
of Aboriginal organisations in their intended role as agents of development at
the point of articulation between external agencies and the Aboriginal domain.
In Chapter 5, Martin focuses on the governance of mining agreements and their
ability to effectively deliver outcomes sustainably. In particular he highlights
that agreements need to be governed as systems; that agreements need to be
understood as transformative; and finally that agreements need to be seen as
intercultural. Martin makes the crucially important point that governance
capacity, both for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal parties to an agreement,
including governments, need to be strategically developed well ahead of
agreement signing and implementation, as the transformation is made from
adversarial negotiation to cooperation and collaboration after mine start-up.
In Chapter 6, Katherine Trebeck examines an aspect of her doctoral research
that explores the relationship between corporate social responsibility and social
sustainability, assuming that an important aspect of the latter is the capacity of
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Indigenous communities to influence decisions that impact on them. She looks
at four cases: the Century mine negotiations and ‘sit in’ (civil unrest); the
Hammersley (now Pilbara) Iron’s Marandoo dispute; Rio Tinto’s adoption of
corporate social responsibility; and the campaign to stop the Jabiluka uranium
mine where community vigilance has resulted in corporate responsiveness.
Trebeck’s analysis focuses on agency, both within corporations where key
individuals influence corporate responsiveness to community demands utilising
the language of ‘business case’; and within Indigenous organisations where key
individuals provide crucial strategic leadership in sometimes protracted
campaigns. Trebeck provides advice to corporations to assist in understanding
the processes whereby Indigenous organisations represent their usually diverse
constituencies, while concurrently arguing that levers can be mobilised at the
community level to influence and even alter corporate behaviour.
In Chapter 7, Sarah Holcombe focuses on the nature and the diversity of
Indigenous entrepreneurialism and the engagement of Indigenous entrepreneurs
with mining company interests. Her focus is very specifically on Aboriginal
organisations and trusts set up to manage the Yandicoogina Land Use Agreement
in the Pilbara. Holcombe relates the lived experiences of a number of individuals
using biographical case material and raises the crucially important issues of
constraints embedded in agreements that might over-emphasise the interests of
future generations over current generations thus limiting opportunities now;
and also the tensions that invariably arise between individual access to benefits
over group access, issues that have been at the heart of agreement making in
the post-land rights era (Altman 1983). Her research highlights that Indigenous
livelihood initiatives arising from mining agreements do not need to be limited
to mine site employment and enterprise, there are many other ways that the
finances provided in land use agreements can be mobilised to build regional
social, cultural, and political capital and associated economic opportunities.
In Chapter 8, Benedict Scambary provides a summary of his doctoral research
that focuses on Indigenous organisations, and specifically on the perspectives
of the members of these organisational ‘carapaces’, in relation to mining and its
potential for sustainable local development. Scambary is particularly interested
in the impacts of beneficial mining agreements on Indigenous livelihoods in
mine hinterlands and focuses on three, the Ranger Uranium Mine Agreement,
the Yandicoogina Land Use Agreement and the Century Mine Agreement across
three jurisdictions. He provides a critique of the efficacy of such agreements,
arguing that a combination of the depth of Indigenous disadvantage and the
mainstream terms of the agreements themselves hamper their potential to deliver
sustainable outcomes for Indigenous people associated with all three agreements.
In his chapter he argues that a fundamental limitation of these mining agreements
is their incapacity to engage with and augment the diverse livelihood objectives
of Indigenous people which results in ambivalent responses to mining on their
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part. Scambary suggests that successful engagement between the mining industry
and local Indigenous people who reside in mine hinterlands is dependent on
accommodation of existing Indigenous skills and knowledge. Examples abound
from across all three locales he studies of Indigenous people successfully striving
to engage in multifaceted ways with the mainstream economy, and the mine
economy, whilst not compromising their cultural identity and aspirations.
Conclusion
As this monograph is completed, Australia is in the grips of the global financial
crisis and an associated global economic recession. These events might encourage,
one might imagine, a more critical thinking about the role that mining might
play in ensuring sustainable Indigenous development. But there seems to be
little evidence of a healthy scepticism about the risks that a development pathway
closely linked to mining might entail. The Rudd Government has made Closing
the Gap its key Indigenous affairs policy focus, with a halving of the employment
gap in the next 10 years one of its key aims (Council of Australian Governments
2008). There is no doubt that a greater engagement of remote-living Indigenous
people in mine economies is seen as a central plank of this goal that will require
100 000 new jobs in the next decade.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Australian Employment Covenant is the
brainchild of mining magnate Andrew Forrest. It is also of no surprise—but of
some disappointment, as noted at the outset—that Minister Macklin (2008)
focuses primarily on how Indigenous people should spend their agreement
payments on community benefit without any engagement with the issue of
whether such payments are adequate or equitable—arguably the crucial
politico-economic question—or whether traditional owners of land should be
required to quarantine their negotiated compensatory payments for damage to
their land for wider community benefits. These are issues that have had a long
history in Indigenous affairs policy debates (see for example Altman 1983;
Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984; O’Faircheallaigh 2004a, 2006; Trigger 2005).
Mining is fundamental to the wealth of Australia and as the Indigenous estate
has expanded to cover over 20 per cent of the continent there is no doubt that
more and more exploration and mining will occur on Aboriginal land. However
development outcomes are defined—narrowly as conforming to a mainstream
ideal or more broadly to focus on a livelihood—there is no doubt that for decades
now these outcomes have been disappointing from Indigenous, corporate and
state perspectives. It has been surprising just how little rigorous research is
undertaken around Australia on the socioeconomic impacts of mining. While
there are numerous ‘top–down’ statements about the benefits that mining should
deliver, grounded Indigenous viewpoints are under-reported or unheard;
pressure is mounting on Indigenous representative organisations to view mining
as the panacea for regional and Indigenous development.
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Yet even within the three cases on which chapters in this volume focus there
are some clear variations in engagement with, and the impacts of, the mining
sector that are heavily influenced by history, the nature of the local Indigenous
polity and land ownership, and the diversity of Indigenous responses. This in
turn has been greatly shaped by provisions in Australian land rights and native
title laws that play a crucial role in (predictably) creating regional Indigenous
diversity and political conflict by differentiating traditional owners or native
title groups from others living in the region.
Chapters in this volume do not assume that mining is either positive or
negative—there is no advocacy for any particular outcomes in situations where
mining occurs on Aboriginal-owned land—but rather they set out to explore
what has happened at three mine sites from a diversity of perspectives. It is
recognised, though, that mining will be a site for contestation and that
development, however defined, will only occur if Indigenous organisations are
empowered and have capacity to negotiate and manage beneficial agreements
in accord with local and regional Indigenous aspirations which may themselves,
as we shall see, differ. These aspirations will, in all probability, be diverse so
that not all Aboriginal people will seek employment opportunity at mine sites.
Indeed, in some situations Indigenous people might actually seek mining
employment so as to earn incomes to enhance opportunities for futures on
country. In other situations even massive long-life mines with heavy Indigenous
mine site engagements will generate insufficient opportunity to solve Aboriginal
development problems, even if mining were a sustainable regional prospect.
An important question that is raised in this monograph from a social sciences
perspective is whether there is too much collusion between the state and mining
companies that offers a development pathway—concentrated mine
dependence—that is too risky and too divorced from the preferences of many
Indigenous subjects. At the current historical moment, perhaps the choice offered
to remote living Indigenous people is too influenced by the dominant logic of
neo-liberalism: engage with the mainstream as individual subjects or miss out.
Such a stark choice seems to be at loggerheads with other more flexible options
that are essential for sustainable livelihoods for people living on their lands and
in accord with contemporary diverse, but intercultural, preferences. One such
option is encapsulated in the notion of ‘economic hybridity’. The simplistic
choice, modern or customary, that so dominates Australian public and intellectual
debates and that ignores the intercultural needs to be challenged by a
combination of grounded realism and engagement with a subordinate
development discourse that is all too rarely articulated in Australia today. The
essays in this volume ultimately aim to broaden this development debate, while
also providing some insights into how, when mining does occur, one might look
to better outcomes for all parties.
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2. Indigenous communities, miners and
the state in Australia
Jon Altman
Introduction
Economic globalisation, as noted in the previous chapter, has served Australia
well in recent years. Until 2008 this rich developed country was in the grip of
an export-oriented resources boom. Even as much of the country was in severe
drought, the economy continued to expand uninterrupted for 15 years. Australia,
a country of only 20 million people, is the world’s fifteenth largest economy.
This good economic fortune has not been shared by all Australians. The Minerals
Council of Australia (MCA) (2006) notes that 60 per cent of minerals operations
in Australia have neighbouring Indigenous communities, but is concerned that
the Australian Government is not doing enough to support the development of
Indigenous representative structures or investing enough in community
infrastructure and social services in remote and regional Indigenous communities.
The MCA has identified a need for 70 000 additional employees by 2015 and an
opportunity for an alliance between government, the private sector and
Indigenous communities that will allow social, employment and business
opportunities in mining regions to be taken up. While 2008–09 has seen a
substantial number of job losses in the mining sector as a result of the global
recession, demand for mining workers is likely to rapidly increase during the
next phase of global economic growth. As noted in Chapter 1, an optimistic
employment outcome is shared by the Australian Employment Covenant,
although it too might be dampened somewhat in reality by the global financial
crisis. Nevertheless, in recent years the MCA has shifted its rhetorical emphasis
from litigating native title to building sustainable Indigenous communities.
This perspective can be contrasted with the somewhat paternalistic state approach
to Indigenous engagement with the mining industry—promulgating a monolithic
and mainstream development approach and trajectory. Historically, wealth
creation for most Australians has been predicated on expropriation of Aboriginal
lands, initially for agriculture and then also for mining from the nineteenth
century. In the 1970s, new and progressive land rights laws in the Northern
Territory saw much land returned to Aboriginal people, but without mineral
and other resource rights. At most, Aboriginal traditional owners were accorded
free prior informed consent provisions, but even these could be overridden by
national interest provisions.
Since then, and despite the 1992 Mabo No. 2 Australian High Court decision
and native title laws, Indigenous resource rights have been diluted: the Native
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Title Act 1993 (Cwlth) (NTA) framework provides a statutory right to negotiate
but no requirement for Indigenous consent to mine. In the last decade, and
especially between 2004 and 2007, the Howard Government controlled both
Houses of Parliament and moved to disempower Indigenous communities and
to depoliticise their institutions. Counter to emerging international conventions,
especially those in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (paradoxically supported by the Rudd Government on 3 April 2009)
special Indigenous rights to land, livelihoods and resources are not given much
support by the Australian state.
The dominant development approach is now focused on statistical equality for
Indigenous Australians. An emergent narrative has looked to pillory the past
policies of ‘self determination’ as the cause of the contemporary Indigenous
absolute and relative socioeconomic disadvantage that can be tracked with
statistical social indicators from each five-yearly census since 1971 (Altman,
Biddle and Hunter 2008). The new emphasis in situations where there is mining
activity is to emphasise the development opportunity that this presents to
Indigenous communities.
The Indigenous response to this development focus has been mixed. In some
situations mainstream opportunity has been embraced, in others fiercely opposed:
to some extent the two extremes have resulted from the absence of an alternate
development discourse where diverse Indigenous views about development can
gain a legitimate hearing. Such extremes have also been structured by the nature
of statutory provisions for engagement that provide incentive to leverage benefit
from adversarial opposition. The absence of support for alternative livelihood
options has contributed too, with Indigenous communities often facing the
choice between mining or welfare dependence—and increasingly even welfare
is being withdrawn if the mining option is not taken up.
The historical legacy of neglect, poor health, poor housing and poor education
will make Indigenous economic and social integration into the mainstream mining
sector extremely difficult. Somewhat paradoxically, to be in a position to reclaim
traditional lands, claimant groups under the NTA framework must demonstrate
before the courts continuous connection to the land and the maintenance of
custom. At the same time active engagement with the mainstream mining sector
could jeopardise the maintenance of custom and connection bases for claim,
while the latest case law indicates that mining leases extinguish native title and
that the ‘bundle of rights’ that constitute native title do not include contemporary
commercial mineral rights.1
1  See Strelein (2006: 59–77) and her discussion of the redefining of extinguishment in the Western
Australia v Ward High Court decision in 2002. See Glaskin (2003) on the bundle of rights approach to
native title.
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This chapter examines the development situation of Indigenous people in
Australia, focusing on the interactions between them and mining sector
multinational corporations in a developed nation state; and the mediating,
regulating and limiting role fulfilled by state governmentality. In a somewhat
inconsistent manner that will be investigated, the Australian state—that is
committed to economic liberalism in such processes—seems to be voraciously
pursuing a strategy to further disempower Indigenous people in an extremely
uneven power relationship.
Initially, I will provide an analysis that focuses separately, and at a general level,
on the historic and current approaches of the state, miners and Indigenous people
to economic development. I will then draw more specifically but briefly on case
study material from the three major mines: Yandicoogina in the Pilbara, Western
Australia; Ranger (and the adjoining Jabiluka prospect) bordering Kakadu
National Park in the Northern Territory); and the Century mine in the Gulf
region of north Queensland. These three major resource development projects
respectively mine iron ore, uranium and zinc and lead.
Whether the opportunities presented by these major mines on Aboriginal land
have generated development outcomes, and according to whose criteria, is a
major issue that animates the analytical section on development contestation.
The notions of ‘power’ and ‘identity’ loom large in this analysis. A final section
challenges the currently dominant view of development focused on ‘practical
reconciliation’ (a term coined by the Howard Government largely to discredit
the symbolic aspects of reconciliation) and Closing the Gap (that is, socioeconomic
equality) by exploring an alternate view that emphasises choice, self
determination and cultural continuity, possibly at the expense of material
prosperity (Altman and Rowse 2005: 176).
Scene setting: The overall context
Australia is a continent of some 7.7 million square kilometres that until 1788
was occupied by between 250 000 and 750 000 Indigenous peoples. Colonisation
of the continent occurred incrementally over the following 150 years, with this
process clearly impacting on the ability of Indigenous peoples to maintain links
with their ancestral lands and pre-colonial economic base. As land was
expropriated, Indigenous marginalisation and relative poverty was created.
While the converse view that return of the land will somehow magically fix the
Indigenous development problem today has some intuitive appeal, it also has
major shortcomings.
Australia is a liberal democratic federation of eight States and Territories with
a population of 20 million people, just over 500 000 of whom are Indigenous
(just over 2 per cent of the total). Reliable information on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islanders was not readily available before 1971. It was only after an
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amendment to the Australian Constitution Act 1901 in 1967 that s.127, which
excluded Indigenous Australians from the census count, was repealed. From the
1971 Census, Indigenous people could self-identify and were included in this
manner in official statistics. In each of eight censuses the segment of the
population that can be identified as Indigenous (owing to the inclusion of a
voluntary self-identifying question on Aboriginality from 1971) has fared far
worse on socioeconomic indicators than the non-Indigenous population.
Numerous analyses since the late 1970s (summarised in Altman and Rowse 2005;
Altman, Biddle and Hunter 2008) have highlighted this, although many also
caution against reliance on culture-relative ‘western science’ social indicators.
Information from five-yearly censuses over 35 years is analysed in five broad
areas—employment, education, income, housing and health—in Altman, Biddle
and Hunter (2008). The data indicate that while absolute Indigenous well-being
at an aggregate national level has improved, relative well-being has improved
much less and has stagnated in recent years. The one outstanding indicator of
Indigenous disadvantage that has barely shifted since 1971 is Indigenous life
expectancy. This is estimated at 17 years lower for Indigenous Australians
compared to the rest of the population, at the national level.
Australia is a so-called strong state, covering a minerals-rich continent. In recent
years it has established a reputation as a country with low sovereign risk: its
relative isolation that historically constituted a competitive disadvantage is now
a positive in terms of isolation and freedom from risk of terrorism. Yet within
this rich, post-colonial, post-industrial society is a marginalised Indigenous
minority, some of whom live in conditions that are far worse than official statistics
and averaging depict.
The state
The state2  has loomed large in the lives of Indigenous Australians. Colonisation
in 1788 was an instrument of British state policy. The history of state policy is
greatly complicated by the emergence in the nineteenth century of an Australia
compromising six colonies each of which developed its own policies for dealing
with its Indigenous inhabitants. Generally, special laws set Indigenous
Australians apart from other colonial citizens for their ‘protection’: the purpose
of this can be interpreted optimistically as either a means to prepare Aborigines
for future full citizenship or to ‘smooth the pillow for a dying race’ (Altman and
Sanders 1991: 1). After federation of the six colonies into the Commonwealth of
Australia in 1901, the new State governments continued to manage their
2 The nature of the state is complicated in Australia by the federal system that views Indigenous people
as both citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia and of States and Territories. In general, mining is
regulated by State and Territory governments, but the focus here is on the Commonwealth government
and its bureaucratic apparatus and institutions, in part because it sets the broad policy frameworks for
mining and Indigenous affairs.
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Indigenous minorities; the Australian Constitution excluded the Federal
Government from an active role in Indigenous affairs, except in the Northern
Territory which was ceded to the Commonwealth from South Australia in 1911.
By the 1950s it became clear that the Indigenous population was not disappearing;
it was officially estimated at between 70 000 and 80 000, representing about
1 per cent of the total Australian population. From then assimilation became the
central term of policy although it was only officially defined in 1961. The policy
of assimilation operated by providing exemptions for individual Aborigines
from the special bodies of laws that continued to be exercised over all Aborigines
(until they could prove worthiness for normal citizenship). Assimilated
Aborigines could take their place as full members of Australian society without
any separate legal status. In some jurisdictions colonial state policy sought to
centralise, sedenterise and assimilate Indigenous people in government
settlements and missions on reserves up until the early 1970s. By then there was
mounting evidence that the policy of economically and culturally integrating
Indigenous people into the majority mainstream society was not working,
especially in remote regions where state colonisation had arrived relatively late,
in some cases in the 1950s.
It was only from the 1970s that federal approaches to Australia’s Indigenous
minority underwent significant change, with self determination becoming the
central term of Indigenous affairs policy for a short period. Suddenly there was
a rapid escalation in federal involvement in Indigenous affairs including a
dedicated government department, an elected Indigenous representative
organisation, Indigenous specific programs, the establishment of thousands of
community-based organisations to locally administer programs, and a bold start
in the creation of laws to enshrine land rights for Indigenous Australians.
It is the last development that is of greatest significance to the discussion here.
The Woodward Land Rights Commission of 1974 (Woodward 1974a, 1974b)
recommended a statutory land rights regime for the Northern Territory, a
jurisdiction still administered from Canberra. This was a political commitment
by the incoming Whitlam Government to address the perceived social injustice
of the Gove land rights case where the plaintiffs sought to stop the development
of a massive bauxite resource development project in north-east Arnhem Land.
The plaintiffs lost the case in the Northern Territory Supreme Court in 1970,
but just six years later the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
(Cwlth) (ALRA) was passed. This statute created a special form of land title,
communal inalienable freehold title, to be held by land trusts and managed by
statutory authorities called land councils. While the Woodward Land Rights
Commission did not recommend conferring of legal mineral rights on land owners,
it did recommend that Indigenous traditional owners of land have a right
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tantamount to free prior informed consent over commercial development. This
is often referred to as the right of veto.
The ALRA had many innovative and important provisions including a land
claims mechanism (although this is limited to unalienated Crown land) and a
statutory financial framework that saw the equivalent of mining royalties raised
on Aboriginal land shared between people in areas affected by mining (30 per
cent), the administrative costs of land councils (40 per cent) and other Indigenous
interests in the Northern Territory (up to 30 per cent). The right of veto
constituted a tradable de facto property right in minerals because there is
provision to negotiate payments for consent (see Altman 1983; Industry
Commission 1991). The establishment of land councils provided traditional
owners with statutory authorities empowered to claim land on their behalf and
to represent them in negotiations with resource developers. Meeting the
administrative costs from mining royalty equivalents paid by the Commonwealth
was an innovative means to provide them budgetary certainty and a degree of
independence from the government of the day.
Subsequently some other Australian States passed land rights laws, but none
have been as comprehensive as the ALRA.3 While the Whitlam Government
had intended this land rights law to be the benchmark for other States, no
subsequent Federal government was willing to introduce national land rights.
Indeed an attempt to do so in 1984 by the Hawke Labor Government became an
electorally contentious issue, especially in Western Australia where proposals
for State land rights law following the Seaman Inquiry were jettisoned by the
Burke State Labor Government after a virulent anti-land rights campaign mounted
by the Western Australian Chamber of Mines (Libby 1989).
The 1992 Mabo judgment, that jettisoned the concept of terra nullius and
recognised that Indigenous native title could exist in Australian common law,
was the precursor to the NTA. This law was as much about validating existing
non-Indigenous interests in land as about providing opportunity for native title
to be claimed over unalienated Crown land and pastoral leasehold land. The
State where native title was most likely to be determined was Western Australia
because over 34 per cent of the State (or 863 000 square kilometres) remained
vacant Crown land in 1993. Consequently, the Western Australia Government
initially refused to accept Commonwealth native title law and instead passed it
own Land Titles and Traditional Usage legislation that was challenged and
deemed unacceptable in the High Court. Pastoral leasehold land that covers over
40 per cent of Australia was shown in the High Court Wik decision of 1996 to
be potentially compatible with native title. This resulted in amendments to
weaken native title law in 1998 by the Howard Government largely to privilege
3  For a detailed recent summary see Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner
(ATSISJC) (2006).
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the commercial interests of miners over native title interests in the name of
workability.
Strelein (2006) has recently referred to native title case law since Mabo as
‘compromised jurisprudence’. It is extremely complicated law that has
nevertheless seen native title determinations (some exclusive possession, some
partial) over an estimated 8 per cent of Australia (Altman, Buchanan and Larsen
2007). Native title has seen the establishment of new institutions including native
title representative bodies (to represent native title claimants); a National Native
Title Tribunal based in Perth, Western Australia to register native title claims
(that then are heard in the Federal Court) and to mediate Indigenous Land Use
Agreements; and Prescribed Bodies Corporate to hold native title in perpetuity
once determined. The emergent institutional landscape is extremely complex.
What is especially significant is that the native title legal framework provides
native title interests (claimants and holders) no special rights over minerals
beyond negotiation rights. The so-called right to negotiate is just that but if
agreement to proceed cannot be met in a strictly stipulated time frame of six
months, then an arbitral process allows mining to proceed with compensation
determined without recourse to the value of minerals. This mechanism is intended
to hasten agreement making between resource developers and Indigenous parties,
with commercial deals possible within the six-month window of opportunity
with registered claimants as well as determined native title groups. To date,
most agreements have been made with claimants.4
It is estimated that 1.5 million square kilometres is now held under some form
of Indigenous title. As Fig. 2.1 shows, these land holdings are heavily skewed
in favour of regional and remote Australia owing to colonial history that saw
only land of low commercial value reserved for Aboriginal use or unalienated.
It is estimated that only about 100 000 Indigenous people, or about 20 per cent
of the ‘officially enumerated’ Indigenous population, live on their now legally
recognised ancestral lands increasingly referred to as ‘the Indigenous estate’ (see
Altman, Buchanan and Larsen 2007).
What is especially important for the discussion is the broad new direction that
was taken by successive Howard Governments from 1996 to 2007, during which
time there emerged a narrative to the effect that policies over the past 30 years
have failed to deliver ‘development’ and that land rights and native title laws
introduced for a number of broad rationales (see ATSISJC 2006: 16ff) are
implicated in this failure. The ALRA is the iconic ‘high water mark’ statute that
has been targeted for special focus with a major review (Reeves 1998)
recommending fundamental changes, subsequently rejected by a Parliamentary
4  See the comprehensive Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Database accessed 22 February
2007, <http://www.atns.net.au/>.
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Inquiry (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs 1999).
These proposed amendments were reintroduced in 2004 when it became clear
that the Federal Government would gain rare absolute power with control of
both Houses of Parliament for the period July 2005–November 2007. Amendments
to the ALRA passed in 2006 were aimed at facilitating enhanced exploration and
mining on Aboriginal owned land as made clear in Explanatory Memoranda.5
It was assumed that benefits would trickle through to Aboriginal communities,
a view that has been challenged by the Productivity Commission (Steering
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 2005). The policy
approach here is confused and contradictory: Indigenous representative
organisations have been weakened; and incentives to consent to mining have
been reduced, as benefit streams need to be applied to community purposes that
are arguably the domain of the state. At once neoliberal policy is highlighting
the need to incentivate individuals and families, while overlooking that it is not
only excluding individuals from direct benefit but also failing to recognise
alternate cultural and environmental values of the Indigenous estate.
Multinational corporations
Mining in Australia is dominated by large multinational corporations, as evident
by listings on the Australian Stock Exchange and membership of the principal
industry lobby group the MCA6 : it is estimated that 80–85 per cent of mineral
production in Australia is undertaken by multinational corporations.
Historically in Australia mining companies have allied with the state (both
Commonwealth and State/Territory) to override Indigenous views about resource
development on their lands. There are some situations that have seen
extraordinarily unbalanced conflicts between the pro-mining state and large
mining companies on one side and the opposing Indigenous communities on the
other. The Gove case, where the mining company Nabalco was joined by the
Australian Government in opposing Milrrpum and others, has already been
mentioned. There have been other examples, such as Comalco on western Cape
York where the Aboriginal community of Mapoon was forcibly closed and its
residents removed to make way for mining in 1963; Noonkanbah and the Argyle
Diamond Mine in the Kimberley region; and iron ore in the Pilbara region of
Western Australia. In a landmark study in the early 1980s, Cousins and
Nieuwenhuysen (1984) looked at each of these sites and illustrated how
Indigenous people with limited, at times non-existent, rights opposed mining
5  ‘The principal objectives are to improve access to Aboriginal land for development, especially mining
… ’ (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2006: 3).
6  See <http://www.minerals.org.au/> and especially the MCA’s Board of Directors dominated by major
multinational corporations; the MCA is funded by member contributions made on a sliding scale based
on economic size.
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on their lands. They also illustrated with quantitative data that Indigenous
peoples benefited little from major mining activity on their lands and adjacent
to their communities. In all the cases of conflict, the state, keen to see resource
development and associated regional development (but not necessarily for
Indigenous people), sided with miners.7
The mining industry’s relations with the state in terms of land rights and native
title have waxed and waned in the last 30 years but have fundamentally been
oppositional, seeing consent or negotiation provisions where the state has
supported land rights as just another regulatory hurdle in the way of unimpeded
access to Aboriginal land for mineral exploration and exploitation. The Australian
Mining Industry Council (as the MCA was then known) strongly opposed land
rights in the 1970s, strongly opposed national land rights in the early 1980s,
and mounted a very effective campaign (with television advertisements) against
Western Australia land rights in 1984 (see Libby 1989). Similarly the mining
industry strongly opposed the passage of native title legislation in 1993 and
made representation for the dilution of land rights and native title in the 1990s.
This was especially evident in the lead up to amendments to the NTA in 1998
that effectively removed the right to negotiate for native title groups on the
pastoral estate that covers 40 per cent of Australia.
Much of this changed from the mid-1990s with one company, Rio Tinto, taking
a strong leadership role. Its then chairman, Leon Davis, challenged the mining
industry to work within the existing native title statutory framework rather
than continuing to oppose it (Davis 1995).8 There has also been a growing
recognition of the extent of Indigenous disadvantage and the contemporary
strains on communities’ social fabric associated with large scale development.
The Rio Tinto booklet The Way We Work (published regularly) indicates a
cautious recognition that mining companies might need to be the catalyst for
sustainable regional development, especially in the absence of other commercial
opportunity. This corporate shift has been influenced by the weak leverage that
native title law provides, as well as events at Bougainville and Ok Tedi in nearby
Papua New Guinea which demonstrate the complexity of issues circulating
around national sovereignty, democratic governance, local community and
business autonomy (Kirsch 2006).
Improved global communications and globalisation have made mining companies
more accountable transnationally and have made competitive advantage partially
7 The one exception to this general rule occurred with the Coronation Hill dispute, where the Hawke
Government in 1991 accepted the recommendation of the Resource Assessment Commission to disallow
mining in the southern part of World Heritage Kakadu National Park. This exceptional decision was
based on both environmental grounds and Indigenous opposition on cultural/religious grounds. It was
a cause celebre that resulted in a considerable political backlash.
8  Research about Rio Tinto reported here has focused on some of its operations in remote Australia,
and none of its operations in settled Australia or globally.
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dependent on community relations track record. Concomitant with the increased
power to trade that economic liberalism has brought to transnational capital is
a growing international interest in how mining companies might demonstrate a
commitment to socially sustainable development. However, the ethical
requirement to profit share rarely extends beyond the requirement to gain licence
to operate.
Harvey (2004) outlines how, in the Australian context, Rio Tinto is keen to
operate as a good corporate citizen and in a socially responsible way. Rio Tinto’s
recent policy changes mean that it now seeks to make agreements with Indigenous
peoples well-represented by their own organisations, with agreements always
signed off by the state (usually with major agreements at both Commonwealth
and State/Territory levels). Modern agreements seek to deal directly with local
Indigenous land owners, although as we shall see below, this can be a problematic
interest group to unambiguously define and target; and to ensure that benefits
are utilised for regional development. In parts of remote Australia, it is large
mining companies that sometimes make the significant social investments that
are the responsibility of the state, in part because historically the development
of new mining towns was a condition of licence to operate. As Holcombe (2006)
notes, in regions like the Pilbara these towns were initially closed to Indigenous
people, being earmarked for mine site personnel only.
In the past the peak mining lobby group, now the MCA, often sided with the
state counter to Indigenous interests, especially in relation to diluting land and
native title rights (as noted above). Through the MCA, some mining companies
have had the ability to influence state policies that have resulted in changes to
laws that have directly benefited their interests.9  More recently, the MCA has
developed an overarching position of looking for strategic partnerships with
Indigenous communities and leaders, the latter through its Indigenous Leaders
Dialogue, and by sponsoring meetings between the National Native Title Council
(the peak association for native title representative bodies), the MCA and senior
industry representatives.10  In its Indigenous Relations Strategic Framework,
the MCA notes that there are now over 300 agreements between minerals
companies and Indigenous communities throughout Australia. By necessity the
MCA interacts with remote Indigenous communities, many of which have poor
public service delivery owing to remoteness. There are limited mainstream
economic development opportunities at such communities and often the minerals
industry claims that it is the only vehicle for socioeconomic development (MCA
2004).
9  Also, some companies operate less ethically than others, as noted in an assessment of 45 mining
agreements by O’Faircheallaigh (2004a).
10  See <http://www.minerals.org.au/>.
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The challenges that the minerals industry faces in its relations with Indigenous
communities though are significant. Some are legal and structural—for example,
a recent High Court decision in Western Australia v Ward judged that historic
mining leases extinguish native title, which places mining companies and
Indigenous claimants in direct political conflict. Similarly, the inevitable
environmental damage caused by mining activity places it in conflict with those
Indigenous interests that accord high value to the cultural and physical landscape.
Also, the minerals industry defines economic development in a similar vein as
the state: in western and mainstream terms of jobs, commercial opportunities
and incomes. The industry is increasingly recognising that it needs to be careful
not to take on state-like functions, because meeting the significant backlog could
jeopardise a project’s profitability. This is evident in the MCA’s increased
willingness to criticise governments for poor delivery of essential community
social and physical infrastructure like education and health services and housing
and water (MCA 2004: 5).
The new positioning of the MCA suggests that its members are more willing to
ally with Indigenous communities in their quest for greater needs-based service
delivery and independent representative bodies (MCA 2006). However the
fundamental issue of what might constitute the sustainable economic legacy that
the mining industry might leave Indigenous communities is rarely addressed.
It is clear that even if all opportunities at mine sites were taken up by Indigenous
people, eventually the mine will close—so mine dependence, like state
dependence, can be very risky.
Indigenous rights and economic levers
As already noted, while the 2006 Census estimated the size of the Indigenous
population at just over 500 000, the colonisation process and the subsequent
mechanisms for returning land to Aboriginal people under land rights and native
title laws have meant two things. First, returned land has by and large been
limited to unalienated Crown land in an inverse relationship to the colonial
settlement pattern.11  Consequently, most is remote and has very limited
commercial value. Second, returned land is very inequitably bestowed. Exact
figures are not available, but in spatial terms Indigenous land holdings are only
significant in three jurisdictions: the Northern Territory (just over 600 000 square
kilometres), in South Australia (just over 200 000 square kilometres), and in
Western Australia (just over 360 000 square kilometres). These figures are
conservative and do not include native title determinations that are seeing
Aboriginal reserves and leasehold in Western Australia rapidly converted to
11 There is a history of programs established by the state to purchase land for Indigenous groups,
mainly for commercial pastoral and agricultural purposes. In 1995, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Land Fund was established to provide land for Indigenous people whose native title had been
extinguished, see <http://www.ilc.gov.au/>.
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exclusive native title possession, often after lengthy litigation.12  In New South
Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory there is little
Indigenous owned land, with some in recent times being purchased and then
vested with Indigenous traditional owner groups.13
There are no data that accurately quantify the total number of Indigenous people
who are land owners or who live on Aboriginal land. Two proxies are often
used. The first is the number of Indigenous people residing at about 1200 discrete
Indigenous communities mostly located on Indigenous owned or managed lands.
This figure is estimated in official statistics at between 100 000 and 120 000
(Altman 2006). The second is the number of Indigenous people living in regions
classified in census geography as remote and very remote; this figure is just over
120 000 (Taylor 2006: 5). It is these people who interact most frequently with
mining companies in relation to exploration and mining on their lands.
As already noted, land rights and native title provide a variety of weak forms
of property (resource) rights to Indigenous land owners, ranging from full
property rights to a limited range of minerals in two jurisdictions (New South
Wales and Tasmania) at the strong end, to a mere right of consultation under
amended native title law at the weak end. In reality, the strongest property
rights are the right of consent provisions of the ALRA. Even here problems
remain owing to the conjunction between exploration and mining14  and the
absence of opportunity to disengage if the impacts of long-life intergenerational
mines are socially or environmentally negative. Again two qualifications are
important (Altman 2001a). First, all land rights and native title laws passed in
Australia have guaranteed that existing mining interests will prevail; so-called
‘prior (commercial) interest’. Second, a series of High Court decisions in land
and sea native title claims to date have ruled that commercial (usually
non-Indigenous) interests always take precedence over customary Indigenous
interests.
The clear message is that Indigenous interests are subordinate to commercial
interests in Australian society today. Yet the mechanisms available if Indigenous
interests want to engage commercially are limited, as if the dice are doubly
loaded against Indigenous people.15  For example, a shortcoming of the available
political and economic levers to consent or negotiate is not only that they can
12  See native title claim and determination maps at <http://www.nntt.gov.au/>.
13  For a spatial summary see Fig. 1, Pollack (2001) and Altman, Buchanan and Larsen (2007); for a
discussion of land rights regimes see ATSISJC (2005) and for native title determinations see the National
Native Title Tribunal website <http://www.nntt.gov.au/>.
14 While in Australian policy and popular discourse it is common to speak of the Indigenous right to
veto mining, in reality Indigenous interests at best have a right to veto exploration; changes to Northern
Territory land rights law in 1987 meant that traditional owners could not exercise the veto over mining
once exploration had been approved.
15  For a recent analysis of the quality of agreements struck see O’Faircheallaigh (2004a) and for an
analysis of the imbalance in arbitrated decisions see Corbett and O’Faircheallaigh (2006).
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be overridden, but that they are most effective at the pre-production phase of
a resource development project.
Interestingly the dominant neo-liberal focus on individualism, entrepreneurship
and profit maximisation does not extend to Indigenous peoples in the mining
context. Under all statutes there are some—at times hotly contested—legal
mechanisms for land owners whose lands are affected by mining to distribute
any compensatory benefits from mining companies to other regional Indigenous
interests, irrespective of social or economic affectedness. The purpose for which
compensation is paid is unresolved in Australian law and policy. As has been
discussed elsewhere (Altman 1983, 2001a) it is unclear if compensation is paid
as a share of mineral rent (in which case it should go to land owners) or as a
means to offset social and economic disruption, in which case it should be
targeted to such purposes.
In the case of the native title legal framework it is clear that compensation is
payable for impairment of native title rights, but mechanisms embedded in the
right to negotiate process actually seek to expedite agreement making by getting
resource developers and native title interests to make agreements rather than
seek compensation determinations by the National Native Title Tribunal or court
system. In this process, the value of a mine can be considered in agreement
making, but not in compensation determinations. The very fact that the language
of compensation is used suggests that there is an expectation of negative impacts
from resource development (Altman and Pollack 1998).
Indigenous aspirations for engagements with mining companies are highly
variable, even for traditional owner groups and other Indigenous interests in
mine hinterlands. It is not surprising to have a diversity of views ranging from
pragmatic acquiescence to mainstream views of development, to total opposition
based on fundamental and at times culturally-based opposition to mining,
unavoidable environmental damage, and the possible desecration of sacred sites.
It is rarely appreciated that for many Indigenous groups the landscape is both
a source of livelihood and the essence of the Dreaming, the sentient landscape
being created according to Indigenous ontology by Ancestoral Beings.
For Indigenous people who have an interest in land and who are likely to engage
with resource development, two fundamental contradictions arise. First, many
Indigenous groups have had to fight hard to reclaim their land under Australian
law. In general, this has placed a legal burden on Indigenous claimants to
demonstrate spiritual attachment or right to forage over the land claimed (under
the ALRA) or continuity of customary practice and connection with claimed
native title land. Such continuity of customary practice is clearly incompatible
with mining because mining disrupts connection and is incompatible with the
maintenance of custom. Second, is the issue of sustainable livelihoods. It is
broadly unclear how Indigenous people are to retain sustainable livelihood
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futures after mine closure. Non-Indigenous (or non-local Indigenous) mine
workers might simply migrate to the next mine, but for Indigenous people living
on their ancestral lands this might not be an option. Paradoxically, the greater
Indigenous integration into the mine economy the greater is the likelihood of
localised livelihood vulnerability after closure; and the greater the vulnerability
to loss of cultural connection to the land that is predicated on living on country.
As Bridge (2004) illustrates graphically with reference to mineral-to-waste ratios,
large scale mineral producers often operate at environmental regulatory limits.
Pollution, even as weak chemically-active waste streams, can threaten livelihoods
that are dependent on wildlife harvesting.
Development outcomes
Under the enormous contemporary pressures exerted by the state to homogenise
and mainstream approaches to Indigenous development, any divisions within
the Indigenous domain are exploited often to the detriment of Indigenous
bargaining power. The outcomes from interactions between miners and
Indigenous people mediated by the state can be understood from two
perspectives: mainstream criteria and local perceptions.
The development outcomes from engagement between miners and Indigenous
peoples have been highly variable and dependent on many factors including
regional histories of colonisation, the nature of mines, the value of negotiated
benefits packages, and the forms of Indigenous engagement with the mine
economy. As suggested above, notions of development are culturally constructed
and never easy to objectively measure. In the general absence of comprehensive
frameworks to independently monitor development outcomes, any study is
generally limited to either using official statistics that have not been purpose
designed to socioeconomic impact assessment or to undertaking case studies (see
Taylor, Chapter 3). A problem with the former approach is that it requires implicit
acceptance of the dominant modernisation framework and leaves no room for
local perspectives; data are generated from standard census instruments. A
problem with the latter is that it can be difficult to make comparisons and to
move from the particular to the general. Both approaches are briefly examined
here.
Formal outcomes and social indicators
The formal approach in this research project used 2001 Census data for
cross-sectional comparative purposes. These data were made available to the
project in 2006 at an unusual level of geographic disaggregation. The analysis
examined health, education, income, employment and housing social indicators
as collected in the census. Eight remote regions with major mines were
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statistically clustered together.16 The analysis undertaken in Table 2.1 compares
the socioeconomic status of Indigenous people in this mining aggregation with
a number of other aggregations: people in adjacent regions, people in remote
areas with major tourism destinations, control areas in remote locations where
commercial opportunity is largely absent, and then all Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians. This suggests that there are positive statistical
outcomes for Indigenous people from mining activity. In Table 2.2 this
socioeconomic information is provided at the level of individual regions within
major mine sites. These are the data that were aggregated in Table 2.1. A major
qualification for this analysis is that it does not take into account the possibility
that in some cases other significant opportunities besides mining might be
available in the eight selected regions.
There are indications from Table 2.1 that mining does make a difference in
outcomes, according to the statistical social indicators available, although clearly
the economic status of Indigenous people in mining areas does not approach
that of non-Indigenous Australians. Furthermore, at the individual mine site
level there are clear indications that employed Indigenous people do not do as
well as non-Indigenous mine workers (ABS 2004). Information in Table 2.2
suggests that there is enormous variability between mining regions.
The social indicators in these tables raise two important issues. First, they
demonstrate how badly off Indigenous people are compared to other Australians
according to mainstream criteria. This, as we shall see below, raises concerns
about whether mining strategies can ‘close the gaps’ in socioeconomic outcomes.
Second, the tables demonstrate how difficult it is to generate appropriate census
geographies that can actually measure the impact of major resource developments
on host or adjacent communities using official data (see Taylor, Chapter 3). In
reality, the impacts on supposed beneficiaries can only be assessed at the local
level on a case by case basis. But even at this level, identifying who has benefited
can be extremely problematic.
16 The eight regions are: Gove/Groote Eylandt/Jabiru/East Kimberley/West Cape York/
Borroloola/Gulf/Pilbara respectively operated by Alcoa/BHP Billiton (GEMCO)/Rio Tinto (ERA)/Rio
Tinto (Argyle Diamond Mine)/Rio Tinto (Comalco)/Xstrata/Zinifex/Rio Tinto (Pilbara Iron), BHP
Billiton,Woodside.
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Table 2.1 Social indicator outcomes at mine site and some other jurisdictions,
2001 Census
Aged 55 years+ (%)Aged 55 years+Aged under 55Demography/health statusa
7.21 25516 306Mining areas
7.52873 522Control areas: Tourism
6.91832 464Control areas: Other
6.727 583382 420Australia: Indigenous
22.03 874 47713 717 012Australia: Non-Indigenous
Completed Year 10 or
higher (%)
Completed Year 10 or
higher
Not completed Year 10Education status
51.85 0374 694Mining areas
36.67591 313Control areas: Tourism
6.91832 464Control areas: Other
61.2131 93383 616Australia: Indigenous









EmployedNot employedEmployment rate (aged 15+)
47.04 9535 576Mining areas
34.27831 510Control Areas: Tourism
31.05211 162Control areas: Other
41.7100 393140 466Australia: Indigenous











33.437 13174 047Australia: Indigenous
72.74 531 5971 703 078Australia: Non-Indigenous
a. Proportion of population aged 55+ years used as a proxy for life expectancy; for further discussion see
Altman, Biddle and Hunter 2008.
Source: ABS 2001 Census of Population and Housing.
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Table 2.2 Social indicator outcomes in eight mining regions, 2001 Census
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a. Proportion of population aged 55+ years used as a proxy for life expectancy; for further discussion see
Altman, Biddle and Hunter 2008. Source: ABS 2001 Census of Population and Housing.
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Local views about outcomes
An analysis of local situations is clearly enormously complicated and an attempt
is made here to briefly canvass issues that arise in the three cases, the Ranger
Uranium Mine (Northern Territory), the Yandicoogina Iron Ore Mine (Western
Australia) and the Century Zinc and Lead Mine (Queensland) (see Fig. 2.1) that
are given more coverage in later chapters. In each case major benefit sharing
agreements have been completed: in the case of Ranger signed in 1978 under
the ALRA; in the case of Yandi as an Indigenous Land Use Agreement completed
outside, but informed by, the native title framework in 1997; and in the case of
Century under the NTA right to negotiate procedures. These are three landmark
and major agreements in the Australian context and a brief examination of each
will show that regional studies suggest that outcomes might be far less beneficial
than official statistics suggest. By looking at particular agreements it is possible
to also dig a little deeper to look at environmental, social, cultural and other
impacts that go beyond the criteria dictated by a limited range of mainstream
social indicators.
Fig. 2.1 The location of the three case studies
Case 1: The Ranger Uranium Mine agreement
The Ranger Uranium Agreement was the first major post-ALRA mining agreement
completed. It has many unusual features: it was a prior interest mining prospect,
so the right of veto could not be exercised; the Australian Government was a
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major stakeholder in the uranium project so was in a conflict of interest as a
party both to the mine and the agreement with traditional owners; and the
agreement was signed as part of a regional deal that included the creation of
Stage 1 of Kakadu National Park and a settled land claim (Fox, Kelleher and Kerr
1977). The Ranger Agreement covered a range of issues including benefit flows,
employment at the mine, and environmental protections. In its early days, it
was judged to be a very positive agreement. The Gagudju Association, a specially
incorporated regional organisation, received ‘areas affected’ monies. These monies
were utilised between 1981 and 1996 to provide services to about 300 members;
to make investments, especially in tourism infrastructure and enterprises in
Kakadu National Park; and to make limited cash payments to its members. Since
1978, royalty equivalents of over $A200 million have been paid in relation to
this mine, with over $A60 million flowing back to the region under the ALRA
formula.
The very positive story of the Gagudju Association soured somewhat from the
mid-1990s after the traditional owners of the mine site, the Mirarr Gundjeihmi,
sought the re-channelling of areas affected monies to a far smaller group of 26
adult traditional owners. The cause of this change was evident in a politically
complex dispute that had its genesis in two key issues (Altman 1997). First, the
Mirarr were concerned that mining had had a negative impact on local Aboriginal
people. Second, and related to this, they opposed the mining of another major
uranium prospect, Jabiluka, that has lain dormant since 1983 owing to the
Commonwealth Labor Government’s 1983–96 freeze on new uranium mines. A
subsequent comprehensive social impact study, the Kakadu Region Social Impact
Study (1997b, 1997c) undertaken by two groups17  broadly supported traditional
owner concerns. It was noted, for example, that mining payments had generated
regional conflict and were largely offset by reduced state expenditure in the
provision of normal citizenship services on a needs basis. A study using available
social indicators demonstrated that Aboriginal people in the mine catchments
were no better off than people in adjoining regions (Taylor 1999).
A recent report, ‘Aborigines and Uranium: Monitoring and Health Hazards’
(Tatz et al. 2006), documents high cancer rates in the region, which has generated
vigorous debate about whether these are linked to uranium or not. Since 1981
there have been more than 120 spillages and leaks of contaminated water at the
mine; a major spill in 2004 resulted in temporary mine closure and subsequent
successful prosecution by the Northern Territory Government in 2005 for breach
of environmental regulations. The predictions of the Fox Inquiry in 1977 that
mining in the region could have negative social impacts appear to have been
17 The Kakadu Region Social Impact Study was undertaken by a mainly local Aboriginal Project
Committee (1997b) and a mainly external Study Advisory Committee (1997c). I was the independent
expert to the latter.
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prescient. There is little evidence of sustainable economic benefits from the mine
whose life has now been extended to beyond 2020 owing to an increase in the
price of uranium oxide in recent years. Local Aboriginal people are reluctant to
work at the mine; those who are ‘job ready’ prefer instead to take up jobs in the
national park or in tourism, although the unemployment rate for locals remains
high.
Case 2: The Yandicoogina Land Use Agreement (YLUA)
The YLUA was the first major post-NTA agreement, but it was completed as a
negotiated agreement outside the NTA framework. The signatories were
Hamersley Iron (now Pilbara Iron, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto) and
the Gumala Aboriginal Corporation representing 430 Nyiyapareli, Banyjima and
Yinhawangka people. The agreement covers an area of approximately 26 000
square kilometres. Initially the agreement was to provide $A60 million to the
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation over 20 years, but a scaling up of production at
Pilbara Iron’s Yandi mine and a confidential payments schedule might see
payments ramped up, possibly over a shorter period.18
The YLUA was completed in the Pilbara, a region where Aboriginal people had
historically been actively involved in mining on a small ‘cottage’ scale until
driven off by large scale development and state policies in the 1960s (Holcombe
2006). As noted earlier, Western Australia is the only jurisdiction in Australia
that has no land rights law and the State government has always taken a very
pro-mining position, often in the face of significant Aboriginal opposition. The
YLUA was seen positively a decade ago as possibly being the harbinger of a new
era in relations between mining companies and Indigenous people: its focus is
on the provision of jobs, training, and business enterprise opportunities for local
people. A major element in the agreement is site clearances which are required
under the Western Australia Aboriginal Heritage Act for broad acre open cut
iron ore extraction; this weak statute requires that sites of cultural significance
be recorded and that any movable cultural objects be relocated. Rather than
contracting heritage clearance work to an independent third party, Pilbara Iron
manages this process in collaboration with Aboriginal consultants in a manner
that could be perceived as problematic (Holcombe 2006). This situation has
evolved for historical reasons when Indigenous representative organisations
were not operating effectively in the region.
A recent comprehensive study by Taylor and Scambary (2005) analysed regional
statistical social indicators, while also seeking detailed Indigenous views about
development impacts. On the statistical side it was shown that employment
status for Indigenous people had barely changed for 30 years despite
18  It is noteworthy that the extensive Yandi deposit is mined by both Rio Tinto-owned Pilbara Iron
and BHP Billiton who have a separate agreement with a similar group of native title interests.
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multinational corporations like Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton setting ambitious
employment targets for Indigenous employment. The authors found that, despite
strong demand for Indigenous labour, there were significant problems on the
supply side owing to poor education, health, substance abuse and high interaction
with the criminal justice system. Much of this was linked to state neglect over
the past 40 years. From the Indigenous perspective, there was disappointment
that the YLUA appeared focused primarily on mainstream outcomes associated
with engagement with the Yandi mine, rather than in meeting the diverse
aspirations of local people that included living at small outstation communities
and engaging in non-mainstream economic activity. In particular, there was
concern that the YLUA tied up compensatory payments in trusts that could not
be accessed by supposed beneficiaries. Scambary (2007) summarises this in a
widely articulated local sentiment: ‘We’ve got the richest trusts but the poorest
people’.
Case 3: The Century Mine agreement
This agreement is generally referred to as the Gulf Communities Agreement
(GCA). The GCA was signed in 1997 between Century Zinc Limited (CZL) (then
a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, now owned by Zinifex), the Queensland Government
and the Waanyi, Mingginda, Gkuthaarn and Kukadj people after prolonged and
at times bitter political dispute (Martin 1998a). The agreement was signed under
the NTA framework before the diluting 1998 amendments and covers the Century
zinc/lead mine, a 350 kilometre slurry pipeline, and a port facility.
The GCA provides $A60 million over 20 years to signatory groups, but unlike
the YLUA also includes significant State government commitments of an
anticipated $A30 million for the provision of education and training,
infrastructure and the conduct of a major regional social impact assessment. It
is noteworthy that the leverage provided by the NTA right to negotiate process
under s.29 saw an initial CZL offer of $70 000 in cash increased to an eventual
$A60 million agreement package (Trebeck 2007a). The GCA is a little unclear
about the intended beneficiaries of the agreement: reference is made to the
provision of employment opportunities at the mine to an estimated 6,000
Aboriginal people in the southern Gulf of Carpentaria while cash benefits are
limited to an estimated 900 members of the four signatory language groups.
The Century Mine has been one of Australia’s most successful in employing
Indigenous labour, with over 100 people or consistently about 20 per cent of
the mine site labour force being Indigenous (Barker and Brereton 2004, 2005).
This is an undoubted success of the GCA. However, the GCA probably
over-ambitiously seeks to remove a large and diverse Indigenous population in
the region from welfare dependency and to promote economic self
sufficiency—admirable goals that one mine agreement cannot deliver. A five-year
review of the GCA in 2002 by a number of parties to the GCA recognised this
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and highlighted problems in a number of areas, including establishment of viable
organisations to channel compensation payments to beneficiaries.19  Subsequent
local dissatisfaction with the review process and with the company’s approach
to community relations saw a ‘civil disobedience’ sit-in at the mine that
threatened its operations: as Trebeck (2007a, this volume Chapter 6) notes, the
sit-in demonstrated that local communities had the potential to impede operations.
Subsequently, a separate review of the GCA by the regional representative body
articulated community concerns especially in relation to meeting obligations in
the GCA to fund outstation and other development (Carpentaria Land Council
Aboriginal Corporation 2004). These criticisms were directed as much at the
Queensland State as the mining company, but the political lever was far greater
with the latter. As in the other two cases, there are tensions following the GCA
between Indigenous beneficiaries groups about distribution of benefit payments
and a lack of clarity about intended agreement beneficiaries especially with
respect to distribution of employment and training opportunities (Scambary
2007).
The three cases briefly canvassed here highlight six commonalities that can be
summarised as follows:
In all cases there are expectations mismatches that reflect differential power
relations and an inability of agreements to recognise regional Indigenous
diversity. Clearly some Indigenous people see mines as providing opportunity
for formal employment while others see agreements as a means to pursue life
projects (Blaser 2004; Peterson 2005; Trigger 2005). Some Indigenous people
interviewed by Taylor and Scambary (2005) articulated a clear aspiration to use
agreement benefits to live on their land and engage in the customary sector
rather than in mine site employment. From the Indigenous perspective, there
was little indication that mining agreements were investing in sustainable futures.
It is unclear who the intended beneficiaries of agreements are. On one hand,
supposed benefits are in the nature of mine site employment that also benefits
the state and the mining industry. It is very clear in all situations that intended
Indigenous beneficiaries have limited autonomous control of how benefits are
spent and there is limited capacity for adaptive management of agreements
(Ballard and Banks 2003).
Demarcating government from company responsibilities is extremely problematic.
Historical underinvestment in social and physical infrastructure by the state
means that many Indigenous people do not have the capabilities to work at
mines, even if they wished to. There is a tension between mining companies and
the state about who should deliver basic services and infrastructure with some
evidence of cost shifting from the state to mining companies (Altman 1983;
19  It should be noted that the author was engaged as an adviser to this review.
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O’Faircheallaigh 2004a). There is recent evidence that Indigenous peoples have
articulated a desire to sign mining agreements with companies to gain access to
essential services that should be provided by the state.20
Friction within the Indigenous population of mine hinterlands is common, with
major tensions arising from lack of clarity about intended beneficiaries and
consequent political conflict between traditional owners (who may or may not
live near the mine) and other Indigenous people, some of whom have been
long-term regional residents (so called historical people) and some who may have
migrated specifically for mine site employment. Mine site statistics show great
variability in local and non-local Indigenous employment (Tiplady and Barclay
2007).
The capacity of Indigenous people to benefit from major resource developments,
even where they seek engagement, can be extremely limited owing to a legacy
from past neglect of poor health and education and high arrest rates that have
made them unsuitable for mine employment. A particular problem that
Indigenous peoples face is poverty traps (represented by extremely high effective
marginal tax rates, sometimes over 100 per cent) that undermine incentives for
mine site employment. These can be exacerbated by agreement payments to
individuals, although these are rare.
Everywhere there are environmental concerns. Examples from the cases being
discussed include the potential to impact on a sacred site or on food-rich wetlands
at Jabiluka; the impact of landscape scale strip mining on cultural heritage sites
in the Pilbara; or on coastal subsistence fisheries or the location of a
cyclone-mooring buoy on a sacred site in the Gulf of Carpentaria. These
environmental concerns can provide fruitful bases for Indigenous alliances with
environmental non-government organisations as occurred very effectively at
Jabiluka (Trebeck 2007a, this volume Chapter 6; Triggs 2002).
Contestation over development
In historical terms the past decade or so is a period when the state has clearly
moved to dilute Indigenous rights, reflecting a particular political climate and
a national focus on economic imperatives, as articulated by the elected
government of the time. A political economy analysis might suggest that the
state and capital have formed an enduring alliance that marginalises Indigenous
people. Yet even such an analysis raises questions about enlightened self interest
(Ferguson 1994) that would suggest that the state’s economic growth project
might be best served by addressing Indigenous poverty and marginality in mine
hinterlands specifically and Australian society generally.
20  R. Taylor, ‘Aboriginals say uranium mines answer to poverty’, The West Australian, 29 June 2006,
p. 6.
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Bridge (2004: 205) suggests that four distinctive approaches (technology and
management centered accounts, public policy studies, structural political
economy and cultural studies) can be used to address this question. Similarly a
large number of analytical approaches could be used to understand the
contestation over development evident in remote Australia between mining
companies, the state and Indigenous peoples. I focus here on two broad
approaches, political economy and cultural analysis, to highlight power
differentials that are seeing the state undertaking a strategy to depoliticise
Indigenous institutions and to incorporate Indigenous people in a monolithic
project of industrialisation; simultaneously, and against the odds, Indigenous
people are mobilising to highlight cultural difference as a means to articulate
their diverse and different notions of development in relation to their lands.
The global discourse of development today is dominated by the perspectives of
affluent states and multinational corporations. Despite growing global concerns
about climate change, resource depletion and limits to growth, economic
liberalism remains in the ascendancy (Harvey 2007). And despite occasional
nods to multi-cultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995), the power of states to define
development trajectories for its citizens is growing. This is despite alternate
views that, with globalisation, the nation state will lose influence to multinational
capital (Blaser 2004; Howitt, Connell and Hirsch 1996).
In the Australian context, economic liberalism and its associated discourse of
development is in the ascendancy, recognition of special Indigenous rights is
currently at a low point (despite the new Rudd Government supporting the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), and the state’s
power to define a development trajectory for the Indigenous minority is hardly
challenged in popular or policy discourses or by high profile Indigenous leaders
some of whom actively advocate for this project of improvement. The state
appears all powerful, immune from serious international scrutiny of its domestic
policies—perhaps because the global community itself is too eager for access to
Australian minerals?
State power, with a compliant media, is increasingly exercised to define
development in terms that reflect dominant group values. Somewhat
paternalistically, after abolishing the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (the national Indigenous representative organization) in 2004, the
state is limiting its notion of Indigenous development to mainstream aspirations:
employment success, high monetary incomes, individual home ownership,
entrepreneurship and material accumulation. This somewhat hegemonic and
monolithic take on development is problematic for many Indigenous groups and
especially those living on the Indigenous estate in remote regions. It is based on
universalism, a focus on the individual, a growing intolerance of cultural
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difference, and a limited view of development that is committed to market-based
solutions to deeply entrenched Indigenous marginalisation.
There are two broad readings of this approach each with its own inherent
contradictions and inconsistencies. The first is that the political and bureaucratic
elites genuinely believe that mainstream development at mine sites can deliver
regional socioeconomic statistical equality. Such a policy aspiration makes some
sense if ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998) for it could reduce the high direct and
indirect costs to the state of Indigenous dependency, generate labour in situations
of shortage, and generate additional national wealth from taxation of Indigenous
workers.
The second equally plausible reading is that the extent of Indigenous land
ownership that has incrementally grown over the past three decades as a result
of new laws based on social justice principles and new legal interpretations, is
just too great. It is certainly the case that land rights and native title laws have
seen the Indigenous estate grow to over 20 per cent of the Australian continent.
While the state might not seek to openly dispossess Indigenous people of their
new land holdings, it might seek to facilitate access to such lands for mineral
exploration and extraction by weakening resource rights, weakening associated
Indigenous negotiating power, and weakening the Indigenous institutions that
can effectively negotiate on behalf of their constituents.
The ‘mainstreaming for engagement’ versus the ‘mainstreaming for exploitation’
readings have logical contradictions. Attempts at Closing the Gap(s) would
benefit from a strengthening not weakening of Indigenous property rights, while
exploitation of the Indigenous estate is hardly likely to close the gaps unless
Indigenous people embrace mine employment. Similarly, it is the extent of
Indigenous dependence on the state that leaves them so vulnerable to state
interventions—‘welfare poison’ can disempower (Pearson 2000a). Hence while
the state’s particular form of development demands enhanced Indigenous
engagement with mining, the social investments to facilitate such participation
are inadequate and the property rights frameworks that might enhance
Indigenous levers to negotiate for such investments are weak.
Mining companies are keen to deal directly with traditional owners to gain social
licence to operate on the Indigenous estate. Owing to security concerns, the
massive ‘greenfields’ Indigenous estate within the strong Australian state is
highly desirable to multinational corporations. Direct relations between miners
and Indigenous peoples are clearly on an upward trajectory, as evidenced by
the hundreds of agreements referred to by the MCA (2006). Two recent studies
(Langton et al. 2004, 2006) clearly show that agreement making is on the rise.
As material on the MCA website shows, its members (who include some of the
world’s most powerful multinationals) have embraced corporate social
responsibility as a new approach in relations with Indigenous communities.
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However, as Trebeck (2005, 2007a, this volume Chapter 6) notes in her study of
the Yandi, Ranger and Century mines, while head office might hold lofty
responsibility ideals and sponsor affirmative programs, these ideals are not
necessarily penetrating to mine site business units. Not only do these units have
greater capacity for technical excellence than social policy, but the financial
bottom line looms large as a priority for mine managers. There are clear tensions
between social, economic and environmental elements of the triple bottom line.
At times these tensions erupt into civil disturbances at or near mine sites and
individual mining companies have not been immune from such Indigenous
activism at Marandoo (in the Pilbara), at the Jabiluka prospect, and at the Century
mine. While sovereign risk in Australia is low, from the Indigenous perspective
such activism provides a means to demonstrate local dissatisfaction with mining
activity and to leverage and then re-negotiate for post-agreement mine site
changes. At Jabiluka, Indigenous traditional owners scored a rare victory when,
via environmental non-government organisation alliances, shareholder activism
and the prolonged and zealous campaigning of the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal
Corporation (that included visits to the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in Paris resulting in the UNESCO Kakadu
Mission in 199821  and to the Rio Tinto Annual General Meeting in London), the
company in 2000 agreed not to mine Jabiluka without traditional owner consent.
This outcome is iconic because it represents the only occasion in Australia where
traditional owners have seen the rescinding of an existing agreement (signed
under duress between the Northern Land Council, Pancontinental and the
Australian Government in 1982).22 Very importantly, this decision by Rio Tinto
has been taken despite state pressures to proceed with mining.
Just as individual mining companies have operated more responsively to
traditional owner views than the state, so too the MCA has repositioned itself.
In the past, the Council used to campaign for amendments to the law to dilute
Indigenous political and economic leverage. More recently, as evidenced by its
recent submission to the Commonwealth government (as well as to Senate
Inquiries into proposed amendments to land rights law in 2006 and to the NTA
in 2007), it has begun to campaign for enhanced government resourcing of remote
Indigenous communities and for support for Indigenous representative
organisations that have a degree of independence and capacity. This is a
surprising development that says as much about the disempowering
21  I was an Australian government appointed member of the Mission.
22  ERA could have mined Jabiluka but would have needed to process the uranium ore on site, something
that was not financially viable in the late 1990s. Consequently, ERA needed to gain traditional owner
consent to transport ore to the Ranger milling facility some 25 kilometres away, permission that was
not forthcoming from the Mirarr Gundjeihmi owners of the transport corridor. It is paradoxical perhaps
that the anti-Jabiluka campaign was at least part-sponsored by an organisation set up with Ranger
Uranium Agreement payments. However, arguably, institutional capacity must be resourced from
somewhere to provide independent voice.
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mainstreaming measures of the Australian Government as it does about the new
ways of doing mining business in Australia.
Indigenous views on development can be very different from mainstream notions.
As already noted this is especially the case in remote regions where the struggle
to win back land has often required provision of proof in the courts of land
connection and extant customary practice. Having won back legal title to land,
many groups are frustrated that their traditional lands are nevertheless available
for exploration and mining in all jurisdictions, except where there are free prior
informed consent provisions. Owing to their minority status and limited political
power, Indigenous views about development form a subordinate discourse that
has great difficulty being heard.
Peterson (2005) uses recent writings from North America (Blaser 2004) to
distinguish Indigenous ‘life projects’ from state ‘development projects’. Such
life projects are structured by colonial history and ongoing relations of high
dependence with the state. They are also structured by ongoing engagement in
the customary (non-market) land-based sector of the economy. Trigger (2005)
assesses mining projects in remote Australia as sites for contestation between
Indigenous and mainstream views about economic and cultural futures. These
contestations can be stylised as a clash between market-based and kin-based
economies (Austin-Broos and MacDonald 2005) and much more. As a general
rule, it is clear that Indigenous land owners look to maintain the environmental
integrity of their land, whilst miners look to exploit the land’s non-renewable
resources; Indigenous people see the land and the landscape as a cultural asset,
not just a commercial asset. An important strength of Trigger’s analysis is his
engagement with mining as an intercultural process: his research reports that
some Indigenous people believe that they can commercially engage with mining,
while maintaining their identity and distinct cultural practices. To paraphrase
Stanner’s poignant words, there are some Indigenous people who believe that
the market and the Dreaming are compatible, others who do not.23
The problem that Indigenous people face is that in the face of a power narrative
of Indigenous policy failure, there is a growing national intolerance of Indigenous
diversity and cultural differences. This is very clearly encapsulated in the
couching of the dominant development discourse in terms of practical
reconciliation or statistical equality between Indigenous and other Australians.
Such policy focus on Closing the Gap has been rejected by Indigenous people
elsewhere internationally because it pathologises Indigenous disadvantage by
defining it in relational terms to mainstream standards that are constructed
according to distinct non-Indigenous cultural values (Durie 2005; Smith 1999;
Storey 2003). In this way very different Indigenous views of development are
23  Stanner’s exact words were ‘Ours is a market-civilisation, theirs not. Indeed there is a sense in which
The Dreaming and The Market are mutually exclusive’ (1979: 58).
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marginalised and development debates are structured by the dominant western
paradigm.
The capacity of Indigenous peoples to resist state-sanctioned mining or to ensure
equitable benefit sharing is highly dependent on enhancing the capacity of
regionally-based Indigenous organisations to protect Indigenous legal rights.
The current approach using existing organisations and negotiation levers is
resulting in Indigenous people becoming increasingly vulnerable to unequal
agreement making (see Corbett and O’Faircheallaigh 2006) and increasingly being
unable to oppose development pressures.24 This is a growing problem because
in recent years the state has become increasingly intolerant of dissenting views,
be they in the academy, the public service, or in advocacy support (Hamilton
and Maddison 2007). In some cases, as documented by Trebeck (Chapter 6), local
Indigenous agency and activism has clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of
mining companies to local hostility. This might explain why companies are more
responsive than the state to Indigenous perspectives and why the industry is
concerned about inequities in bargaining power. An adversarial approach,
however, may not be sustainable as a source of bargaining strength.
Reconciling different views of development
This chapter has focused on three very broad categories—Indigenous peoples,
states and mining companies—and examined their interactions in development
processes. As with all such articulations there are clearly category overlaps and
cleavages: Indigenous people are citizens of Australia and companies operate
within the nation’s borders and in accord with Australian laws. In terms of
motivating simplifications, it could be argued that the state seeks authority and
compliance with its dominant notion of development, Indigenous peoples seek
autonomy and the right of self governance, and mining companies seek licence
to operate and secure access to resources.
In terms of dominant ideology, it is increasingly the case that the states subscribe
to economic liberalism, while Indigenous peoples are seeking recognition of
their right to be different and to be heard—as outlined in post-development
theory that problematises western notions of development (Storey 2003: 34–37).
In Australia, this tension is evident in debates about practical versus symbolic
reconciliation, economic equality versus cultural plurality, and market-based
versus kin-based economic systems. Is some commensurability between such
binaries a possibility, or are what Mander and Tauli-Corpus (2006) term ‘paradigm
wars’ inevitable?
24  Corbett and O’Faircheallaigh (2006) argue that even when using the available and supposedly impartial
National Native Title Tribunal institutions for arbitration, native title parties are disadvantaged and
‘grantees’ (mining companies) advantaged.
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An alternative model that is applicable to Indigenous people in remote Australia
is the hybrid economy framework (Altman 2005a). This model is based on a
critique of orthodox development approaches that privilege the market and the
state and ignore the customary or non-market sector of local economies. The
model has some commonalities with both the livelihoods (de Haan and Zoomers
2005) and community economy approaches (Gibson-Graham 2005).
The hybrid economy model is depicted conceptually and diagrammatically in
Fig. 2.2. To simplify considerably, it is made up of three sectors (represented by
the circles marked 1, 2 and 3). A crucial feature of the model is the articulations
(or inter-linkages) between these sectors (depicted by the segments 4, 5, 6 and
7). An important feature of the model is that the relative scale of the three sectors
and four points of articulation vary from one context to another. In remote
Australia, many Indigenous people regularly move between these seven segments
with the mobility evident in pre-colonial times in the food quest now evident
in livelihood adaptations. For example, an individual might participate in wildlife
harvesting for domestic use, the production of an artefact for sale, employment
at a mine site or in the public sector or be in receipt of income support from the
state.
Fig. 2.2 The hybrid economy framework
In such circumstances people are not solely reliant on welfare, on the non-market
sector, or on income from market engagement. In a sense, part of the emerging
post-colonial adaptation observed is a risk-minimisation strategy, whereby a
diversity of sources of livelihood results in engagement in all sectors of the local
economy. What differentiates the Indigenous Australian situation from many
other Third World situations is the central role of the state providing citizen
entitlements to various degrees. This support occurs directly, for example, in
the provision of income support and indirectly, for example, through the
provision of state patronage of community enterprise.
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While the notion of the hybrid economy in Australia grew from case study work
in Arnhem Land among an encapsulated minority in a post-colonial state who
have shaped their local economy into a very distinct form, there are two broad
reasons to believe that this concept has wider Australian applicability.
First, a major survey undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the
National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey 2002 indicated a very
high level of Indigenous participation in non-market activity in hunting and
fishing and in paid cultural activities like production of art for sale (Altman,
Buchanan and Biddle 2006). While the 2002 Survey had major shortcomings in
fully capturing the significance of all elements of the hybrid economy, it certainly
demonstrated that the land had important productive value for Indigenous
people which is often overlooked. It also reinforced the view that the nature of
the economic problem in remote Indigenous Australia is misunderstood as the
level of engagement with the customary sector is overlooked.
Second, in Australia as elsewhere, climate change and associated national concerns
about water quantity and quality and potential loss of biodiversity are all high
priorities. Recent research shows that the Indigenous estate includes some of
the most biodiverse lands in Australia (Altman, Buchanan and Larsen 2007).
Official natural resource atlas maps produced by Land and Water Australia and
the Department of Environment and Heritage indicate that many of the most
intact and nationally-important wetlands, riparian zones, forests and rivers and
waterways are located on the Indigenous estate. Mapping also shows that these
lands are at risk of species contraction and face major threats from feral animals,
exotic weeds, changed fire regimes, pollution and overgrazing. Potentially there
is a crucial role for Indigenous people in environmental management of the
Indigenous estate they own. This is an area where Indigenous ecological
knowledge and Western science can be linked and where Indigenous people are
actively seeking enhanced engagement. While much is already undertaken,
Indigenous people are poorly remunerated for the provision of a range of
environmental services. There are significant opportunities to enhance such
Indigenous engagement as an element of the hybrid economy that could be
supported by the state or by mining companies in environmentally managing
their properties.
The hybrid economy model does not seek to ignore the contestation within the
Indigenous domain about economic futures. There are influential Indigenous
leaders (as noted by Trigger 2005) who advocate a fuller Indigenous embrace of
the market as a means to create wealth and long-term prosperity and address
social problems. In the hybrid economy model, market engagement is not
precluded. As noted earlier, some people near mine sites seek employment with
various motivations including as a means to accumulate financial resources to
get back onto their country (Scambary 2007, this volume Chapter 9). This
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highlights the plurality of development approaches sought by Indigenous people.
The question remains, can the state and mining companies accommodate and
foster such plurality while also facilitating productive engagement with mine
economies?
It is here that contradictions emerge, because even within the state there is
debate—evident, for example, in the very different approaches of industry and
environmental agencies. Dominant political and bureaucratic views support
expansion of mining onto the Indigenous estate, while less powerful
environmental agencies are seeking to include more and more of the Indigenous
estate into the conservation estate using the Indigenous Protected Areas program.
On the other hand, mining companies appear reluctant to directly support
employment in natural resource management, choosing instead, perhaps from
self-interest, to focus all effort on training and employment on mine sites even
if take up is poor. There may be more productive ways to engage with Aboriginal
people in mine hinterlands especially given the extent of occupational migration
between all sectors of the ‘hybrid’ economy.
Conclusion
This chapter highlights contestation over economic development, with the state
and mining companies looking to exploit the mineral wealth of the Indigenous
estate, and Indigenous Australians often seeking to challenge this powerful
alliance with different and diverse notions of development. It has been argued
that the state, having made laws in the recent past to return considerable tracts
of land to Indigenous Australians, is now looking at this estate as ‘greenfields’
for mining development and as the means to deliver mainstream development
to Indigenous communities. The state has constructed a new discourse of policy
failure and a need to break business-as-usual approaches. Arguably, the state is
also seeking to encourage commercial penetration of the Indigenous estate by
weakening already weak Indigenous property rights and institutions in a manner
that is at odds with emerging international conventions on the recognition of
Indigenous rights such as numerous articles with the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The analysis here highlights two fundamentally different views about the
appropriate development pathways on the Indigenous estate. The perspective
of dominant national interest and global geopolitics seeks to explore and exploit
the mineral wealth of the Indigenous estate irrespective of the wishes of the land
owners. An alternative view, based on emerging alliances between Indigenous
land owners and environmental and developmental non-government
organisations, emphasises the biodiversity value of the Indigenous estate as an
alternative form of development to mineral extraction.
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At present, the former perspective is in the ascendancy, dominated by the views
and political and economic power of the state and mining companies. At the
start of the twenty-first century there has been an acceleration of a new economic
order predicated on world trade and energy-intensive industrialisation that is
right now being challenged by a global slowdown. As a commodity-export
dependent economy, Australia has been at the vanguard of the neoliberal order
that has been so dominant in recent years. At the same time, there are concerns
about climate change that the Australian Government, in recent years, has been
at the vanguard of ignoring, at least until a change of national government in
November 2007. At such a time it is extremely difficult for any alternative
development perspective, based on proven links to land and continuity of
custom, to gain political traction. This is especially the case because the Australian
state is in the process of depoliticising Indigenous institutions, and mainstream
political channels reflect the views of the majority only.
The means that the powerful use to support arguments in favour of modernisation
is to suggest that Indigenous people living in remote Australia face a stark choice
between tradition and modernity: the former is associated with material poverty,
the latter with affluence. This is a false dichotomy because Indigenous people
in remote Australia are already participating in a hybrid economy that is
thoroughly intercultural and is inclusive of both the customary and the market.
Indigenous people undergo rigorous tests to show that they maintain custom
and identity in order to regain land ownership; they now face new challenges
in retaining that land ownership. There are immense pressures to join the
mainstream, but the issue then arises of whether economic integration is possible
for Indigenous Australians without losing their links to the land. Conversely, if
a choice is made not to join the mainstream, then there is the unenviable prospect
of ongoing poverty and marginalisation.
There are many possibilities that are currently not being considered. A new
approach is needed that gives institutional recognition to the inherent rights of
Indigenous Australians to control the nature of development on their ancestral
lands by bestowing them with more potent property rights. Indigenous peoples
need to be empowered by the state, as noted by the MCA, so that they can
participate in negotiations with mining companies on a more equitable basis.
Such empowerment will ensure that Indigenous Australians have the capabilities
and capacities to engage with the state and mining companies, and can define
their own aspirations. This is a right, as espoused by Sen (1999), to develop
capabilities to negotiate the forms that development and participation will take.
The Australian states and mining companies need to recognise that the security
of the poor and of the prosperous are inter-linked; poverty and instability has
the capacity to destabilise states and to enhance risk.
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In the political struggle over ideas about development and how Indigenous land
should be used, Indigenous Australians need to use available political instruments
and alliances to gain a hearing. This may entail appeal to international forums,
although as noted the Australian state has historically been relatively impervious
to international opinion. There is a glimmer of hope in the shifting national mood
and changes in direction of the moment (post the onset of the global financial
crisis) that might see a greater acceptance of alternate development models, like
the hybrid economy framework, that have the capacity to incorporate Indigenous
priorities. The challenge for the Australian state is to recognise the value of
cultural diversity and economic hybridity; and to acknowledge that there is
nothing inherently valuable about monolithic approaches based on resource
extraction. The challenge for mining companies is to recognise that the fostering
of sound regional relations with Indigenous people might involve agreement
making that supports their aspirations for economic diversity beyond mine site
options. Given poor past relations, Indigenous scepticism about rampant
development is understandable. Whether the marginal situation of Indigenous
peoples in remote Australia can be improved will be highly dependent on
acceptance by the state and mining companies that all their interests are
interdependent.
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3. Data mining: Indigenous peoples,
applied demography and the resource
extraction industry
John Taylor
In recent decades, applied demography has emerged as a sub-field of demography
partly in response to a growing demand from governments and private sector
interests to better understand the implications of population trends for public
policy and business strategy (Murdock and Ellis 1991; Siegel 2002). While in
essence, this involves the practical application of demographic materials and
methods (Siegel 2002: 2), the emphasis is on gaining knowledge of the
consequences and concomitants of change in the size of populations, their
distribution, composition and characteristics, so as to guide decision-making
related to planning and the distribution of public or private sector goods and
services for current and future use (Murdock and Ellis 1991: 6). This is precisely
the empirical input that industry, government and Indigenous stakeholders
have begun to identify as contributing to meaningful discussions about options
for integrating the activities of mining operations with broader social and
economic development goals in mine hinterlands. Accordingly, a push for
profiling regional social and economic conditions has emerged from a coalition
of these interests (Harvey and Brereton 2005).
Underlying this push, the current political economy of minerals development
across remote Australia attempts to ensure that Indigenous peoples and
communities increase their capacity to participate in bouyant regional economies
that are stimulated by the ‘super-cycle’ of global demand for mineral products
(Harvey 2002a; Hooke 2007). Overall, the aim is to establish initiatives that will
secure sustainable economies for mining regions beyond the operational life of
mines, making full use of local labour (Harvey 2002a, 2004). From a minerals
sector perspective, this reflects the growing influence of corporate social
responsibility and a corresponding recognition of necessary foundations for a
social licence to operate (Trebeck, Chapter 6). From an Indigenous perspective,
it reflects the assertion of a legitimate stake in directing regional development
options, not least on Aboriginal lands. And from a government perspective, it
reflects a window of opportunity to realise policy goals of Closing the Gap via
the activities and economies of scale induced by minerals development.
Measuring impacts
One way in which these varied aspirations are pursued is through negotiated
mining and other region-specific agreements. In the early 1970s, there was
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considerable optimism that mining agreements, many with significant financial
benefit packages, would make a difference to the marginal economic situation
of Indigenous beneficiaries (Altman 1983). However, research to date indicates
that for a complex set of reasons, Indigenous economic status has changed little
in subsequent years—dependence on government transfer payments across
remote Australia remains high, while the economic profile of Indigenous people
residing in the vicinity of major long-life mines is often indistinguishable from
that of Indigenous people elsewhere in remote Australia (Taylor 1999, 2003;
Taylor and Scambary 2005).
This situation partly reflects the incapacity of Indigenous community
organisations and individuals to cope with the impacts of large-scale operations
and take advantage from them. Equally, though, such organisations and the
people they represent may have ambivalent responses to the potential cultural
assimilation implied by their increasing integration into a market economy and
its associated monetisation of many aspects of social life. A third key factor has
been the attitudes and responses of both mining companies and governments,
and their inability to comprehend and respond to the scale of historic Aboriginal
disadvantage and strain on the social fabric of societies so radically affected by
colonisation.
As well as these issues, it is now also clear that the content of many agreements
has been far from optimal and that substantial legal, policy and institutional
obstacles remain in the way of favourable negotiated terms related to mining
activity on Aboriginal lands (Altman, Chapter 2; O’Faircheallaigh 2006). One
issue in particular that has compromised the quality (or effectiveness) of
agreements, is the general lack of attention paid to initiatives and activities
required to give effect to stated provisions. The result, in many instances, is a
failure of implementation for want of adequate resources and structures to ensure
that this occurs and is sustained (O’Faircheallaigh 2002a).
Viewed historically, this general failure of agreements to monitor progress and
impacts may be seen as a lesson once learnt, then subsequently lost, since the
prototype for monitoring emerged as a key recommendation of the Fox Inquiry
as far back as 1977. This inquiry called for the establishment of a five-year
monitoring study of the social impact of uranium mining on Aborigines that
was undertaken by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies. While this
study openly eschewed what it referred to as the ‘technocratic tradition’ and
the hard-edged statistical approach of the policy sciences, it nonetheless aimed
to generate as much baseline data as possible against which to measure social
change. In line with a movement towards what was described as a ‘political’ or
‘community development’ model of social impact assessment (Ross 1990: 12),
this was to be developed as a computer-based store of relevant information that
could answer numerous questions for Aboriginal communities, government
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agencies, mining companies and researchers, and be functional for decades to
come (Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies 1984).
While the scope of this study was sound enough, it is interesting to note that
almost 20 years later when faced with the task of profiling the employment,
income, education, housing and health status of the Aboriginal population in
Kakadu National Park and acquiring some sense of how these might have changed
over the previous 20 years, the Kakadu Region Social Impact Study had no
readily available and comprehensive statistical information upon which to
determine its case. This was due to a failure of the Australian Institute of
Aboriginal Studies study to provide adequate quality data for the regional
population, even as a baseline, let alone in the form of ongoing monitoring that
was initially called for (Kesteven 1986).
Partly in response to such issues, and in the emerging context of corporate social
responsibility, there has been a concerted effort in recent years by some major
mining companies to address aspects of this regional information void with
support for regional profiling in the East Kimberley (Taylor 2004a), the Pilbara
(Taylor and Scambary 2005) and the West Kimberley (Taylor 2006b). Wider
recognition of this requirement by Indigenous stakeholders is also indicated by
land council and native title representative body support for such activity in
the case of the Kakadu Social Impact Study (1997b), as well as in the regional
studies listed above.
Such profiles are an important adjunct to the formulation and subsequent
monitoring of company and Indigenous stakeholder actions designed to increase
Indigenous participation in regional economies. Specifically, they help in three
ways: by establishing the quantum of needs for regional planning (both present
and future), by identifying particular opportunities and constraints for enhanced
participation in regional economies, and by providing the demographic backdrop
for assessment of the effectiveness of any actions undertaken, whether this is
done using conventional or alternative approaches to the evaluation of outcomes
from mining agreements (O’Faircheallaigh 2002b: 18–22).
Furthermore, with a focus on the demographic composition and population
dynamics of mine hinterlands, regional profiles can assist in the identification
of targets to meet particular objectives, particularly in providing an overall sense
of the scale of potential undertakings. This adoption of targets for improving
the situation of Indigenous peoples is an issue that has recently drawn the
attention of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner
in discussions over the Australian government’s reporting framework on
Indigenous disadvantage (Calma 2005). Casting this in a human rights approach,
the argument presented is for accountability in moving towards the achievement
of identified goals within a defined time frame. In development discourse this
invokes the principle of ‘progressive realisation’ and takes reporting to a new
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level by requiring that stakeholders make justification if there is no improvement
in certain agreed benchmarks, or where there is improvement, to establish
whether the progress achieved is at a sufficient rate (Calma 2005). While the
levels and rates involved to assess such progress require regular calibration,
fundamentally they require the development of a baseline from which to measure
change.
Data on Indigenous populations in proximity to mining
operations
The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) estimates that 60 per cent of mining
operations in Australia are ‘neighbours’ with Indigenous communities (MCA
2004: 5). To this extent, the prospect of broad-scale demographic analysis is
invoked. However, any consolidated approach to the demography of Indigenous
populations in proximity to mining operations would belie the variable
availability, quality and applicability of population data, to say nothing of the
diversity of social, economic and cultural conditions that exist across mining
regions. The very existence of estimated different land use agreements referring
to distinct population groups and regional configurations demands disaggregated
analysis. However, as we shall see, some geographic scaling-up is also required
because of the nature of data availability and the relatively small size of
population groupings.
Population data
Two categories of population data are necessary to support the different roles
required of regional demographic profiling. The first concerns data for monitoring
as enabled by the provision of a statistical baseline of existing conditions against
which an assessment of past and future change can be made. The second supports
a predictive role, or at least an anticipation of the possible effects of proposed
development set against future population scenarios. In constructing such
profiles, a range of data are available from a variety of published and unpublished
sources including the Census of Population and Housing and other Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) collections, administrative data sets held by
Commonwealth and State government agencies, and statistical information from
mining companies, regionally-based institutions, and Indigenous organisations.
The array of such available data is substantial and some idea of the range, even
for relatively small geographic areas, is provided in Table 3.1, based on
experience in the Thamarrurr region of the Northern Territory (Taylor 2004a).
To date, regional profiles have involved the development of social indicators
drawn from across the range of official data sets as shown in Table 3.1. For both
Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations, these include demographic structure
and residence patterns, labour force status, education and training, income,
welfare, housing, justice and health status. Ideally, indicators for each of these
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categories should be established at the commencement of local mining operations
and then subsequently in order to establish trends. To complete the profile,
regional population projections should also be produced, typically for 20 years
(roughly a generation). This may encourage forward thinking and an anticipation
of needs—and the opportunity to respond to them before they are realised.
Whilst acknowledging that the accuracy of projections diminishes with the
length of projection period (Bell 1992; Smith and Sincich 1991), this capacity to
project future population levels is an essential component of the preparation of
regional profiles. All too often in Indigenous affairs, policy has been ‘reactive’,
and by responding to historic levels of need thereby creating a constant sense
of catch up. If mining agreements are to be effective catalysts for change what
is required is a ‘proactive’ methodology which seeks to anticipate and plan for
expected requirements—essentially a means of translating the content and intent
of agreements into a required quantum of program and partner commitments
over a given time frame.
Data quality
In establishing the relative social and economic circumstances of Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Australians, there is considerable reliance on census data for
many key indicators. This has a number of advantages given the comprehensive
scope of coverage and the application of standard measures. However, there are
drawbacks too. First of all, the five-yearly census means that available population
data can be as much as seven years old when first publicly available, given the
time taken to process census output. There is also the problem of coverage, both
in terms of population counts and population characteristics, especially for the
Indigenous population. To date, the net census undercount of Indigenous peoples
has been estimated to be around 6–7 per cent, although this is likely to vary
geographically, with much higher rates estimated for some remote regions (Martin
and Taylor 1996; Taylor and Bell 2003). The application of a post-enumeration
survey by the ABS in remote Indigenous communities for the first time in 2006
produced substantial estimates of net undercount of 24 per cent, 19 per cent
and 12 per cent respectively in the Northern Territory, Western Australia and
Queensland (ABS 2007). Non-response to census questions is also an issue (Taylor
1993), with relatively high rates of non-response observed for many Indigenous
population characteristics. While little can be done about non-response for
census characteristics, the ABS does establish post-censal estimates of the
Indigenous population in an attempt to adjust for undercount and non-response
to the Indigenous status question, and herein lies a solution to the problem of
coverage raised above.
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Table 3.1 Data items available for the Thamarrurr region from Commonwealth,
Northern Territory and local government agencies
Population
ABS census counts and estimates of Indigenous and non-Indigenous population by 5 year age and sex for
Wadeye town and outstations as a group.
Community census producing single year Indigenous and non-Indigenous age and sex capable of manipulation
by community working groups into section of town, individual outstations, and clan groupings.
Clinic estimate of ‘active client’ Indigenous and non-Indigenous population by 5-year age and sex
Thamarrurr Housing Office population list of service population
Age and sex of Centrelink customers
Age and sex of regional residents on the electoral roll
Number of Indigenous persons registered with Medicare with a usual address in Thamarrurr
Labour force
Census data on labour force status, industry, occupation, hours worked
CDEPb participants by age, sex, and occupation
Centrelink data on Newstart and Youth Allowance payments
Local employer administrative records
Education and training
School enrolments by age, sex and grade level
School attendance by age, sex and grade level
School Multi Level Assessment Program (MAP) test results for Year 3 and 5 reading and numeracy
Enrolments: by training provider category by field of study by certificate level and accreditation category by
outcome status by Indigenous status, age and sex
Census data on highest level of schooling achieved
Census data on post-school qualifications
Housing
Census estimates of housing occupancy rates
CHINSa and census data on housing stock by occupancy and number of bedrooms
CHINS data on housing stock by repairs needed
CHINS and census-based estimates of housing need
Health
Chronic disease incidence by age and sex
Growth characteristics of under-5s
Regional food costs compared to elsewhere in NT
Cost of family food basket
Fresh food variety, quality, availability
Unique hospital patients by Major Diagnostic Code (MDC), 5 year age and sex
Hospital patient separations by MDC by 5 year age and sex
Birth weights
Active client population for clinic by 5 year age and sex
Clinic staffing classification by Indigenous status
Justice
Reported regional property offences and offences against the person
Persons in adult correctional centres by last known address and birthplace
Juveniles in detention by last known address and birthplace
Adult conditional liberty caseload
Juvenile conditional liberty caseload
Conditional liberty order commencements
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Welfare
Centrelink payments by type and $ amount (cells <20 supressed)
Census estimates of employment and non-employment income
a. CHINS = Community Housing and Infrastructure Needs Survey.
b. CDEP = Community Development Employment Program.
Source: Taylor 2004b.
Basically, in situations of significant undercount, the census can be viewed as
a very large sample survey with the key output being population rates rather
than population levels (Siegel 2002: 495). Rates established net of non-response
(on the assumption that the latter are evenly distributed for each population
characteristic) can then be applied to population estimates—initially to the
estimate for the census year, and then to any population projections from the
census year on the assumption that the observed rates remain constant or change
according to prescribed criteria. While an assumption of constancy might be
seen as unrealistic, it should be noted that one of the unfortunate features of
many Indigenous social indicators in mining regions over the past two decades
(such as labour force status, income, education, and housing) has been their
relative stability. It is also true that social indicator rates, by their very nature,
are unlikely to drastically alter over short periods of time as they require
substantial shift in levels in order to effect change (Hunter 1999). This is
especially so among rapidly growing populations.
Whatever the approach to constructing regional profiles, it is crucial that they
are based on reliable population estimates. Program-wise, this requires reliable
breakdown into relevant policy age-groups: infants, mothers, school-age children,
youth, young adults, middle-aged, and older people. Ideally, it also requires
that statistical events in the population (such as employment numbers, school
enrolments, hospital separations) are drawn from the same population universe,
such that numerators are drawn from denominators in the calculation of rates.
Unfortunately, under conditions of high inter-regional mobility and variable
reporting of Indigenous status in administrative systems, this is not always the
case (Cunningham 1998). What is clear, though, is that standard small area
statistics as available from the ABS in the form of Indigenous Community Profiles
provide only a starting point. Not only do these require ground-truthing in
terms of cultural and geographic match, they are also limited in scope (and
sometimes coverage), hence the need for additional data to be compiled from
alternate sources.
Perhaps more telling from the point of view of data quality are concerns about
the capacity of official data to provide a meaningful representation of the social
and economic status of Indigenous people, especially in remote regions. Is it
meaningful to measure one set of social, cultural and economic systems
(Indigenous/local) using the tools, methods, and purposes of another
(mainstream/national/global)? One view on this describes the process of census
Data mining  57
enumeration in remote Aboriginal communities as a ‘collision of systems’ and
concludes that census questions lack cross-cultural fit and produce answers that
are often close to nonsensical (Morphy 2002). Equally, while social indicators
report on observable population characteristics, they reveal nothing about more
behavioural population attributes such as individual and community priorities
and aspirations for enhancing quality of life. Indeed the whole question of what
the latter might mean and how it might be measured for Indigenous populations
is only now being addressed by the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues in challenging the appropriateness of Millennium Development
Goal indicators (United Nations 2006), an issue that has also been raised in the
context of Australian frameworks for reporting disadvantage (Taylor 2008a). In
working through these questions, we should be mindful that from an Indigenous
perspective the very notion of measurement often carries with it the spectre of
state control, and the implications of who is measuring what, for whom, and to
what end should be crucial points for consideration, as demonstrated, for
example, in respect of Maori (Smith 1999).
Thus, regional profiling using official statistical data can be seen simply as a
method for ‘rapid appraisal’ and rightly criticised for lacking community input,
thereby restricting its relevance and representativeness (Birckhead 1999; Walsh
and Mitchell 2002). The danger is one of using data that have little relevance (to
Indigenous stakeholders) and excluding those that do. Thus, along with the
compilation of mainstream social indicators there is a need also to acquire
information that reflects Indigenous priorities and understandings of what
constitutes appropriate and sustainable development. This has some resonance
with O’Faircheallaigh’s (2002b) ‘alternate’ approach to evaluation which includes
examination of the unfolding responses of Aboriginal actors to development
initiatives. So far, however, only limited attempt has been made to incorporate
such data into regional profiling (Taylor and Scambary 2005), although Scambary
(this volume) has explored Indigenous development aspirations in considerable
ethnographic detail and found these to be often at odds with more mainstream
understandings of optimal outcomes from the interaction between miners and
Indigenous people. Likewise, in a survey of traditional Aboriginal owners
conducted in 2006 to establish what they wanted to do with their land, less than
13 per cent listed economic development as a first priority while more than
one-third highlighted access, residence, land and sea management and cultural
heritage (Balsamo and Calma 2007). Interestingly, these are all components of
what O’Faircheallaigh (2006: 3–4) has referred to as the ‘better life’ that many
Aboriginal people aspire to while living on land that they own. Partly for these
reasons, the extent to which data of sufficient quantity and quality currently
exist in Australia exist for the purposes of establishing meaningful baseline
profiles remains a moot point.
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Indigenous culture and measurement
A recent study of social and economic conditions in the Pilbara sheds some light
on this issue (Taylor and Scambary 2005). This study sought the views of a
selection of local Aboriginal people on conventional social indicators that were
deemed to be representative of their parlous socioeconomic situation. One such
comment reflecting on increasing levels of participation in mining employment
was as follows:
“Life is a bit better out here because of mining and those agreements.
But my thing is my own kids, we’re not pushing them into what we
want them to be. It’s up to them as individuals, I believe that’s fair
enough. They can go and work in the mine, but they will be men and
will have kids of their own, and they need to be there for their own kids
to learn and teach them their culture. Because it’s about carrying on the
traditional cultural ways teaching knowledge skills, and the country
itself, all those kinds of things, the trees, the language, going to
ceremony, going out on country. My kid’s father is teaching our kids.
His grandmothers and grandfathers, they passed on all the knowledge
to him, making him understand who he is, he hasn’t missed out on
anything, he’s got it all and he knows what his role is as a cultural man
and in our cultural life. But some of those mining men aren’t there for
all that and that’s no good.” (Taylor and Scambary 2005: 58)
This statement has relevance for any discussion about the evaluation and
monitoring of mining impacts. It highlights the fact that a positive mainstream
measure of development (employment in mining) may have negative
consequences for an Indigenous measure of well-being (carrying on traditional
cultural ways). More to the point, it illustrates that a range of Indigenous views
on the appropriateness of various indicators are likely to exist and that these
may stand outside, and therefore be excluded from, mainstream indicator
frameworks.
Not surprisingly, then, a consistent message to emerge from consultations
conducted by the Australian Government with select Indigenous people and
organisations regarding the measurement of disadvantage is the need to improve
representations of Indigenous culture in formal reporting frameworks (Steering
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision 2005: 2.11). Although
no explanation is provided as to what precisely is meant by the term ‘culture’
(Peterson 2005), a basic dilemma to emerge from these consultations is the
difficulty of identifying single indicators given the diversity of Indigenous
circumstances and societies across Australia. Furthermore, the fact that the
construction of objective indices is more likely to be directed at informing
government policy, and not necessarily Indigenous priorities and processes,
means that the challenge is to satisfy the first requirement while at the same
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time producing measures that have widespread relevance to Indigenous peoples.
Ultimately what is sought, then, is similar to the mechanism for illuminating the
legal nature of native title for public discourse in Australia in terms of a
‘recognition, or translation, space’ that exists where Indigenous law and custom
and Australian property law intersect (Mantziaris and Martin 2000). This
conceptualisation of a legal ‘recognition space’ may be adapted to the area of
social indicator development as illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
As inferred from the diagram, much of what constitutes important aspects of
Indigenous world views, notions of productivity, appropriate structures of social
relationships, land relationships, kinship rights and obligations, reciprocities
and accountabilities (Altman 2005a; Martin 1995; Peterson 2005; Povinelli 1993;
Schwab 1995; Trigger 2005)—in effect, different ways of life—is not necessarily
brought to the level of public discourse (the intersect in Fig. 3.1), and is therefore
not easily amenable to measurement. Even where measurement appears possible,
distinct modes of Indigenous living and aspiration may be incommensurate with
the broad goals of government policy to the point where they defy common
understandings.
Fig. 3.1 The potential recognition space for indicators of Indigenous well-being
Source: Taylor 2008c.
In the Australian context, for example, there is a clear contradiction between
the desire of many Indigenous people to live in remote areas in small dispersed
communities on traditional lands, and the general thrust of government policy
intent on securing Indigenous participation in mainstream urban economies as
a core means to enhance well-being. By the same token, elements of government
reporting (certainly when it comes down to particular strategic change measures)
may have little connection to Indigenous concerns and practices. An especially
poignant example of this is provided by outputs from the Australian census
which, because they are designed to represent the circumstances of mainstream
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Australia, generate results for Indigenous peoples in remote settings that can
have little meaning (Morphy 2002). As noted earlier, important elements of
Indigenous customary economic activity, for example, can be overlooked entirely
(Altman 2005a, 2007b; Altman, Buchanan and Biddle 2006), a problem noted for
other Indigenous populations in developed country settings (Usher, Duhaime
and Searles 2003).
The main focus of the diagram, then, is on the overlap where policy makers and
Indigenous people can seek to build meaningful engagement and measurement.
This is the area that allows for a necessarily reductionist translation of Indigenous
people’s own perceptions of their well-being into measurable indices sought by
industry and governments. What is captured in this space is obviously far from
the totality of Indigenous understandings of well-being, a point noted before
in respect of Australian social survey data (Peterson 1996). As Peterson (2005)
has also pointed out, without a common agreed view of different and shared
perceptions of well-being, the danger is that indicators become ethnocentric and
the notion that Indigenous people may have their own life projects is obscured
by the pressing moral and political objective of achieving statistical equality
that comes with policies of closing the gap and mainstreaming (see also
McCausland 2005b; Tehan et al. 2006: 7-8). In working through these questions,
the implications of who is measuring what, for whom, and to what end is
therefore crucial. This cross-cultural encounter involves more than just
recognition of difference—it requires the development of models of bi-cultural
or partnership research involving negotiated design, methodologies and outcomes
(Smith 1999: 173–8). According to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Social Justice Commissioner (Calma 2005), part of the means to this end lies in
ensuring effective full participation of Indigenous people in all stages of data
collection and analysis as an essential component of participatory development
practice, much in the same way as has been achieved in New Zealand (Wereta
and Bishop 2006).
In the sphere of economic activity alone, there is clearly scope within
agreement-making processes to broaden the range of data within the area of
overlap in Fig. 3.1 in a manner that better represents the priorities of Indigenous
people. Indeed, it may be argued that agreement-making requires this (Tehan
et al. 2006: 8). For example, if we return to the above quote from the Pilbara,
then “carrying on traditional cultural ways” might be reflected in a range of
economic activities associated with cultural and language maintenance, arts and
crafts manufacture, land and sea natural resource management, and cultural
tourism that are widespread across remote Australia (Armstrong, Morrison and
Yu 2005; Hill et al. 2005; Toussaint et al. 2001). From a profiling perspective,
the problem is that such activities are poorly quantified and often amorphously
classified in labour statistics under the category ‘Community Development
Employment Program’.
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To take the West Kimberley region as a case in point, there are numerous
examples of significant impacts on local economic participation that derive from
Indigenous priorities for economic development—the trochus hatchery at One
Arm Point, the Pandanus Park freshwater crustacean project, the Manbana
multi-species aquaculture hatchery and discovery centre in Broome, the Emama
Nguda mud crab fishing enterprise in Derby, Goolarri Media Knowledge Centre
in Broome—numerous small cultural tourism enterprises across the region provide
commercial examples of this. Elsewhere, land and sea management activities
include the Dugong and Marine Turtle project on the Dampier Peninsula, the
Saltwater Country project along the north-west Kimberley coastline, the Coastal
Landcare project at Broome, the Karrajarri Coastal Management at Port Smith
involving Karrajarri Rangers, the Freshwater Sawfish project on the Fitzroy
River, and the Rivercare project based on the development of a Fitzroy River
Action Management Plan. Alongside these are activities aimed at developing
consolidated ‘looking after country’ plans across the region combining the
resources of the Kimberley Land Council, the Kimberley Aboriginal Law and
Culture Centre, the Kimberley Aboriginal Pastoral Association, and the Kimberley
Language Resource Centre. An example of this was the establishment by
Kimberley Aboriginal Law and Culture Centre and the Yiriman Project of a pilot
community ranger program at the Jarlmadangah Burru Community in 2006 with
options now being explored to extend training and employment pathways for
Aboriginal Rangers along the lower Fitzroy River. Soon to come on stream within
the Ngurrara Native Title claim is the Great Sandy Desert—Warlu Jilajaa Jumu
Indigenous Protected Area with proposals for further ranger programs.
Altogether, 11 ranger programs currently exist across the Kimberley under the
umbrella of the Kimberley Land Council and North Australia Indigenous Land
and Sea Management Alliance with most of these heavily reliant on Community
Development Employment Program (CDEP) funding.
Despite all this activity, there is no clear sense of overall impact for want of an
appropriate instrument for measuring the collective number and nature of jobs
created and the degree to which these might be further developed and supported
to form part of a broad-based sustainable regional economy. In this regard, it is
significant to note substantial movement on the part of the Commonwealth
government with the establishment of the Working on Country program for
Indigenous employment in activities such as fire management, feral weed and
animal control and heritage site protection.
What hinterland? Defining the region
A fundamental issue for regional profiling, and one that is likely to assume
variable character depending on the nature of different agreements, is the
question of precisely which population (and therefore which geographic area)
is implicated. Consideration of this matter has its origins in the original
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deliberations over the receipt of mining monies from the Ranger mine and the
relevant provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
(Cwlth) (ALRA) that refer to ‘areas affected’. While the political contestations
in regard to this important matter are of interest in themselves, what concerns
us here, with respect to profiling, is the outcome in relation to what ended up
constituting the ‘region’ or geographic unit of analysis.
The Ranger case is instructive. Initially, ‘the traditional owners of the Kakadu
region’ were to receive Ranger up-front monies (Levitus 1991: 156). While the
‘Kakadu region’ was not precisely defined, it was conceived as approximating
Stage 1 of Kakadu National Park and the Ranger Inquiry land claim identified
107 people as the traditional owners of that area (Levitus 1991: 157). However,
in creating an Association to hold dealings with traditional owners, the Northern
Land Council adopted a more inclusive approach to compiling Association
membership. As a consequence, by 1979, membership of the new Gagudju
Association was much larger and comprised individuals, ‘connected with the
Ranger country, either through blood ties, intermarriage, clan relationships or
some shared dreamings’ (Levitus 1991: 157). By the mid-1990s, however, the
Mirrarr Gunjeihmi clan challenged the validity of the Gagudju Association to
receive ‘areas affected’ monies and legal opinion supported their view that the
ALRA reference to area affected referred to the physical area of the Ranger
mining lease rather to the spatially much wider notion of social affectedness
(Altman 2007b, this volume Chapter 2).
All of this greatly complicates matters in terms of circumscribing a definitive
geographic area for the purposes of regional profiling. It also shows that where
there is intention to construct social indicators from secondary sources for a
population defined on the basis of cultural criteria then this can be rendered
difficult by the sort of ambiguities illustrated above. This aside, the fact that
most official and administrative data are available at fixed aggregate levels only
and mostly for relatively large areas (certainly beyond a mining lease area) results
in a degree of inflexibility. In the Kakadu Social Impact Study, this area turned
out to be that bounded by Stages 1 and 2 of Kakadu National Park as these
matched ABS geographic boundaries (Taylor 1999). For the most part, then, the
geographic areas for which statistical information is available (including
administrative data) are dictated by the boundaries set out in the ABS’ Australian
Standard Geographic Classification (ABS 2006a) and the Australian Indigenous
Geographic Classification (ABS 2002).
Accordingly, in profiling socioeconomic circumstances, the tendency has been
to take a broad regional, rather than limited local, perspective on the geography
of mine hinterlands. This is not just because of the sorts of issues raised above,
but also because a key interest of some mining companies and Indigenous
stakeholders is to build regional economies beyond the mine gate (Barker 2006;
Data mining  63
Harvey 2002a). One manifestation of this is the negotiation of Indigenous Land
Use Agreements (such as the Argyle Participation Agreement) that can have
effect over substantial geographic areas. In the lead up to this agreement,
discussions with the Kimberley Land Council about what constituted the region
of interest for baseline profiling focused initially on the area covered by the
Good Neighbour Program involving communities closest to the Argyle mine
site, but then this widened out to incorporate the whole of the east Kimberley
excluding the southern part of Halls Creek Shire, but including Kalumburu
(Taylor 2004a). Likewise, the Century Zinc Project Act 1997, enacted in relation
to the Gulf Communities Agreement, referred to a large area known as the
Carpentaria-Mt Isa mineral province. Such interpretations necessarily expand
the scope of any analysis beyond the potentially narrow geographic bounds of
immediate mine hinterlands to encompass more functional definitions of ‘area
affected’ based on some measure of regionally integrated social, economic and
administrative interactions. In the Pilbara, for example, the physical separation
of most Aboriginal people from actual mine sites means that ‘local’ labour is
likely to be drawn from across the whole of the ABS’ Pilbara Statistical Division
which more or less represents the jurisdiction of the Pilbara Native Title Service
under the umbrella of the Yamatji Marlpa Barna Baba Maaja Aboriginal
Corporation (Taylor and Scambary 2005).
Although regional perspectives clearly emerge in practice, what is lacking is
any operational definition or criteria for guidance on regional selection, except
to say that there seems to be some trade-off between regions identified according
to customs and traditions versus the need for economies of scale and recognition
of existing service delivery frameworks in development planning. This is
captured by the Northern Territory Government’s Stronger Regions Policy that
initially envisaged negotiated regions based on the following criteria:
an area that the people in it see as a region and that the government
agrees should be treated as such; where a reasonable community of
interest exists; where there is capacity to achieve economies of scale in
the achievement of outcomes; and where there is demonstrated capacity
or need for whole of community action to cooperate in the achievement
of shared objectives (Northern Territory Government 2003).
While such groupings might appear intuitively sound, it should be noted that
complexities are almost certain to arise in seeking to establish boundaries for
the purposes of representing regional ‘communities of interest’ with ‘shared
objectives’. Useful insights into the nature of such complexities and how they
might impact on attempts at regional planning are available from Sutton’s (1995)
critique of Davis and Prescott’s (1992) work on Aboriginal boundaries, and
Morphy’s (1999: 36) critique of the Reeves (1998) proposals for reform of the
ALRA.
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Indigenous population trends in Australia
For the most part, Australian mineral provinces occupy large swathes of country
across the remoter parts of the continent. In such areas, significant demographic
shifts have been underway since colonisation although the defining feature of
regional demography remains the high Indigenous share of population and the
relatively high Indigenous rate of natural increase (Taylor, Brown and Bell 2006).
By way of background, it is worth noting that parallels exist between the
modern-day classification of remote areas and the historic distinctions drawn
between ‘colonial’ and ‘settled’ Australia in recognition of the much higher
proportions of Indigenous people in remote areas, and the somewhat different
manner of their incorporation into wider social and economic structures (Rowley
1971).
This spatial framework also provides essential context for understanding the
substantial transfer of land back to Aboriginal ownership across remote regions
that has occurred in recent times, with the prospect of more to come via land
purchase and successful native title claims (Altman, Buchanan and Larson 2007;
Pollack 2001). One prominent long-term analyst of demographic trends in remote
areas views this land transfer as an important element of the post-productivist
transition in Australia’s rangelands with newly recognised land values often
lying outside the old economy, being more culturally-based (Holmes 2002). These
values are manifest in the emergence of a distinct settlement structure on
Aboriginal lands involving the formation of numerous, dispersed, small,
Indigenous communities, especially in the Northern Territory, Western Australia
and the far north of South Australia and Queensland. Most, if not all, of these
communities required no modern economic base, nor have they subsequently
acquired one, at least not in a manner beyond the combined provisions of a
sizeable state sector, a limited private sector, and a customary sector of variable
size. The term ‘hybrid economy’ has been coined to describe this structural
arrangement (Altman 2005a). Across remote areas, a total of 1112 such
communities were identified by the Community Housing and Infrastructure
Needs Survey (CHINS) in 2006 with a total estimated usual population of 80,500
(ABS 2006b: 17). The vast majority (838, or 75 per cent) of these were very small
in size with less than 50 persons, although collectively these very small places
accounted for only 10,200 persons, or 13 per cent of the total in remote discrete
communities (ABS 2006b: 5).
For reasons of differential population dynamics, the Indigenous population in
remote parts of Australia grew by 23 per cent between 1981 and 2001 while
overall non-Indigenous population growth over the same areas has been negative
since 1986 (Taylor 2003). Away from the larger mining towns and service centres
of remote Australia, Indigenous peoples are increasingly the majority. These
trends are leading to a rising Indigenous share of remote area population and
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there is every reason to expect that this will continue. While there is no denying
that minerals development has been a major stimulus to population growth in
these areas since the 1960s, it is also true that this has been highly variable due
to boom and bust in commodity prices, while part of the ongoing dynamic has
been a distortion of underlying non-Indigenous population growth rates due to
the expansion of fly-in-fly-out arrangements (Storey 2001).
Across the vast arid zone, the Indigenous population is projected to rise from
39 800 in 2006 to 47 000 in 2021 while the non-Indigenous population is projected
to decline from 135 000 to 124 000 (Taylor Brown and Bell 2006) producing an
increase in the Indigenous share of population in Arid Australia from 23 per
cent to 27 per cent. In the combined regions across the wet tropics from Cape
York to the Kimberley, similar projections to 2016 indicate a rise in Indigenous
population from 25 600 to 32 400 representing an increase in population share
from 38 per cent to 42 per cent (Taylor and Bell 2001). Even in the more
economically dynamic remote regions of the outback, such as the Pilbara, the
Indigenous share of the usually resident regional population is projected to
continue to rise from 16 per cent in 2001 to 18 per cent by 2016 (Taylor and
Scambary 2005). Some indication of the sorts of figures involved for Indigenous
growth in selected mining regions is shown in Fig. 3.2 using 1996 Census based
cohort-component projections, although ideally such projections would also be
informed by economic impact forecasting (Phibbs 1989).
Employment implications of Indigenous population growth
Given that commitments to Indigenous employment and training form a key
part of many mining agreements, one of the key implications of this high
Indigenous population growth is the manner in which it interacts with labour
demand and supply. In recent years, the thrust of both government and minerals
sector policy has been towards increasing Indigenous employment in mainstream
jobs. If we take an historic view of this we can see that while the numbers of
Indigenous people employed in mining regions may have increased over the
past 30 years or so, the rate has not because of a failure of jobs growth to keep
pace with population growth. What then is the scale of the task ahead if the aim
is to increase the rate of Indigenous employment? To establish this, we can use
the projection of the future size of the working age population and consider this
against variable scenarios in terms of regional employment rates.
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Fig. 3.2 Indigenous population projections 1996–2016 in selected
mining regions
The West Kimberley region provides a useful example. By 2021, the Indigenous
adult population of the West Kimberley is projected to increase by 36 per cent
(or an average of 2.1 per cent per annum) to reach a population of 9156—an
increase of almost 2500 persons. What are the implications of this growth for
future jobs needs if certain employment rates are to be achieved? Two scenarios
are explored in Table 3.2. The first considers the number of Indigenous jobs
that would be required in the West Kimberley by 2021 if the 2006 Indigenous
employment/population ratio were to remain unchanged at 53.5 per cent
(inclusive of CDEP). The answer is 4 898 jobs, or an additional 2 381. The second
scenario considers the future job requirements necessary to raise the Indigenous
employment/population ratio to that recorded for non-Indigenous residents (79.3
per cent). This requires the number in work to reach 7261—massively in excess
of the current level. In effect, to close the regional employment gap with the
non-Indigenous workforce, the number of Indigenous people in work across the
West Kimberley would need to almost triple over the next 15 year period, with
an additional 316 jobs created and then occupied each year.
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Table 3.2 Extra Indigenous jobs required in the West Kimberley by 2021
Extra jobs required by
2021




Employment/population ratios in 2006
23814898251753.5a
47447261251779.3b
a. The Indigenous census-derived employment/population ratio in 2006 inclusive of CDEP.
b. The non-Indigenous census-derived employment/population ratio in 2006.
c. Based on projections of Indigenous adult population by 2021 (9156).
Source: Taylor 2006b.
Implications for government and industry
As noted at the outset, the role of applied demography is to provide an essential
quantum to discussions of needs, aspirations, and policy development. The basic
message conveyed from such applications to date in mining regions across
northern Australia is that little had been achieved over the decades since mining
commenced in terms of enhancing overall Indigenous socioeconomic status, and
that this is now exacerbated by rapid population growth. Despite current
unprecedented demand for Indigenous labour in the formal economy, the capacity
of labour to respond to this remains substantially constrained by limited human
capital. As a consequence, many in the Indigenous population will continue to
experience structural dis-engagement from mainstream work in the absence of
substantially enhanced infrastructure and services to redress historic exclusion.
Of course, in pursuit of a social licence to operate, major corporates are active
in engaging Indigenous workers with many mine sites adopting target quotas.
But such is the depth of supply-side disadvantage that a major challenge lies
ahead in meeting these targets (certainly in a collective sense) given that they
are likely to come close to exhausting entire local supplies of employable labour.
For this reason, companies are increasingly investing in remedial programs to
enhance work readiness and to address structural barriers in meeting ‘fitness
for work’ requirements (Tiplady and Barclay 2007). Even so, if current targets
were to be achieved, the additional jobs created might only suffice to keep pace
with the growth in the Indigenous working-age population. Thus, while much
might be accomplished by the mining sector in the years ahead in terms of raising
levels of Indigenous employment, little change might be discernable in terms of
aggregate social indicators, with a large component of the population remaining
marginalised. To avoid this, it is essential that all sectors of regional economies
should be utilised for Indigenous engagement, including activities associated
with Indigenous priorities and aspirations in arts and craft manufacture, land
and sea resource management, and cultural tourism. However, whatever
development options are pursued, substantial constraints on participation remain
to be overcome across the spectrum of social and economic conditions.
To indicate the scale of some of these constraints that have been quantified,
Table 3.3 provides indicative proxies of labour force exclusion in the Pilbara
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for 2006. It is necessary to bear in mind that the adult population for that year
was projected to be 4,759. What this shows is that the vast majority of Indigenous
adults in the region do not have full schooling; or a qualification; around half
of adults remain outside the labour force; many are hospitalised at any one time;
others are subject to chronic conditions requiring strict management regimes;
many are arrested and incarcerated (especially young males); and feeding into
this adult realm are relatively low achievers from the education system. In any
event, the potential for prolonged and productive workforce participation on
the part of young people is severely curtailed by premature mortality.
Table 3.3 Summary indicative proxies of Indigenous labour force exclusion,
Pilbara region, 2006
4759Population aged 15+
4200Has no post-school qualification
1500Has less than Year 10 schooling
2190Not in the labour force
2800Hospitalised each year (all persons)
1020Has diabetes (25 years and over)
1020Has a disability
1050Arrested each year
310In custody/supervision at any one time
60%Achieves Year 7 literacy (current attendees)
<50%15 year olds surviving to age 65
Source: Taylor and Scambary 2005.
From a policy perspective, levels of economic exclusion on the scale implied
here raise questions about the adequacy of government resourcing to meet the
backlog of disadvantage that has so obviously accumulated in many mining
regions. Looking ahead, this raises questions about the costs to industry, to
government, and to Indigenous people, if social and economic conditions remain
the same as currently experienced. Basically, these costs will simply escalate in
line with the growth in population. However, to properly assess adequacy in
this context, it is not sufficient to consider amounts expended by governments
on Indigenous programs separately from the key questions of whether such
amounts are commensurate with the scale of the task of overcoming disadvantage,
and whether they are equitable on a per capita basis when compared with
spending in the States and Territories and nationally on people in similar
circumstances.
It is interesting to note that the only analysis to have measured spending in this
way for a single Aboriginal community (Wadeye) in the Northern Territory
uncovered gross inadequacies and inequities in crucial areas of capacity building
such as education, training and infrastructure with associated high expenditures
in health, welfare and incarceration (Taylor and Stanley 2005). If similar
inadequacies were to exist in communities across mining regions, and at this
stage this is not known, then the level of government intervention aimed at
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overcoming disadvantage among the growing Indigenous populations of these
regions would not only be found wanting, it would simply be ‘funding into a
deficit’ (Ah Kit 2004). This reflects the regressive nature of the link between
demography and economy in contemporary Indigenous Australia and it means
that governments, and industry for that matter, can either invest up-front to
build capabilities, or pay heavily in the future to manage the social and economic
consequences. Whatever the case, a fiscal response is unavoidable.
Conclusion
With approximately 18 per cent of the Australian continent under some form
of Indigenous tenure (Altman, Buchanan and Larson 2007), and with this set to
rise via native title determinations and land purchases, the demand for statistical
information on Indigenous groups as proprietors of territory is also growing in
the context of formal agreement-making. As with the broader government
agendas of closing the gaps, applied demography has found a natural and
successful disciplinary niche here by exploiting the rich seams of census, survey
and administrative data that make up the burgeoning Indigenous statistical
archive, even at local and regional levels. In particular, it is the predictive
capacity of the demographic repertoire that has mostly caught the eye of regional
stakeholders (Harvey and Brereton 2005) with its fiscal opportunity-cost message
that business as usual is simply not an option in Indigenous affairs because of
the weight of population momentum. However, there are two important
constraints on the efficacy of this contribution that need attention if the interests
of Indigenous stakeholders are to be truly represented and if the scope of applied
demography is to be extended.
The first of these relates to geography and concerns the long-standing conundrum
of determining which area/peoples are affected/implicated by mining. In regard
to this, it remains the case that analysts are constrained by the configuration of
official ABS and other administrative boundaries that are used for the collection
and dissemination of official statistical data. While it is true that the Australian
Indigenous Geographic Classification of the ABS attempts to best reflect the
spatial distribution of the Indigenous population—to enable a ‘demography in
situ’ as it were (to use Kreager’s (1982) term describing demography built from
the ground upwards)—in some ways this misses the point entirely. The primary
organising principles of Indigenous social formation are both spatial and
socio-relational (Morphy 2007) and these invariably do not coincide to produce
discretely bounded social groupings that neatly mesh with units of the Australian
Indigenous Geographic Classification. In a nutshell, the statistical geography
available to analysts is unlikely to provide a demography of Indigenous polities
with rights and interests in particular places, or agreements.
In many ways this highlights an important distinction raised by Rowse (2008)
between Indigenous populations and Indigenous peoples. Our current
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demography refers to Indigenous populations revealed by standard identification
questions and is best suited to the provision of citizen rights. What it does not
necessarily provide for are the interests of groups of Indigenous people in
proprietory rights, in particular over areas of land. All across Australia we are
witnessing a growing discrepancy between the best-intentioned of statistical
output frameworks and the actual needs of Indigenous land-holding groups for
an ethnographically-informed demography suited to their aspirations for
managing the Indigenous estate via land use agreements.
The second constraint refers to the nature of available data themselves. While
information on vital demographic events are constrained only by the degree to
which this is gathered in respect of any population, the greater concern is to do
with information on population characteristics as well as broader epistemological
questions surrounding notions of well-being and what these imply about
appropriate variables to be measuring. As things stand, the social, economic,
and even some cultural, features of Indigenous populations are invariably
established via mainstream categories. Whether these coincide with Indigenous
categories in any given situation, and whether such categories can be identified,
measured and are desired, remains a moot point.
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4. Aboriginal organisations and
development: The structural context
Robert Levitus
In recent decades, the debate over mining development and Indigenous peoples
has broadened, both geographically and thematically. The resistance paradigm
that asserts the rights of communities against a new industrialised wave of
dispossession has been sustained and applied to a succession of new case studies
(Cultural Survival 2001; Downing et al. 2003; Hyndman 1994; Lane and Chase
1996; Roberts 1978). Alongside that, and especially in developed countries such
as Australia and Canada, attention has shifted to work within a paradigm of
engagement, negotiation and management (Howitt 2001: 208–65; Render 2005;
Vachon and Toyne 1983). Much discussion now revolves around the achievement
of best-practice processes to maximise the short and long-term benefits that
mining can offer, and mitigate or compensate for the problems it causes (Hill
1999; Indigenous Support Services and ACIL Consulting (ISS/ACIL) 2001;
O’Faircheallaigh 1996, 2003b; Sosa and Keenan 2001).
The most widely recognised benefit is the direct injection of earned income into
the Indigenous domain, either by employment of Indigenous people in the mining
operation or support for Indigenous businesses created to service the project
(Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen 1984). A problem affecting both these economic
inflows is their long-term sustainability, especially in the local area. Once the
mining operation ceases, Aboriginal employees with skills and experience may
be faced with a choice of returning to an environment of unemployment or
underemployment, or moving to areas with an active job market. Similarly,
businesses may have to fold or seek custom elsewhere.
A more indirect way in which mining companies have sought to transfer benefits
to Indigenous communities is through the funding of local organisations which
apply the received resources to various programs of their own design. In some
cases these organisations’ revenues will come in part from their role as business
operators and thus face the same risk of mine closure. More importantly,
however, mining agreements can direct substantial revenue flows, in the form
of entitlements to an agreed percentage of mine income, to local organisations,
allowing or even requiring them to accumulate capital funds over which they
exercise long-term trusteeship. This is an important but under-utilised way in
which mining companies can contribute to the preconditions for long-term
remote-area Indigenous development that is not ancillary to the mining operation
itself.
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Aboriginal organisations funded from mining revenue sit at the intersection of
two policy discourses in Australia. The first is that adverted to already: that
carried on within and around the mining industry itself about benefit packages
for communities affected by mining operations. While also part of an ongoing
national and international debate over social justice towards Indigenous people,
this concern is internally motivated by increasing corporate recognition of the
business case for preserving a social license to operate in remote areas where the
population is often predominantly Indigenous. The second is the ongoing
discourse around national policy in the area of Indigenous affairs. Within the
paradigm of self-determination that had currency at the Federal level from the
1970s to the 1990s, Aboriginal organisations were strategically central. During
those years also, the issue of the social license to operate came to the attention
of some mining companies operating in Australia, so that the emerging industry
attitude began to align with the national policy attitude. State government
recalcitrance, especially in Queensland and Western Australia, and industry
reaction, especially from the peak Australian Mining Industry Council (now
Minerals Council of Australia), meant that this was never a uniform trend on
either side. Moreover, the most recent phase of Federal Aboriginal policy-making1
has substantially abandoned the self-determination paradigm. Nevertheless the
recognition of a form of native title in Australian law and a growing trend
towards agreement-making have developed to sustain and expand the niches
occupied by local Indigenous organisations, and the industry’s preparedness to
acknowledge their standing.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider Aboriginal organisations in their
intended role as agents of development. It aims to identify a set of structural
conditions under which they operate and which bear upon their capacity to
implement development. My focus here thus falls within the paradigm of
‘capacity building’ that has attracted recent attention (Commonwealth of Australia
2004: 111–65). It is distinct from the common emphasis upon operational deficits
in matters such as skills, knowledge and leadership suffered by many Indigenous
organisations, but it does relate, especially in one of the later sections, to
questions of governance. While the primary concern, consistent with the theme
of this volume, is those organisations funded by mining revenue, they make up
a small sub-set of Aboriginal organisations in Australia, and share the same
general policy origins as the others. Thus, much of the following discussion has
a wider focus. However, while the structural conditions that I identify are not
unique to mining-funded organisations, I argue that several factors, including
recent changes in the Indigenous affairs policy environment, cause these
conditions to impinge upon such organisations in particular ways. Depending
1 This is being written immediately following the election of November 2007 in which the conservative
Liberal-National Party coalition was replaced by a Labor Government.
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on what share of their total resources are accounted for by mining, this has
implications for their capacity to define a developmental path on behalf of their
constituents.
After looking in the next section at the emergence of Aboriginal organisations
in policy history, I discuss four structural conditions affecting their capacity to
effect developmental change on behalf of an Aboriginal constituency. Central
to this analysis is Charles Rowley’s conceptualisation of Aboriginal organisations
as a carapace. As such, they are simultaneously a transactional boundary and a
point of articulation between external agencies and an Aboriginal domain. The
structural conditions that I identify bear principally on these qualities. The first
is the level of political authority at which the organisation articulates with its
resource providers in the wider society, usually a state agency, sometimes a
mining company. The second is the manner in which resources are transferred
across that point of articulation into the jurisdiction of the Aboriginal
organisation. The third is the availability of alternative sources of servicing and
supply, independent of the organisation, to which its members or clientele may
have resort. The fourth is the endogenous relationship between the organisation
and the Aboriginal domain that it exists to service and/or represent. I then
consider the particular position of organisations receiving funding from mining
agreements with respect to these structural conditions. In the penultimate section,
I discuss a central developmental function incumbent upon organisations located
at this resourcing interface.
The Aboriginal organisation in policy: carapace and domain
The idea of corporatising the Aboriginal interest emerged from the progressive
political thinking of the 1960s. Those corporate entities became a critical
instrument through which the new policy paradigm of self-determination was
to operate. Rowley, and like thinkers such as Strehlow (n.d.: 19–24) and Coombs
(Rowse 2000a), argued for respecting the integrative values of the Aboriginal
social group, and allowing room for Aboriginal group choice in implementing
social change. They saw the Aboriginal domain as a basis for new forms of
planning and action, as ‘an opportunity for some real political science, ... for
some real government’ (Rowley 1966: 236). Rowley and Coombs wanted to admit
the Aboriginal group as an agent of development, given an expanded conception
of what development might mean. So the design of suitable forms of Aboriginal
organisation and the fostering of an Indigenous leadership were strategically
central to these policy reformers (Rowse 2000a: 31–3).
This was a decisive step in the field of Aboriginal development. Prior to this,
Aborigines figured as welfare recipients or units of labour. Even where
congregated as ‘communities’ on reserves, settlements and missions, Aborigines
participated in the developmental programs of the assimilation era mainly as
workers in internal servicing and primary production jobs, making sure that
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the structures of dependency were at least functional. The creation in the 1970s
of Aboriginal councils and servicing agencies, and their recognition as an entry
point for government moneys payable to those settlements, were intended to
promote the conditions for self-determined development, that is, the endogenous
determination of the future of those places as Aboriginal.
Self-determination thinking was open to the spread of such arrangements
throughout Aboriginal Australia for almost any purpose relevant to local needs
(Anderson 2004: 260; Commonwealth of Australia 2004: 111–12; Rowley 1972:
439–41). They were adopted even where Aborigines lived among whites, and
the physical separateness characteristic of remote communities was absent. The
adoption of the legally incorporated form across all areas of Aboriginal interest
proceeded apace, so that from the mid-1970s many thousands of associations,
services, centres, councils and corporations were registered under either the
Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976,2  or
corresponding State and Territory legislation. Rowse has written about this
explosion of Aboriginal organisations across Australia as a central manifestation
of the shift from assimilation to self-determination (Rowse 2000b: 1515–16; 2005:
214–19).
That policy step has consequently had major ramifications in the structuring of
resource flows and political activity in all Aboriginal domains. The ‘community’,
given legal personality by organisation into corporate forms, was deemed to be
the initiator of development. From the perspective of the state, Aboriginal
organisations were each a carapace beneath which the business of development
could be allowed to proceed. These Indigenous legal entities thus carried the
weight of the state’s expectations that it could fund self-determining Aborigines
to deliver development (see Batty 2005).
The two terms, domain and carapace, require comment. In his discussion of the
concept of the Aboriginal domain, Rowse (1992: 19–21) substantiates it primarily
in terms of content: Aboriginal people, using Aboriginal languages, organising
themselves according to Aboriginal values for the pursuit of Aboriginal priorities.
He also adverts to a criterion of size, but does not insist upon it, noting that
some writers have applied the term to Aboriginal fields much smaller than, for
example, the west Arnhem regional domain described by von Sturmer. Indeed
Rowse distinguishes domain from ‘enclave’, a term he prefers to apply to such
larger regions. The large-scale mining projects considered in this volume occur
in regions where many Aboriginal people live in discrete settlements that would
satisfy such a macro conception of the Aboriginal domain. Others, however, live
in towns among white neighbours. Like Rowse, therefore, I do not wish to impose
any requirement of size. Any arena in which affairs are consistently conducted
2  Recently replaced by the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006.
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in an Aboriginal idiom and informed by Aboriginal meanings, such that
Aboriginal people expect such a mode of behaviour to occur there, is an instance
of the Aboriginal domain.
In the last two decades, the concept of domain has been overtaken by new modes
of conceptualising relations between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous in
Australia (Hinkson and Smith 2005). I retain the concept here because it was
central to the model of incorporation by which Rowley and his colleagues thought
self-determination could be activated. Domain and carapace were the two
structural halves of that model. In this chapter, inquiring into the activation of
that model in the context of development, I want to ask how those constituent
concepts fare in the face of what I argue to be the structural preconditions of
such a role. In other words, we can judge the adaptability and durability of
Rowley’s conception by seeing how well it has meshed with those preconditions.
Indeed, in such an analytical context, the concept of domain remains, in my
view, a necessary tool for considering relations of articulation between
collectivities. Moreover, the ethnographically minimal conception of domain
being proposed here implies none of the hermetic or endogenously
self-reproducing characteristics that have been the main cause for criticism of
the concept.
Rowley (1972: 423, 429) conceived of the Aboriginal organisation as a carapace
in the sense of a protective cover for the localised Aboriginal domain. My use
here of the concept of carapace does not depend on the relationship between
organisation and domain taking any particular ethnographic form, but rather
arises from the positioning (and self-positioning) of organisations within policy.
Later discussion will refigure the carapace as often more partial and fragmented
than allowed by the initial vision of policy planners and intellectuals.
Viewed from the outside, it is clear that limitations upon the capacity of
Aboriginal organisations to facilitate the self-determined development expected
of them are implicit in the niche that has been created for them in public
Aboriginal affairs. Historically, colonialism forged relations of articulation that
now make Aboriginal society everywhere a part-society. To borrow a metaphor
once prominent in anthropological theory, responsibility for the social
reproduction of Aboriginal society is therefore nowhere located entirely within
an Aboriginal social universe. It always draws to some extent on external sources
of supply that are under non-Aboriginal control. This is so even in those remote
areas where Indigenous domains are more socially self-contained. As discussed
above, Aboriginal organisations are themselves an artefact of a particular moment
in the policy management of those relations of articulation. They occupy niches
created when the state decided that the points of articulation between Australian
society and the various manifestations of Aboriginal part-societies that it
encapsulates, should be made more permeable to Aboriginal participation and
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receptive to Aboriginal concerns. There they proliferated to a collective position
of prominence.
As carapace, the Aboriginal organisation is an institution that creates a formal
transactional boundary for certain purposes between its membership or clientele
and the outside world. It is at the same time a conduit for external resources
flowing into the Aboriginal domain. In the discussion that follows I want to look
at that articulatory role and what it implies for Aboriginal development. The
institutional boundary just referred to was seen to be essential if the development
enabled by incoming resources was to be self-determined. The policy function
of the organisational carapace as a point of articulation between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal domains is thus central for realising self-determined development.
There are at least two other structural conditions, however, that affect its potency
in that respect. The first is the political level at which the point of articulation
is established, and the second is the mode of transfer of resources from the
non-Aboriginal domain.
Condition 1: Political level of articulation
The design of the carapace—the geographical area, functions, Aboriginal
population and other organisations that it will encompass—has in past years
been a major site of public debate over Aboriginal political futures. It seems that
Rowley’s (1972: 412–13, 424) initial conception presumed an organic
correspondence between the organisation and the local Aboriginal group, and
the Council for Aboriginal Affairs in the early 1970s similarly thought in terms
of ‘a politics of localised empowerments’ (Rowse 2000a: 107–8). In time, political
evolution and the legislative recognition of new rights at State, Territory and
national levels produced correspondingly higher levels of Aboriginal organisation
that typically discharged servicing and distributional responsibilities internally
and lobbying and representative functions externally. Land councils and the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) have been the most
familiar of these.
A domain of Indigenous control in the management of some resources intended
for certain functions, is created beneath each such carapace. To that extent, the
relationship between domain and organisation is reciprocal, such that the
disposition of resources through the organisation tends to re-figure Aboriginal
political relationships in reference to it (Martin and Finlayson 1996: 6–7; Sutton
1998: 69). Where the carapace exists at a high level of political aggregation,
regional or larger, and other more localised organisations relate to that higher
level as clients or constituents, that initial point of articulation with
non-Aboriginal funding providers overlooks a geographically broad and
internally differentiated Aboriginal domain of decision-making and service
provision.
78  Power, Culture, Economy
The structures operating in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) (ALRA) for distribution of moneys
from resource developments on Aboriginal land, or those proposed by Pearson
(2000a: 67–73) for a new model of governance in Cape York, are such instances.
Smith (2002: 25–7) has proposed a model of jurisdictional devolution that she
calls ‘regionally-dispersed layered community governance’, whereby major
communities are conceived as bases of Indigenous authority and responsibility.
They would then act ‘as the starting point for aggregation at the sub-community
and regional levels’, servicing smaller satellite settlements, and being themselves
aggregated for particular functions that are more effectively discharged at higher
political levels. It seems clear, however, that any institutional arrangement
established at a supra-community level would require its own funding
entitlements from the state for stability and effectiveness, lest it fall away with
each successive community secession. Thus the structural depth and geographical
breadth of the Aboriginal domain depends in part on the vertical positioning of
that linkage with the non-Aboriginal world that is made at the point of entry
of external financial transfers.
Condition 2: Mode of resource transfer
The other important set of mechanisms affecting the jurisdictional power of the
Aboriginal carapace relate to the manner of payment and extent of oversight of
funds paid into the organisations concerned. In part this is the familiar issue of
accountability. The application of external public funds to internal Indigenous
programs places Aboriginal organisations in a mediating role between external
accountability requirements and internal cultural conventions and proprieties
over matters of access, distribution and control (Commonwealth of Australia
2004: 128–34; Macdonald 2004: 62–4; Martin and Finlayson 1996: 1–8). Much
comment has recognised the difficulties that office-bearers and staff face in
attempting to effect positive change in the face of multiple expectations that are
both incompatible amongst themselves and unsympathetic to the overall
operating environment (Austin-Broos 2003: 128; Sullivan 1996: 95–7; Thorburn
2006). The associated stresses may perpetuate the managerial dominance of
relative outsiders who have nothing to lose but the job itself.
The complexity of both applying and accounting for external funds, and the
weight this places on small organisations with limited skills, has been another
difficulty. Such demands often leave no time for strategic planning, much less
for the ‘vision thing’. Pearson (1999: 33) criticises the ‘hydra’ character of
government articulation with Cape York communities, of multiple parties and
programs, and demands a more coordinated and holistic regional approach to
resource use in which government plays a junior role (and see Gerritsen 1982:
18–19; Macdonald 2004: 44–5; Smith 2002: 6, but cf. Gray and Sanders 2006:
22–3, 25; Sanders 1993). A recent phase of policy innovation in Aboriginal affairs
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has emphasised coordination of agencies’ programs across all functional areas
through the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination and a number of Indigenous
Coordination Centres at the national and regional levels respectively (Office of
Indigenous Policy Coordination 2004). The ideas behind these new structures
are not entirely new (Gray and Sanders 2006: 19–21). Under the previous Labor
Government for example, Daffen proposed that the Department of Administrative
Services should take on just such a coordination role at national and community
levels (Daffen 1995: 21–5, 39–51).
The complementary question is that of what scope Aboriginal organisations will
be allowed to determine use of those moneys. The mode of transferring funds
counts for much. I will distinguish here between block grants and pooled
funding. By the former I mean a grant from a single funding source concerned
with a particular functional area, such as health or education, in which the
budget consists of one instead of many line items. The Aboriginal organisation
is simply presented with, say, $5 million for housing, rather than $5 million
divided into smaller amounts for particular structures, landscaping, fittings etc.
The funds take the form of a single undifferentiated grant for unified Indigenous
management and disbursement on housing needs. In that way, external transfers
can, beneath that carapace, be converted into internal operational autonomy.
In its expansion across the country from the 1970s to the 1990s (Sanders 2005:
205–7), the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme
pioneered a new pattern of block grants in which the funds consolidated are
not existing organisational grants, but individual welfare entitlements. By pooling
unemployment benefits supplemented with amounts for capital and
administration, these schemes place substantial resources at the disposal of
Aboriginal management boards that function, generally, at about the suburban
or municipal levels, and are able to mobilise the labour of between dozens and
hundreds of local participants. At the time of writing, CDEP has passed through
a phase of retraction under the policies of the Howard Government. Profitable
settlement enterprises, especially general stores and alcohol canteens, offer, more
indirectly and mostly at a smaller scale, the same potential. They can convert
the transfers of government welfare payments to individual local Aborigines
into a substantial retailing profit, some of which can similarly be made available
for collective purposes such as airstrips or grants for education or ceremony
(Arthur 1999: 7; Commonwealth of Australia 2000a: 90).
By pooled funding I mean the combining of allocations for a particular functional
area from a number of funding sources, say a Commonwealth and its
corresponding State/Territory department, into a joint payment, such as those
disbursed by the Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory
(Commonwealth of Australia 2000a: 65–6). Once again, the aim is to enhance
self-determination by allowing a greater degree of internal operational autonomy
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(Smith 2002: 20–2). Such arrangements were trialed in the area of Indigenous
health.
Under the trials each of the [Commonwealth, State and Territory]
jurisdictions involved contributes an amount to the funds pool, based
on an estimate of what would have been available to the community had
there not been a trial. . . . .
This pool of funds, which is no longer constrained by the specific rules
of the programs of origin, can then be used by the community for service
substitution and to address the health priorities that the community itself
considers to be the most pressing.
The advantage of the trials is that there is much more intensive
community involvement, both through consultation prior to the
commencement of the trial and in the decision making on health services
delivery during the course of the trial (Commonwealth of Australia
2000a: 30).
Conditions 1 and 2: Articulation, aggregation and autonomy
This mechanism has appeared particularly apt in company with the kind of
vertical political development discussed previously. Prior to the abolition of the
Federal-level ATSIC, a good deal of reformist thinking was focused on redesigning
the political structures of Aboriginal affairs towards institutionalising Aboriginal
authority at higher levels, and consolidating the revenues passing through those
carapaces into Aboriginal domains at once larger and more functionally versatile.
Reeves (1998), in his model for a new Aboriginal land rights regime, proposed
a Northern Territory Aboriginal Council that would receive all royalties3  payable
from resource developments on Aboriginal lands, to be disbursed through a
competitive granting system to regional land councils, and then used to meet
local needs for social or economic development.
Centralising the royalty stream would have required a proportion of it to be
re-appropriated from existing local royalty associations. These bodies, and their
individual members who in some cases receive cash distributions, would have
no further direct entitlement (Reeves 1998: 361–3, 609). Reeves hoped that the
vastly larger funds directed by ATSIC and Territory agencies into Aboriginal
programs would be delivered the same way. Similarly, the Commonwealth Grants
Commission raised the possibility of Indigenous-controlled State-level bodies
through which all Commonwealth, and perhaps State, funding for Indigenous
purposes would pass (Commonwealth of Australia 2000b: 59–60). Such a unified
point of articulation in each State or Territory would constitute a single carapace
3  Strictly speaking, the moneys received by Aboriginal interests are royalty equivalents—that is an
amount paid to them by government equal to the amount of royalties received by government.
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over what, it was argued, would be a more functionally integrated Indigenous
domain.
Evident in some of these proposals, however, is a move beyond block and pooled
funding to something in the nature of general revenue, in which there is a
consolidation of funds from all sources, whether different agencies or levels of
government, into a single sum, and no prescription even as to the ‘portfolio’
area to which the moneys are to be applied. As the terms used here imply, the
degree of internal autonomy that this facilitates approaches the prerogatives of
government. Pearson (1999, 2000a: 70–2, 78–80), operating at the regional level
of Cape York, has argued explicitly that the political relationship between the
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains should be negotiated across an interface,
in my terms a point of articulation, instituted at regional level, and across which
resources should pass from the state with minimal regulation. As part of his
campaign to convert ‘negative’ into ‘positive’ welfare, these resources should
include those moneys currently being provided directly to individual Aborigines
as pensions and benefits, thereby replicating the CDEP mechanism at a
geographically and financially more inclusive level (Pearson 2000a: 88).
A further possibility arises from the work of Pretes (2005), who reviewed national
and provincial-level trust arrangements in other parts of the world. These convert
windfall or limited-term resource development payments into a permanent
income-producing trust fund by means of investment in metropolitan capital
markets. He reports that the tiny Pacific island country of Tuvalu entered an
arrangement with aid donors for the advance payment of aid moneys into a trust,
the income of which has largely removed the need for aid (Pretes 2005: 230–42).
East Timor’s Petroleum Fund is another example. Such arrangements have not
been widely explored at the local or regional Aboriginal level, but they signal
the possibility of a further step, from the device of converting external subsidy
into internal operational autonomy, to transforming it into dedicated capital (eg.
Altman 1985a: 143–5 and passim).
By progressively reducing the degree of prescription that accompanies external
funding as it enters the Aboriginal domain, such institutional devices turn the
organisational structure into a more absolute transactional boundary, and a more
effective carapace. However, it is only necessary to recount these proposals of
several years ago to be struck by how sharply they run against the more recent
trend of policy. While that trend is now indeed towards program coordination
and pooling of funds, developmental goals are to be negotiated between
Indigenous interests and government, and progress towards those goals subject
to official monitoring (Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination 2004). Innovations
such as the health funding trials were among the last to explicitly endorse what
was in effect a self-determination ethos at the level of local application.
82  Power, Culture, Economy
Following the abolition of ATSIC, renewed effort was directed at the coordination
of administration and funding both between agencies and across levels of
government in all areas of Indigenous servicing, as mentioned above. This ‘whole
of government’ approach was combined, however, with a new assertiveness by
Federal policy-makers insisting on the achievement of negotiated outcomes aimed
at the improvement of conventional social indicators. This new attitude was
proclaimed primarily by the highly publicised instrument of Shared
Responsibility Agreements, although they are supposed to cover discretionary
funding only (Commonwealth of Australia 2005: 100–3; McCausland 2005a), and
so far account for a tiny proportion of spending on Indigenous affairs (Gray and
Sanders 2006: 13–14).4  Most recently, the Federal intervention in Northern
Territory Aboriginal communities has dramatised government insistence on
integration and public oversight as the path to acceptable outcomes in the policy
arena of remote area Indigenous development. These initiatives were undertaken
without reference to the major Northern Territory land councils. In other words,
Aboriginal organisations are to become less of a transactional boundary, not
more. The carapace is being removed.
Condition 3: Alternative sources of supply
Having considered up to this point structural conditions affecting the Aboriginal
organisation in its relations with the external world of non-Aboriginal resource
providers, I turn now to look at its relations with the Aboriginal domain that it
services and represents. In this section I briefly discuss a third condition affecting
the capacity of organisations to bring about self-determined development. This
relates again to the extent to which an organisation is able to satisfy Rowley’s
image of the carapace, a protective layer that intercedes between the Aboriginal
domain and the outside world, manages incoming traffic from non-Aboriginal
agencies, and creates interior space for the formulation of Aboriginal priorities
and responses. The limiting factor here is the availability of alternative service
providers, and the scope that individuals and families from within the Aboriginal
domain have, or seek, to conduct their affairs through alternative connections.
The capacity of Aboriginal agencies to effect developmental change is dependent
upon the relative intensity of their engagement with local Aboriginal affairs,
with the daily functionality of Aboriginal lives, both in itself and by comparison
with the Aboriginal business that passes them by. A comparison may help to
make the point.
Remote area organisations seem best placed to maximise their share of dealings
with Aborigines within their particular geographical and functional catchments.
So, for example, when Pearson has made his arguments for a regional Cape York
4  Gray and Sanders (2006: 13) refer to 120 Shared Responsibility Agreements signed by November
2005. The government website <http://www.indigenous.gov.au/sra/search/srasearch.aspx> lists 267
as at December 2007.
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planning process that will take charge of all resources due to Aborigines from
government and other parties, he then turns to the question of internal allocation
for social and economic purposes beneath an Aboriginal organisational carapace
that can claim almost comprehensive coverage of Aboriginal affairs on the
settlements within that region. His proposals on this, as evidenced in his
distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ welfare, are about changing the
impact of existing resource inputs by managing them in a manner that promotes
development instead of perpetuating dependency. Pearson’s vision takes
advantage of the conditions of remote Australia, where the lines of articulation
connecting Aboriginal people on the ground with external servicing and welfare
regimes, or to sources of supply in general, are limited in number, and therefore
able to be negotiated and rationalised into a unified regional management
structure. Perhaps the most ambitious instance of such a program was that
attempted by the Indigenous Nodom and Pindan companies in the Pilbara in
the 1940s and 1950s, in which company governance aimed to provide an
exclusive regime of social control and development for all Aboriginal camp
residents (Holcombe 2006: 7, 9, 11).
Turning to settled Australia, such possibilities for consolidated management are
more limited, and were explored mainly at the local level through CDEP schemes,
most now abolished. Whatever Aboriginal carapace can be constructed in the
settled regions, it is always partial in both functional and geographical terms,
existing alongside a multiplicity of non-Aboriginal agencies—shops, government
offices, charities, employers, schools—through which Aboriginal people are
able to conduct their affairs. The following passage describes the reach of
Aboriginal organisational domains, and intersperses them with those mainstream
domains accessed through Aboriginal linkage staff, in the small New South Wales
country town of Walgett as listed by a member of a local Aboriginal family.
In the town there are several Aboriginal community services. . . . Today
the most central services are the Walgett Aboriginal Medical Service and
the Aboriginal Lands Council. There are also Aboriginal employment
services and schemes such as the Community Development Employment
Program. Also important are Aboriginal education services and
committees on three school campuses in the town . . . and the two
Aboriginal Education Officers based at the Walgett branch of the NSW
TAFE department. Walgett also has an Aboriginal Legal Service, several
Aboriginal Health Workers and an Aboriginal Nurse at the Walgett
District Hospital, Euragai Goondi which is a home for the elderly,
operating also as a conference centre and accommodation service,
Aboriginal Police Liaison Officers, Aboriginal Meals on Wheels workers,
an Aboriginal community worker for the Department Of Community
Services, three Aboriginal football teams, an Aboriginal Lawn Bowl team,
and Aboriginal Cricket, Golf and Darts teams (Peters-Little 2000: 12–13).
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With the exception of rural property holdings, there is also no bounded or
coherent physical domain. Aboriginal lives in settled Australia proceed in
contiguity with an existing civic society. Aboriginal organisations, on the one
hand, can offer only patchy coverage for people wishing to satisfy their needs
by dealing with other Aborigines, and on the other hand, are less able to enforce
social disciplines or participation in developmental programs. There are too
many competing lines of articulation, which prevent the Aboriginal carapace in
settled Australia from taking on the dimensions of broad civic authority that
Pearson proposes for Cape York, and which allow its functional reach to be
evaded.
That, indeed, is an explanation advanced by Sanders, Taylor and Ross (2000:
14–15) for the pattern of voter participation in ATSIC elections. Participation
was highest in the remote ATSIC regions, lower in the southern settled regions,
and lowest in capital city regions, because, they suggested, ATSIC resources
became progressively less significant in each type of area as a proportion of total
servicing resources and market opportunities available, and thus ATSIC was of
correspondingly less importance in Indigenous peoples’ lives. The same could
be said of Aboriginal organisations in general. Conversely, in the remote
Maningrida area of north Arnhem Land, the major improvement in infrastructure
and amenities provided to the region’s outstations by the local Aboriginal
corporation was ‘underwritten primarily by ATSIC in the 1990s’ (Altman and
Johnson 2000: 11). The contrast between remote and settled Australia thus
suggests that the potential for an Indigenous model of development to emerge
beneath the Aboriginal organisational carapace is inversely related to the extent
of alternative individualised articulations maintained outside that carapace.
Condition 4: Organisations and ‘community’
To this point, the ability of Aboriginal organisations to foster an Indigenous
model of development has been discussed in terms of an interaction between
their functions as a point of articulation and as carapace, that is, their capacity
to operate as a transactional boundary within the policy and program structures
of Aboriginal affairs. Other considerations emerge from looking beneath the
carapace at the question of the internal coherence and integrity of the Aboriginal
domains that they represent (Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 281–6). It directs our
attention to endogenous constraints on developmental possibilities. As higher
levels of organisation will inevitably comprehend more diverse constituencies,
sometimes mutually hostile ones (Tonkinson 1984-5: 381), this question is sensibly
pursued at the local scale.
Rowley appears to have regarded the relationship between community and
organisation as unproblematic, perhaps organic. Sullivan, as evidenced by the
title of his discussion paper ‘A sacred land, a sovereign people, an Aboriginal
corporation’ (1997), similarly takes as fundamental the need for land-controlling
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organisations to faithfully embody a social community. The histories of many
of the remote settlements for which formal incorporation was first conceived,
as artificial clusters of traditionally separate and widespread groups, might have
caused some prima facie reservations about the representative capacity of any
single administration. Still, settlement councils and the like sprang from the
realities of residence, and so could claim at least a secular municipal realism, if
not a cultural authority (see Sullivan 1996: 10–12; Smith 2002: 23–4). The same
can be said for some legal, health and other services that have been organised
from the ground up in response to a localised Indigenous need. Holcombe (2004b)
has gone further to describe how co-residence at a remote settlement can indeed
provide a basis for the development of real communality among people of diverse
traditional attachments.
In other cases, organisations have been created less as the incorporated form of
a discrete pre-existing Indigenous domain and more as a contrivance around
some connection between Indigenous space and an external contingency that
happens to have policy relevance. Northern Territory royalty associations, for
example, are constituted by s.35 of the ALRA around the accidental geography
of a mineral deposit (Altman 1983: 126–30; Levitus 1991). Similarly accidental
are the boundaries of land left available for transfer in various jurisdictions, but
which make up an immutable frame within which Aborigines, whose attachments
may extend into the land from different directions, must organise themselves
as claimants, and then as owners and managers.
Policy initiatives, such as the devolved New South Wales local land councils,
can be introduced into places in which colonial history has already embedded
a potential for conflict between Indigenous groups. In many parts of Australia,
both settled and remote (Macdonald 1997; Martin 1997; Pearson 2000a: 65), the
localised distinctions between ‘traditional’ and ‘historical’ peoples structure
internal Aboriginal conflicts that bear upon organisations and the disposition
of their resources. Similarly, a different cultural consciousness and lack of mutual
sympathy may divide town-dwelling ‘half-castes’ from reserve-dwelling
‘blackfellas’ (Sullivan 1996: 86–90). These common conditions of the political
genesis of organisations condition also the ongoing character of political business
conducted around and within them. Disputes among native title or land rights
claimants, family politicking for capture of the resources of local organisations,
disquiet over the introduced artificiality of ‘communities’ and the legitimacy of
those deemed to be politically representative, all go to subvert any preconceptions
of communitas beneath the carapace (Brennan 1998: 34–5; Macdonald 2004: 43;
Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 277–80; Peters-Little 2000: 13–14, 17–21; Rowse
2000b: 1525). They therefore also bear upon any prospects for the endogenous
mapping out of new paths of development.
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Condition 4 (cont.): The political economy of organisation
and domain
We can, then, presume no necessary and natural dimensions of correspondence
between Aboriginal groupings and Aboriginal organisations. However,
recognising the potential for conflict and schism that resides in the historical or
organisational overriding of Aboriginal diversity does not exhaust the issue.
We can take it further by looking at two studies from the early 1980s that were
not focused specifically on Aboriginal organisations, but posed alternative
conceptions of the remote-area Aboriginal domain as an object of development
policy.
Elspeth Young’s (1981) portraits of the Northern Territory settlements of
Yuendumu, Willowra and Numbulwar sought to forge a link between the
recognition of development problems confined within economics, and the
recognition of culture confined within anthropology. Young saw Aboriginal
communities as a domain of difference. That difference affected both in degree
and in kind their need for housing, health, education and employment, and
affected also their capacity to derive benefit from the prevailing servicing regimes
for all those things. Developing the Aboriginal economy demanded an
understanding of that economy as Aborigines experienced it, including their
understandings of money, commodities, welfare, land and business enterprise
(for example, Young 1981: 162–4). Only on the basis of those levels of
understanding could self-determination be realised. Young wanted policy to
reform itself so that it could assist ‘in bringing about the development of lifestyles
closer to those which Aborigines desire’ (1981: 3). Illustrative of her appreciation
of Aboriginal lifestyle and thus of the internal character of the Aboriginal domain
was her view of the implications of a shortage of cash at Yuendumu in 1978,
when in one month only 41 per cent of adults received a significant monetary
income.
Thus more than half of Aboriginal adults resident in Yuendumu have to
depend on the generosity of their relatives and friends for money to buy
food, clothing and other necessities. While the sharing of these resources
is an integral part of the social system, vital to the maintenance of status
and consolidation of alliances and relationships, the amount available
for redistribution, as indicated by the low per capita income, is clearly
less than required (Young 1981: 109).
Young thus interprets the management of this money shortage in the positive
terms of cultural consolidation. It appears, however, to indicate major shifts in
the politics of sharing. Subsistence resources were no longer sufficient for family
needs, and access to them was rationed by controllers of vehicles, so the broad
distribution of production rights and the balance of exchange linkages associated
with that domain of bush provisioning were on the whole less significant for
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Yuendumu people. Cash income was now needed, but its distribution was
substantially unbalanced. More than half the adult population was thus critically
under-resourced for participation in the politics of reciprocity and patronage.
Young’s remarks suggest an intensive and unilateral deployment of kinship as
a currency of supplication, which means that some people with money income
were engaged in the constant tactical fielding of demands. We do not know to
what extent this was burdensome or empowering (Austin-Broos 2003: 125-26;
Peterson 1997: 190).
John von Sturmer studied the impact of major resource developments in western
Arnhem Land from 1979 to 1983. He also saw difference, not in the sense of
generalised cultural preferences, but as alternative sources and manifestations
of power. He recognised how the social values contingent upon connections to
country came to depend less on the shifting politics of access to increase sites
and their bounty (von Sturmer 1984a), and more on the fixity of rights to mining
sites and their royalties. He showed also how they had been joined by new
structural points of control over resource flows into Oenpelli and Kakadu National
Park. Von Sturmer (1984b: 151–63) thus probed the implications of
self-determination policy and mining development in terms of the changing
niches and rewards of employment and residence open to the Aborigines of
western Arnhem Land.
The irony in this comparison lies in the relationship that each scholar perceives
between Aboriginal agency and development. Young represents Aborigines as
respondents of policy, and wants policy amended in ways that will allow
Aborigines to respond to more desirable effect. Von Sturmer sees Aborigines as
active calculators to whom policy presents opportunities for strategic
emplacements leading to personal advantage (see also Gerritsen 1982: 21–6).
Altman and Smith’s (1994) subsequent study of the Nabarlek Traditional Owners
Association clarified the anti-developmental outcomes implied by von Sturmer’s
analysis. Almost all moneys paid to local Aboriginal interests from the Nabarlek
mine were disbursed in the form of vehicles and cash distributions, to
beneficiaries determined more by personal networking than by traditional
entitlement or social need. The amount devoted to social or financial investments
that could produce lasting benefits was tiny. In contrast to Young, then, von
Sturmer recognised not just a domain of difference, and not a moral economy,
but an Aboriginal political economy.
These perspectives are relevant here for how they allow us to perceive Aboriginal
organisations and the Indigenous domains that they overlook. Young’s
perspective acknowledges an Aboriginal desire for development of a culturally
appropriate kind, but does not recognise internal differentiation in terms of the
capacity of particular individuals or families to control traditional or introduced
resources, and to interpolate themselves between those resources and other
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people who need them. Her perspective equips us to understand Aboriginal
organisations that service such domains and claim to speak for them, in similarly
opaque terms—that is according to their self-representation as facilitators of
self-determined development. To that extent Young validates from the field the
expectations of Rowley and Coombs as to the likely character of Aboriginal
organisations as a policy intervention.
Von Sturmer’s perspective makes us look at that policy intervention differently.
By investing Aborigines with a political capacity and relating that capacity to
new and old sources of power, he asks us to analyse the impact of the Aboriginal
organisation in terms of structural innovation and the internal redistributions
that flow from it. In other words, von Sturmer’s approach points to a
complementarity between the two policy functions of the Aboriginal organisation.
As a point of articulation it channels material resources, and as a carapace it
offers a set of political niches that are funded by, and positioned to take
advantage of, that resource flow.
In addressing the relationship between Aboriginal organisations and domains,
we therefore need to think in terms of a realpolitik of articulation. The picture
is one of web-lines of major and minor fractures in the Aboriginal polity fanning
out from every point at which resources feed in from the non-Aboriginal world.
It requires us to place inverted commas around the word community, and offers
a framework for understanding the excess of small-scale incorporations
experienced in some areas (Commonwealth of Australia 2004: 130–31; Smith
2002: 9). It makes a matter for analysis the question of what new points of
articulation and an enhanced flow of resources cause to happen among Aborigines
and the implications of these things for development, and it moves such analysis
beyond ethnic boundaries and the politics of difference to re-focus on older
concerns like kinship, patronage, corporate groups and power (Austin-Broos
2003; Folds 2001: 144–7; Macdonald 2000: 106–9; Mantziaris and Martin 2000:
192–4; Smith 2005).
The implication here is that the policy conception of Aboriginal organisations
as protagonists on behalf of an agreed community conception of welfare and
progress must take cognisance of the standing of those organisations in relation
to Aboriginal domains that are themselves political fields. These fields may
include, it should be said, some political actors who genuinely seek to advance
just such a common conception of welfare and progress. Thus, we need to remain
open as well to the possibility that constructive organisational leadership can
actually overcome family factionalism, as Pearson (2000a: 69–70) claims has
occurred in the town of Coen, but that too must be a matter for analysis, and
not accepted prima facie as a connotation of the term ‘community’.
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Aboriginal organisations and mining
In a limited number of cases, a large proportion of the resources flowing to
Aboriginal organisations come from agreements negotiated with resource
developers. In such cases, that financial point of origin has implications for the
way in which the four structural factors identified here bear upon those
organisations.
The political level at which mining revenues enter the Aboriginal domain will
depend on the legislative and institutional framework for managing them. In
the Northern Territory, the formula given by the ALRA for distributing mining
royalty equivalents from Aboriginal land for long directed the largest share (now
somewhat reduced) to the Aboriginal land councils (Altman and Levitus 1999:
7–8). The two largest of these operate as high-level political and administrative
organisations. In the 1980s Altman and Dillon (1988: 126) observed that
land councils represent the most advanced and comprehensive expression
of Aboriginal self-government in the NT (and for that matter anywhere
in Australia). Land councils’ activities are increasingly para-governmental
in nature.
That such a level of Indigenous political authority is funded from resource
development is, of course, a peculiarity of the land rights legislation created for
the Territory in the 1970s. Such an arrangement has not been replicated in other
jurisdictions, and in its absence, the mining industry has found no reason of its
own to fund Aboriginal interests at that level for anything beyond discrete
projects of mutual concern. While mining companies may be international
entities, their operating units are always local, and the business case for
protecting their social license to operate by fostering Aboriginal development
will be focused on Aboriginal groups in the areas affected by mining. Indeed,
this local imperative is written into the Northern Territory legislation itself,
under which traditional owners have veto rights over proposed exploration.
Thus, the uranium company Energy Resources of Australia is legally required
to deal with the Northern Land Council, but it has nurtured a relationship with
the local Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, the members of which are primary
traditional owners of the Ranger and Jabiluka uranium deposits.
Even in the absence of a veto, hostile Aboriginal political action is bad both for
its impact on public opinion towards the industry, and as a direct cost in the
form of an impediment to land access or project continuity (Harvey 2002b: 4;
Hawke and Gallagher 1989; Trebeck 2007a). For such reasons, mining companies
will generally seek to concentrate resources flowing to Aboriginal interests at a
local level. Consequently, and especially in a policy environment that has in
recent years abandoned concern with high-level Aboriginal political
development, the point of articulation across which resources flow from mine
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operators into Aboriginal domains will tend to be occupied by organisations
constituted within limits that are proximate to the extraction project itself.
While that local focus is by definition a confining factor, the mode of transfer
of resources into that domain can be relatively free. Altman and Dillon (1988:
134) comment that mining moneys in the Northern Territory ‘from the Aboriginal
perspective . . . are the single most significant source of finance that is untied
and that can be used for development purposes’. Local associations established
to represent people in the areas affected by mines on Aboriginal land are entitled
to at least 30 per cent of the royalty equivalents payable from those mines.
Outside the Territory, Rio Tinto is pioneering a similar transfer of substantial
resources to local Aboriginal control. In the East Kimberley, one of the criticisms
directed by Aborigines at the notorious Glen Hill Agreement and the subsequent
Good Neighbour Agreement entered into by the operators of the Argyle Diamond
Mine in the 1980s was that the company controlled all moneys and decided what
benefits were to be provided to the recipient communities (Dixon 1990). Moneys
distributed by the Argyle Social Impact Group were similarly subject to
non-Aboriginal criteria (Howitt 2001: 244–5). When the company moved into
a new generation of community relations thinking and signed the Argyle
Participation Agreement in 2004 (Harvey and Brereton 2005: 11), funding was
directed to a number of community-controlled trusts.
In western Cape York, Comalco established the Weipa Aborigines Society in
1972 to carry out projects for Aboriginal benefit. Its lack of accountability to
Aboriginal interests led to the creation of the locally operated Napranum
Aboriginal Corporation in 1993, but corporate funding conditions continued to
restrict the independence of that organisation as well (Howitt 2001: 220–2).
Under the Western Cape Communities Co-existence Agreement negotiated
between 1996 and 2001, a minimum of $4 million annually is transferred from
the company and the Queensland Government to the Western Cape Community
Trust, under the majority control of local traditional owners (Harvey 2004:
241–42).
While such funding transfers under mining agreements are now less likely to
allow for unrestrained and immediate consumption expenditure (Altman and
Smith 1994; ISS/ACIL 2001: 37), to the extent that they are not accompanied by
any specific spending prescription they preserve a potential for self-determined
development. Such arrangements respect the status of the recipient organisations
as a transactional boundary, and thus contrast with the ideological shift in the
general Indigenous affairs policy environment represented by Shared
Responsibility Agreements. Indeed, Rio Tinto’s senior Community and Aboriginal
Relations officer was admonished by a public service bureaucrat that the
relatively untied money provided by miners made the task of promoting Shared
Responsibility Agreements more difficult for government (B. Harvey pers.
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comm.). Where government funding is increasingly tied to agreed outcomes,
mining agreements may thus offer a preferred and relatively independent
operating environment for Aboriginal organisations.
With respect to the third structural condition discussed above, that is the
availability of alternative providers with which an Aboriginal organisation’s
constituency may prefer to conduct their affairs, the significance of mining
revenues seems ambivalent. Those revenues, often being of the scale of a windfall
for local Aborigines and relatively untied, can appear to present the promise of
a coherent endogenous strategy of social development being designed and applied
within a local Aboriginal domain beneath the protective coverage of a complete
organisational carapace, much after the vision of the Nodom and Pindan
companies mentioned earlier. Indeed the practice of substitution (whereby
government agencies direct discretionary funding to communities without access
to mining-related benefits and thereby force those groups funded by mining to
use their income as a substitute for government servicing) can push onto such
organisations a wider responsibility for local servicing than they may wish to
have. But at the same time, major resource development projects in remote areas
improve transport and communications and occasion the implanting of enclaves
of western civil society alongside. In western Cape York, north-east and western
Arnhem Land, the Pilbara and elsewhere, towns exist because of mining. The
servicing agencies that populate these places can offer such a multiplicity of
contacts to local Aborigines that their combined impact is not only confusing
but anti-developmental, and their rationalisation has lately become a major
priority in Indigenous policy (Edmunds 1989: 79–81; Gray and Sanders 2006).
Finally, the relationship between organisation and domain can be a particularly
vexed feature of the structural context. I referred earlier to Northern Territory
royalty associations as an example of organisations built upon an external
contingency, their memberships determined by some process and politics of
recognition of Aboriginal spatial relationships with the mine site. Any sizeable
Aboriginal corporate entity will include categorical distinctions within its
membership that can provide the raw material for political fission. Organisations
that exist to receive benefits from a mine, however, would appear, by the absence
of any ‘natural’ constituency and therefore of any original legitimacy, to be
unusually predisposed to that risk.
I have elsewhere explored the impact of this failure of collective commitment
in the history of the Gagudju Association of Kakadu National Park (Levitus
2005). Its replacement as the royalty-receiving association for the Ranger Uranium
Mine by the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation elevated narrowly conceived
traditional rights over the mine site at the expense of a more expansive, though
incoherently realised (Levitus 1991), concept of affected peoples. Similarly, the
Rio Tinto officer mentioned above has remarked that one of the dangers for the
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company’s policy of promoting regional Indigenous development in its areas of
operation is the tendency in some circumstances for every clan and family to
demand that the company pays for a lawyer to negotiate their own separate deal
(B. Harvey pers. comm.).
In summary, then, the distinctive potential for sustainable and self-determined
Aboriginal development offered by remote-area mining projects arises from their
capacity to bring a large and relatively untied revenue flow to bear within a
limited geographical range, through the agency of a locally constituted
organisational structure. That potential, then, flows from the standing of such
organisations with respect to the first two structural conditions discussed in this
chapter. Perhaps that will not be enough. The record of the Gagudju Association
suggests as much, for surely a local operational focus and active constituency
and a large untied revenue flow were two of its strengths. Von Sturmer is one
observer who requires more. The structural conditions that he listed for the
success of west Arnhem royalty-receiving associations were akin to the third
and fourth discussed here:
Success will hinge on their capacity to incorporate and to reflect all the
features of Aboriginal social structure and organisation; to deflect fissive
pressures; and to incorporate all other organisations operating within
their sphere of influence within a single hierarchically-ordered structure;
. . . If they are to work, the associations must constitute literally a system
of local government and be able to ensure social equity. They must be
able to make rules, and to enforce them (von Sturmer 1982: 99–100—his
emphases).
Clearly only some aspects of these specifications are controllable though
negotiation and agreement with the miners. They evoke again the image of the
complete carapace, and imply at least a political unity, if not Rowley’s organic
identity, between organisation and domain. Organisations established on this
vision, even remote ones, will always be heir to the challenges of alternative
external connections and internal differentiation.
The assimilation of resources
After acknowledging the structural limitations discussed so far, we need also to
recognise the strategic centrality of Aboriginal organisations. This discussion
has used two characterisations: each organisation occupies a point of articulation,
that is, a bridge for the movement of resources across that intersection of policy
and culture, and each is a carapace, marking out a functional framework beneath
which a more-or-less coherent Aboriginal domain of action and values can be
created, enhanced or preserved. As Rowley recognised in the beginning, that
duality offers the potential, even within a context of dependency, to exercise
some Aboriginal influence over processes of change.
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One important function that local Aboriginal organisations can have is to deflect
and manage the impact of external subsidies upon Indigenous recipients. It is a
function that has been most obviously and commonly exercised by CDEP
schemes, that intervenes in the previously direct flow of money from social
security providers into consumption expenditure by the clients, consolidate
those multiple individuated flows into a resource and channel it through projects
for community benefit. Northern Territory royalty associations illustrate other
features of this intervening role. Royalty associations receive shares of the
payments made from resource development projects under the ALRA. During
the extended debate over reform of this legislation following the Reeves Report,
the question arose as to whether there was any need to prescribe Aboriginal
structures of decision-making below the level of a regional land council, that is,
whether local royalty associations had any role to play. The view held by Reeves
(1998: 207, 596) and others, that local traditional processes could be allowed free
play, was in my view misconceived (Levitus 1999: 126–7). This issue goes to
understanding the character of local organisations as, in the terms used above,
a formal transactional boundary and a conduit for the transfer of resources,
between the non-Aboriginal world and the organisations’ memberships.
There are two important respects in which the allocatory tasks of local
associations are different from those managed in pre-colonial times within
traditional Aboriginal society. Firstly, the bundles of rights and benefits at stake
are of enormous quantity by comparison with anything that passed through
hunter-gatherer processes of production and distribution. The material values
represented in a government instrumentality’s one-line budget item, or in a
single payment of mining royalty equivalents, is vast and unprecedented by
comparison with the volume of desirables handled by traditional allocatory
systems. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, these benefits and entitlements
do not physically originate from within the Indigenous domain, and so are not
already enmeshed in those relationships of reciprocity and obligation that attach
to locally produced items. Rather, they have an external source and are arbitrary
both as to their timing and point of entry into the Indigenous system. They are
unsocialised goods. So a program is approved and a delivery arrives—a housing
project, a convoy of Toyotas, an office equipped with modern communication
equipment—and local processes have to absorb it.
Because these items are so substantial, and management of them within the
Indigenous domain is not already conditioned by relationships embedded within
the circumstances of their production, it is necessary to design mediating
structures and processes that function not to replace, but to assimilate them into,
locally self-determined distributory mechanisms. That should be the function
of royalty associations and like organisations. This connects with some of the
concerns discussed above and with many of the considerations raised in
discussions of governance and internal accountability (Dodson and Smith 2003;
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Hunt and Smith 2006b). It is complementary to the point made above, about the
conversion of external subsidy into internal operational autonomy. That earlier
point was about freeing resources from bureaucratic prescription and making
them available to Aboriginal priorities. The present point is about subjecting
those resources to a structured and considered passage into local Indigenous
domains. Both matters need to be understood as preconditions to the
implementation of Aboriginal development plans.
Conclusion
Aboriginal organisations were seen as an instrument through which a
self-determined Aboriginal developmental trajectory could be formulated and
pursued. They were an institutional home for what remained of policy’s
aspirations for Aboriginal development after that concept was surrendered into
the discourse of self-determination in the 1970s. Their capacity to satisfy such
aspirations can, from the outside, be seen to have depended on a number of
structural conditions, operating both above, with respect to the supervening
non-Aboriginal domain, and beneath, with respect to their own capacity as
carapace. Those structural conditions, bearing upon the status of the organisation
as a transactional boundary, continue to be a focus of policy innovation and
discord. Most recently, the trend of policy has been to sidestep or overrule that
boundary and project its managerial agency directly into local Aboriginal
domains.
I have suggested here that Aboriginal organisations funded principally from
mining projects are now relatively well placed to preserve internal operational
autonomy. It is clear, despite the changing relationship between the mining
industry and Indigenous people in Australia, that establishing and resourcing
such organisations is not a widely acknowledged channel for transferring benefits
to Aboriginal peoples affected by mining. The Australian Government’s ‘Working
in Partnership’ program for developing cooperative relationships between the
mining industry and Indigenous communities heavily emphasises training,
employment and business development. A ready possible explanation for this
flows directly from my previous point. Government is more interested in
promoting the mainstreaming linkages of employment and ancillary business
between projects and local communities than in resourcing self-determination.
Alternatively it may simply reflect a reasonable up-front emphasis on the
immediate opportunities for project participation, relegating post-project
sustainability to downstream planning.
There also seems to be limited industry recognition. Few of the companies
subscribing to the Working in Partnership program provide revenue streams
to local organisations under majority Indigenous direction. Indeed, of those mine
sites surveyed by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics
that were located in the vicinity of a discrete Indigenous community, half had
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no agreements of any kind with local Indigenous people at the mining stage of
their operations (Tedesco, Fainstein and Hogan 2003: 24). In another survey
published in 2001, a highly disproportionate number of agreements between
mining companies and Indigenous communities were attributable to only two
companies, Rio Tinto and Normandy (ISS/ACIL 2001: 15). However, ‘payments
or other compensation mechanisms’ was the most common kind of provision
included in the 140 agreements surveyed, covering ‘lump sum payments, soft
loans, royalty equivalents, and equity in companies, rents and lease payments’
(ISS/ACIL 2001: 17). Not all of these will produce a revenue stream for a
locally-controlled Aboriginal organisation, but this figure provides an indication
of a potential to be explored. These survey data suggest that few players are
including the resourcing of Aboriginal organisations and post-mining
development within their range of expectations from the advent of mining, but
those players are important ones.
In the long-run history of any remote Aboriginal town facing deteriorating
demographic trends (Taylor Chapter 3), the duration of even a major mining
project is only a window (Render 2005: 35). Moreover, there will always be
many people of working age in such areas who will never achieve the required
state of work-readiness, or who have no wish to work in a mine, or who are
numerically beyond the capacity of the mining industry to absorb them. In the
relationship between mining companies and local Aboriginal populations, the
resources and capacities of Aboriginal organisations will be an important
determinant of the long-term developmental legacy a mining project will leave
behind. The initiatives of such organisations will be a critical mediator between
the windfall revenues from mining, and what those revenues are able to create
and sustain for the Aborigines in that area. While the remote-area mining
industry in Australia is currently undergoing unprecedented expansion, and
there will always be major new projects eventuating here and there, for any
given Aboriginal community the particular project occurring in their vicinity
may be the only opportunity in much more than a generation to acquire the
capital base for at least a partially self-resourced future. As O’Faircheallaigh
remarks, ‘a community will tend to have just one chance to extract revenue; if
it fails in relation to this specific project, it fails in total’ (1996: 198).
We leave the discussion, then, at the point where it begins to broach another
issue, that is, the kind of development that Indigenous peoples may wish to
foster. In the international discourse around the relationship between miners
and indigenes, some have begun distinguishing between economic development
and what is variously called culturally appropriate, community-led, or human,
development, thinking less about ‘how to fit Indigenous peoples into a
commercial mining operation, and looking instead at how a commercial mining
operation can fit into Indigenous life’ (Render 2005: 35–8). This not only raises
new questions of definition and evaluation, but places responsibility on
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Aborigines themselves to determine what development should be, and how to
bring it about. In this context, the matters discussed in this chapter are structural
preconditions, important because they affect the ability of Indigenous interests
to equip themselves with the institutional instruments necessary for development
with or without mining. They are about using the resource transfer instigated
by mining to create a space in which they may consider their own options for
development. The work of development itself has still to follow.
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5. The governance of agreements
between Aboriginal people and




In February 2008, the Commonwealth Attorney General called for a new approach
to resolving native title claims, unblocking the system through ‘interests-based’
negotiations between claimants and other parties, including governments, which
can result in an array of ‘non-native title’ outcomes (McClelland 2008). More
recently, in the 2008 Mabo Lecture the Commonwealth Minister for Families,
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (Macklin 2008) called for
‘a mindset which structures the governance of these arrangements to ensure
financial benefits create employment and educational opportunities for
individuals and are invested for the long term benefit of communities’.1
These Ministerial speeches raise a number of important questions. The first is
that they do not engage with research in relation to major Australian mining
agreements which argues that many do not in fact deliver substantive, meaningful
benefits to the Aboriginal parties (for example, Cousins and Nieuwenhuysen
1984; O’Faircheallaigh 1988, 2006). Even when agreements do deliver such
benefits, they would appear to have only minimal impact on the general
socioeconomic status of the Aboriginal people in mine hinterlands (for example,
Taylor and Scambary 2005).2  Secondly, the speeches avoid reference to the
important issue which arises where compensatory payments involve the
substitution of monetary benefits with goods and services which arguably should
be generally accessible to all citizens (Smith 2001: 44; see also, for example,
Altman 1985b; Altman and Levitus 1999: 17–18; Toohey 1984).
Thirdly, there are questions relating to the ‘distributive equity’ of agreement
payments (that is, ensuring that compensation is paid to the appropriate rights
holders) and ‘distributive spread’ (for example, whether other Aboriginal people
than just those whose native title rights are impacted, should also receive a
portion of compensatory payments) (Smith 2001: 42). Fourthly, there is the issue
1  Such sentiments are far from novel—they have a history at least as long as that of land rights itself;
see for example Turnbull 1978.
2  Indeed, such factors as the lack of adequate baseline data in many regions, compounded by difficulties
in obtaining quantitative data sets that relate to the specific groups who are the beneficiaries of an
agreement (Taylor 2008a), make the monitoring of agreement impacts potentially quite difficult.
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raised by the commonly inadequate attention typically paid to the implementation
and monitoring stages of mining agreements (O’Faircheallaigh 2002a, 2003b).
Lastly, and the subject of this chapter, are questions of the governance of mining
agreements, which go to the ongoing ability of agreements to sustainably and
effectively deliver the negotiated outcomes of any particular agreement. The
significance of effective and sustainable agreement governance applies irrespective
of these preceding factors, but little attention appears to have been paid to it as
an issue, although attention has been paid to the governance of royalty
associations and the like (for example, Altman 1985b; Altman and Smith 1999).
This chapter examines this core requirement of agreements to meet their
objectives, making three key arguments: that inadequate attention is paid to the
governance of agreements as systems; that agreement governance has to be
explicitly understood and implemented as transformative; and that agreement
governance should be seen as intercultural, a characteristic operating differentially
across the various entities and relationships within any particular agreement.
These are not the only significant governance characteristics. For example,
sustainable governance needs to incorporate an active recognition of the diversity
amongst Aboriginal stakeholders, and between them and other parties (see
Holcombe, Chapter 7; Scambary, Chapter 8). Indeed, the need to incorporate
recognition of diversity is not unique to the case of Aboriginal people; there are
arguments that it is an essential component of social sustainability more generally
(Martin, Hondros and Scambary 2004; Western Australian Council of Social
Services 2000). However, the three identified governance issues constitute case
studies illustrating important principles for the negotiation, design, and
implementation of large-scale mining agreements between Aboriginal people
and major resource developers.
The governance of agreements as systems
Mining agreements are negotiated in complex and contested intercultural fields
where the parties (Aboriginal groups, resource developers, and governments)
bring potentially quite divergent interests and goals to bear on the negotiations,
and indeed to subsequent implementation of the resulting agreement. There are
substantial structural power and resource imbalances which disadvantage the
Aboriginal parties in negotiations. This is despite the leverage which can be
offered variously by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cwlth) (NTA), land rights and
heritage legislation, by corporate responsiveness to Aboriginal pressure (Trebeck,
Chapter 6), and by the involvement of Aboriginal representative and advocacy
organisations with statutory responsibilities (O’Faircheallaigh 2006; but compare
Senior 1998: 9). All parties including Aboriginal people seek advice from a range
of such specialists as lawyers, resource economists, environmental scientists,
investment and tax experts, anthropologists, and others. While negotiations
themselves may include varying levels of involvement by the Aboriginal people
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concerned (Blowes and Trigger 1998; O’Faircheallaigh 2000; Senior 1998; Trigger
1997b), they and other parties are heavily dependent during negotiations on
technical advisors, who overwhelmingly determine the form and structures of
the resultant agreements.
This is not in any way to argue against the involvement of competent lawyers
and other specialists; they are clearly essential for all parties, given such factors
as the sometimes byzantine politics and strategic bargaining involved. There
are also particular difficulties entailed in developing a common position amongst
sometimes factionalised Aboriginal parties, and the complex legal frameworks
(such as contract law, and that of the NTA) against which agreements are set,
and the need for precision and clarity in their wording also pose challenges (for
example, see accounts in O’Faircheallaigh 2000; Senior 1998). However, a failure
to also include a specific consideration of governance issues can, I argue here,
militate against long-term agreement sustainability. Similarly to the
implementation of sustainable development principles more generally in the
minerals industry (Brereton 2003), the development of effective and appropriate
agreement governance requires a multidisciplinary approach.
The technical experts for each of the parties usually play a significant role in
developing the broad terms and principles of a deal, and subsequently have
major responsibility for the translation of that deal into a legally binding
document which ensures the rights and obligations of the parties are specified
sufficiently that they can be protected or enforced at law (O’Faircheallaigh 2000:
12). Key interlinked issues identified by Aboriginal parties are formulated against
a background of concerns about the adverse potential impacts of the proposed
development on country and culture, a wish to address the historic injustices
which are reflected in continuing exclusion from meaningful participation in
regional political and economic systems a desire for recognition of political
autonomy and self-determination, a concern for capacity to control and access
traditional country, and an often ambivalent recognition that mining agreements
offer possibilities for leveraging change in their marginalised circumstances.
These concerns arise from within social fields which while intercultural (see
discussion in the next section) are characterised by distinctive Aboriginal
worldviews, beliefs and practices in which connections to country and kin are
very significant (see, for example, Blowes and Trigger 1998; O’Faircheallaigh
2006; Scambary 2007; Sutton 2003; Trigger 1997b, 1998, 2005). There have been
enormous impacts on the original economies of the Aboriginal groups now within
Australian mine hinterlands, resulting from a whole range of historical factors
including the development of the pastoral industry; the sedentarisation of people
in towns and settlements; large-scale mining; and, in recent decades, the
introduction of the welfare-based cash economy (see, for example, Edmunds
1989; Taylor and Scambary 2005). Aboriginal economies in these regions still
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operate through dominant principles such as flexible, opportunistic and
immediate-return foraging, strong pressure to share resources amongst kin, and
(related to this) an anti-accumulation, immediate distribution ethos (Martin
2008a; Peterson 1993, 2005). Scambary (2007) details these matters in his doctoral
thesis, summed up elegantly in its title ‘My Country, Mine Country’.
The translation previously referred to is not simply a technical exercise in
distilling issues raised by Aboriginal people into the legalese of an agreement
(contra O’Faircheallaigh 2006). It entails the rendition of what may be quite
different and indeed contested notions of cultural and economic futures
(Scambary 2007; Trigger 1997a, 1998) into terms which can be recognised and
enforced under Australian law—in a manner entirely analogous to the translation
of the nature of Aboriginal people’s connections to country under their laws
and customs to rights and interests in the ‘recognition’ or ‘translation’ space of
native title (Mantziaris and Martin 2000). What can with the best of intentions
still be a rather impoverished translation entails the possibility of a degree of
incommensurability between systems of values. Furthermore, the interests-based
negotiation process together with standard legal methods combine to break
down complex social realities and processes into defined components, and then
to establish putative relationships between them. In this way the often generalised
and interconnected matters raised by Aboriginal people in negotiations (such
as those outlined previously), are distilled and disaggregated into distinct specific
elements for which responsibilities may be assigned to particular parties and
resources committed for implementation.
For example, concerns about the impacts of mining on country are translated
into mechanisms for the protection of its cultural heritage and environmental
values; historic exclusion and ongoing socioeconomic marginality are translated
into financial benefits, employment and training, and business development
provisions. Equally, desires for return to and control of traditional country are
met with provisions such as return of mined areas, divesting pastoral stations
in the mining hinterland to Aboriginal people, and support for outstation
development. Demands for political autonomy and self-determination transmute
to self-management and result in the establishment of Aboriginal-controlled
entities such as trustee corporations and representative/advocacy bodies, and
Aboriginal representation on the raft of committees usually set up under
agreements.
This analysis is not meant to imply that there is an alternative set of more
culturally appropriate principles by which mining agreements should be
negotiated. By their very nature, agreements involving the Aboriginal people
of Australian mine hinterlands are intercultural phenomena which must
necessarily involve processes of translation (albeit with some inevitable level of
incommensurability with Aboriginal values and aspirations) in order to have
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the intended practical effects within the dominant society’s legal, political and
economic systems. However, I argue that in the negotiating phase inadequate
attention is paid to both the governance of agreements as systems comprised of
the disaggregated components resulting from the negotiation process, and to
the implications of agreements as intercultural institutions. In my view these
problems arise in part because the technical experts and the parties they represent
are not necessarily alert to the complexities and implications of intercultural
issues, including those pertaining to agreement governance.
Through the processes discussed above, both the structure of an agreement—and
the institutions which may be set up under it—reflect issues identified and
agreed to in principle within a translation space established between the values
and aspirations of the Aboriginal parties and those of the other parties through
the negotiation process and the legal drafting of the agreement. This can be seen
particularly clearly in the structures set up under the Century Mine Agreement.
This agreement was signed in May 1997 between representatives of three native
title groups, Century Zinc Limited (CZL), then a subsidiary of CRA Limited, and
the State of Queensland. The agreement concerned a proposal to open cut mining
of a very large zinc deposit north-west of Mt Isa. The formal signing followed
protracted and frequently bitter regional negotiations (Blowes and Trigger 1998;
Trebeck 2007a; Trigger 1997b) which were initially outside the ambit of the
NTA and involved the broader gulf Aboriginal community as well as those
asserting native title in the mine site area, the pipeline route, and the port at
Karumba.3 With a breakdown in negotiations leading to the issuance of s.29
Notices under the NTA, there was a consequent change in focus to negotiating
with the registered native title claimants under the Right to Negotiate provisions
of the Act. Ultimately, final agreement was precipitated by arbitration procedures
commenced in February 1997 with strict timeframes under the Act. CZL was
purchased from CRA by Pasminco prior to mine site construction beginning,
and the Century agreement was renamed the Gulf Communities Agreement
(GCA). In 2002, a cash-strapped Pasminco was reconstituted as Zinifex. The terms
of the GCA binds all future owners and operators of the mine, including
subcontractors.
Benefits from the agreement are directed to members of the three native title
groups wherever they may live, and to Aboriginal residents of designated
communities in the region, including Doomadgee, Burketown, Mornington
Island and Normanton. The GCA and its associated schedules are structured
around specific categories of issues and benefits negotiated with the native title
3 This account is drawn from Martin (1998a) which is based on my own knowledge and experience
gained during the period when I was engaged by the three native title groups to assist in implementing
the terms of the agreement, from information gathered during a short period of fieldwork as part of the
CAEPR Mining Project, and from the information provided in Scambary (2007).
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groups, and the structures established to address them. CZL is required to provide
employment opportunities; provide training programs to assist Aboriginal people
in developing the relevant skills; resource and provide financial resources to
assist the native title groups and the designated communities to develop small
businesses, joint ventures and contracting opportunities; provide monetary
payments for the benefit of the native title group; provide assurances about
environmental protection in the project area and about the identification,
protection and management of culturally significant sites; and access to and
interests in pastoral leases held by CZL for the relevant native title groups
(Scambary 2007: 109–12).
The bulk of the community benefits package is delivered to the Aboriginal
parties through two special purpose organisations established pursuant to the
GCA: the Gulf Aboriginal Development Company Ltd (GADC), and the Aboriginal
Development Benefits Trust. GADC is a company limited by guarantee whose
members are drawn from each of the three native title groups. Its establishment
resulted from a political compromise during the latter stages of negotiations,
necessitated by entrenched opposition to the regional native title representative
body both from the Queensland Government and CZL as well as a degree of
distrust of the native title representative body amongst a substantial proportion
of the Aboriginal people of the region. GADC was clearly envisaged as playing
a significant role in administering the GCA on behalf of the native title groups,
and ensuring benefits are delivered in accordance with the intent of the
Agreement. After its incorporation, GADC became a formal party to the GCA
on behalf of the native title groups. Its functions include distributing monetary
payments from CZL directly to Aboriginal corporations representing the native
title groups under a formula specified in the GCA, employing a Liaison Officer
to assist the Environment Committee and the native title groups in monitoring
the project’s environmental management regime, an important coordinating role
in employment, training and business development, seeking additional resources
from government to assist implementation of the Century Employment and
Training Plan, providing advice to CZL on contracting and joint venturing
possibilities, facilitating the appointment of native title group representatives
on the various committees organisations, and assisting in the monitoring and
review of the Agreement (Martin 1998a; Scambary 2007: 109–12).
The primary function of the Aboriginal Development Benefits Trust is to promote
economic development for members of the native title groups and residents of
the designated communities through providing loans or grants for business skills
training, start-up finance for small businesses, and financial equity in joint
ventures and land purchases. The Trust’s principal funds derive from CZL under
a formula set out in the Agreement, and at the time the GCA was signed were
expected to total around $20 million over the then anticipated 15-year life of
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the mine. The Trust is also responsible for delivering a relatively small program
for sporting development with funds provided by CZL and Queensland.
Other special purpose organisations and committees were established under the
GCA. Various pastoral property holding and management companies were set
up to enable the gradual transfer of ownership and control of five hitherto
CZL-owned properties to the relevant Aboriginal groups—three to Waanyi
people, and two to Ganggalida. The Century Employment and Training Committee
is an advisory body with representation from each of the native title groups,
the designated Aboriginal communities of the gulf, CZL, and government. It has
a key role in developing the Century Employment and Training Plan which,
along with the Aboriginal Development Benefits Trust, lies at the heart of the
GCA’s economic development mechanisms. As well, an Environment Committee
was set up with the intended role of providing direction to the environmental
Liaison Officer and acting as a clearinghouse between the Aboriginal parties and
the mine on environmental matters. Finally, a Liaison and Advisory Committee
was established for general liaison, reviewing project plans and operations, and
as a conduit for information exchange between the project (see above comment)
and the members of the native title groups, and designated communities.
Fig. 5.1 Gulf Communities Agreement structure
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The various entities established under the GCA and aspects of the connections
between them are shown in Fig. 5.1. It illustrates an archetypical case of the
isomorphism discussed previously, in which responsibilities for particular issues
and processes are mapped onto function-specific entities. The viability and
effectiveness of this complex and interlinked set of entities is essential to the
successful implementation of the Agreement, including delivery of benefits to
the Aboriginal parties, as well as the certainty and risk management sought by
the resource developer (Pasminco, The State of Queensland and GADC 2002: 7).
O’Faircheallaigh (2002a, 2004b) has strongly argued that the implementation
phase is given completely inadequate attention in Australian (and Canadian)
mining agreements. The GCA provides an instance of another crucial
implementation issue to which inadequate attention is paid in negotiating and
designing Australian mining agreements—the governance of agreements as
systems. This is a first order implementation issue because no matter how
advantageous to the Aboriginal and other parties a negotiated set of outcomes
may be, unless there is sustainable, coordinated, robust and effective governance
across an agreement as a whole, there will be a strong likelihood of it failing to
meet either mandated outcomes or the expectations of the parties, particularly
the Aboriginal ones. This is in fact what occurred in the case of the GCA.
The first five-yearly review of the GCA (Pasminco, The State of Queensland and
GADC 2002) found that its institutional arrangements have proved to be
uncoordinated, unwieldy, inefficient and far more resource intensive for all
parties (in both human and capital terms) than was originally envisaged when
the agreement was negotiated. The requirement for Aboriginal representation
on the plethora of boards and committees has placed particular strain on the
subset of Aboriginal people who are able, willing and deemed by the relevant
Aboriginal groups as being structurally appropriate to serve on them. Critically,
the central role to be played by the GADC in implementing the Agreement and
representing the interests of the Native Title Groups could not be undertaken
in part because of a lack of the resources necessary to meet its contractual
obligations (Pasminco et al. 2002: 94; Scambary 2007: 111–12). While its initial
establishment was reasonably resourced, after the first two years CZL was
required to provide an annual grant of only $50 000 (indexed) for GADC’s
operations (Scambary 2007: 112), not even enough to pay the salary of one
appropriately qualified staff member, let alone undertaken any of its functions.
The risks posed by the potential non-viability of GADC were identified by GADC
itself in the early stages of agreement implementation, but virtually all attempts
to seek additional funding, or alternative sources of funds, failed. The author
was engaged to work for the three native title groups in setting up the GADC
and undertaking its formal functions under the GCA until it had been
incorporated and had recruited a staff member to undertake its work. In this
role, the author expended considerable effort in seeking to persuade CZL, the
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, various State agencies and
others of the implications for the Agreement should GADC not be adequately
resourced. Some short-term additional funds were provided by a State agency,
but apart from this all efforts proved unsuccessful. CZL in particular argued that
meeting any shortfall was the responsibility of the Native Title Groups, and that
they should dedicate a portion of the benefit monies received by their eligible
corporations to GADC’s administration. Not unsurprisingly, this was not
supported by the relevant Aboriginal people as they saw these monies as
compensation for the damage done to their country, and the impasse could not
be resolved. By 2000 GADC was essentially a hollow shell of an organisation
with little capacity to undertake its specified functions and little active support
from its nominal constituency.
The de facto capacity failure of GADC was compounded by compliance failures
in the small Aboriginal corporations receiving the monetary payments from CZL.
As previously outlined, one of GADC’s functions was to receive an aggregate
annual payment from CZL, and hold it in trust pending disbursement to each of
six ‘eligible’ Aboriginal corporations, in accordance with a formula set out in
the Agreement. In order to be eligible to receive its payment, each corporation
had to maintain compliance with the reporting requirements of its incorporating
act, the then Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth). Within two
years, four of the six Aboriginal corporations were ineligible to receive these
funds (Martin, Hondros and Scambary 2004: 8) and, of these, three had their
memberships drawn from the Waanyi Native Title Group, on whose traditional
lands the actual mine was located. Furthermore, recognising the fact that there
were many Waanyi people who were not members of or associated with any of
the existing four Waanyi corporations, there was an unallocated amount
designated for the Waanyi Native Title Group which was received each year by
GADC, but which it could not distribute until it had obtained the informed
consent of the group as a whole.
The consequence of these entirely predictable compliance failures was that by
2002 a quite substantial sum of money had accrued for the Waanyi Native Title
Group which could not legally be distributed by GADC under the terms of the
Agreement. However, as explained above, GADC did not have the staff or
financial resources to undertake the necessary consultations with Waanyi people
about how to resolve this situation, or what to do with the unallocated Waanyi
funds. Indeed, it had never had the resources to assist the corporations to
maintain regulatory compliance (which would have avoided this problem). The
frustration of Waanyi people with the inability of the GADC to pay what they
saw as their compensatory monies has been identified as one of the key reasons
which led to the 2002 sit-in at the mine site kitchen by Waanyi people, which
exposed the operation to serious financial risk at a particularly vulnerable time
(Scambary 2007: 236).
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This case study provides an unfortunate example of the problems which may
arise if agreement implementation structures and processes are not viewed as a
system, and agreement governance is not established and implemented
systematically. As Fig. 5.1 and the above discussion illustrate, in common with
many major mining agreements the GCA constitutes a system comprised of
complex, interlinked, and interdependent structures and relationships which
are more than just an aggregation of separately negotiated components. However,
recognition of this systemic character was not incorporated into its governance
or implementation. In such circumstances, an agreement is prone to failure at
crucial and unexpected points, and this failure may pose major risks to the
interests of all parties. It is significant in this context that in the events which
led up to the sit-in at the Century mine (which potentially threatened the project),
the element of the GCA which failed (monetary payments to the native title
groups) was a relatively minor component of the Agreement of little direct
concern to the miner or to government. However, these payments were both
highly politically symbolic and of intense practical interest to the Aboriginal
people concerned.
Governance for transformation
Many (but not all)4  agreements between Aboriginal people and resource
developers are based on procedures set out in the NTA, in particular its Right
to Negotiate provisions, precipitated by the successful registration of a claim
for native title. To pass the registration test, claimants are obliged to construct
an account of their present society and culture in terms of essentially unbroken
connections to their pre-sovereignty past—as arising through adaptation to the
wider society, not transformation by it. This process becomes even more exacting
if claims are to result in a successful determination of native title. From this
perspective, the native title claims regime can be seen as a state resourced and
mandated project of ‘traditionalism’—the reconstruction of an idealised
representation of the present as it allegedly is, in terms of how it supposedly
was in the past (Merlan 1998: 231). On the other hand, agreements such as
Indigenous Land Use Agreements under s.24 of the NTA offer possibilities for
Aboriginal people to construct their futures through explicitly transformative
processes involving engagement with the institutions of the dominant society.5
Such processes can enable claimants to negotiate ways to have their interests
and certain of their rights recognised and aspirations met (including for
development), without these having to be refracted through the distorting lens
4  For example, the Yandicoogina agreement in the Pilbara is a private contract, not an Indigenous Land
Use Agreement under the NTA (Scambary 2007: 97, this volume Chapter 8). Also, many agreements
have been negotiated in the Northern Territory under the provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) (ALRA).
5  Smith (1998) still offers the most comprehensive account of the Indigenous Land Use Agreement
provisions of the Act.
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of traditionalism. That is, in contrast to native title claims, agreements are
potentially privately resourced6  and optional projects of modernism.
Native title has been placed in something of a traditionalist policy enclave over
the decade since the so called ‘Wik’ amendments to the NTA. In no small part
as a direct result of those amendments, successive Federal and High Court
decisions have led to a progressive diminution of what can be recognised as
native title, and progressively higher evidentiary thresholds for its proof. As a
consequence, native title has become an increasingly attenuated property right,
with little direct fungibility to other forms of capital and thus difficult to leverage
as an effective base for sustainable development (Pearson and Kostakidis-Lianos
2004, referring to the work of Peruvian development economist de Soto 2000).7
Native title is also a very legally fragile form of property right. Its existence
depends upon continuing adherence by the native title holders to the laws and
customs from which their native title derives. Post-determination socio-cultural
changes—including indeed those which would logically result from the positive
impacts of engagement with the mining industry—could result in a government
seeking to have the determination that native title exists revoked, on the basis
that the particular groups’ laws and customs are no longer traditional.
Paradoxically therefore, while native title (or its assertion) can provide leverage
for agreements, its legal fragility provides a poor substrate for agreements in
terms of their long-term sustainability. More broadly, an increasing gap has
developed between Aboriginal goals and aspirations beyond economic
development and what can actually be delivered by the recognition of native
title (Strelein 2003). Yet, in the face of overwhelming and continuing
disadvantage, under the Howard coalition government Aboriginal affairs policy
rhetoric more generally was focused on social and economic engagement, through
individual participation in what has been termed (following Pearson 2000a) the
‘real economy’—an archetypical modernist project.
There are signs that the Rudd Labor Government may be seeking to move native
title out of this enclave, linking it through agreement making into such
developing policy frameworks as ‘closing the gap’ and social inclusion. As
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in February 2008, the Commonwealth
Attorney General called for a new approach to resolving native title claims,
through ‘interests based’ negotiations between claimants and other parties
resulting in an array of ‘non-native title’ outcomes (McClelland 2008). More
recently, in the 2008 Mabo Lecture the Commonwealth Minister for Families,
6  Although many are also funded by native title representative bodies, most of the large-scale agreements
are resourced by the relevant mining company.
7 While the Right to Negotiate provisions of the NTA, and the veto provisions of the ALRA provide
forms of de facto fungibility, it nonetheless is the case that native title rights and interests and those
arising from the inalienable freehold issued under the ALRA are not directly fungible to other forms
of capital.
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Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs argued that benefits from
mining agreements should create employment and educational opportunities for
individuals and be invested for the long-term benefit of communities. Macklin
(2008) observed:
The challenge here is to ensure that financial flows to native title
holders—and indeed landholders under other land rights
legislation—contribute positively to improving Indigenous economic
status. To do this, these financial transfers must be structured to increase
wealth and capital assets within Indigenous communities.
Given that agreements are essentially private contracts between the parties,
albeit given certain legal characteristics if negotiated and registered as Indigenous
Land Use Agreements, it is difficult to see how government could insist that
agreement benefits be structured in certain ways, unless there is the intention
to establish Indigenous Land Use Agreements as statutory contracts.
This chapter does not address the question of whether Australian agreements
between Aboriginal people and resource developers have historically delivered
the benefits which Aboriginal parties expected of them (for example,
O’Faircheallaigh 2006),8  nor the enormous structural and other impediments to
their doing so (for example, Taylor 2004a, 2008b; Taylor and Scambary 2005).
There are also complex challenges to the policy frameworks of ‘closing the gap’
and social inclusion posed by the well-documented maintenance of particular
Aboriginal worldviews which may be inimical to certain forms of participation
in the wider society. Further challenges are posed by evidence that there are
many Aboriginal people who, while they seek better access to the goods and
services of the wider society, nonetheless have no desire to be assimilated into
it or to share all of its values, lifestyles and locales (Altman, Biddle and Hunter
2008; Martin 2005b; Scambary 2007; Sullivan 2007; Sutton 2001).
Whether effectively negotiated and implemented or not, all agreements are
explicitly transformative institutions. This is irrespective of whether the aims
include the protection and maintenance of Aboriginal culture. An example of
this is the GCA, which establishes one of the goals and aspirations of the
Aboriginal parties as being:
… to ensure that the material benefits do not corrupt indigenous cultures
but enable people to re-affirm the cultures and enhance the lifestyles of
the members of the Native Title Groups and other members of the
Communities through community and cultural development initiatives
(GCA 1997: 6).
8  As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are real issues with the availability of appropriate
data for benchmarking and measuring agreement impacts.
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Objectives of mining agreements—such as financial benefits and economic
development through employment, training and business development—are
predicated precisely upon the transformation of the Aboriginal parties’ existing
socioeconomic status. It is clear in fact that irrespective of the efficacy of mining
agreements, or that of government policies, Aboriginal people in mine hinterlands
are undergoing profound, and arguably accelerating, transformation. There are
significant and ongoing demographic changes in Aboriginal populations in
Australian mine hinterlands, as elsewhere in remote and rural Aboriginal
Australia. For example, Taylor and Scambary (2005) have produced a major
baseline study for Aboriginal participation in the Pilbara mining boom. They
showed that in the absence of substantial out-migration the Pilbara Aboriginal
population is set to expand for decades to come, with the largest growth being
in younger age groups, although there will be a greater proportion of older
people than is currently the case. In combination, Taylor and Scambary (2005)
argue, these expanding cohorts present significant challenges for social and
economic policy. Arguably, they also have major implications for cultural
reproduction, with enculturation into a distinctively Aboriginal social and
cultural milieu taking place within generational age cohorts—such as peer
groups—rather than through transmission from senior to junior generations
(Martin 2003, 2008b).
There are other very significant demographic changes taking place. The majority
of Aboriginal people associated with any given traditional country are now
usually living in polyglot townships along with non-Aboriginal people and
members from other Aboriginal groups. These townships may be situated on
the country of the group concerned (as Tom Price is for its Eastern Gurrama
residents), on or near its periphery (as Aurukun is for its Wik Way residents),
or at some remove from it (as is Mornington Island for its Waanyi residents).
Those Aboriginal people from a particular country are thus typically dispersed
across wide regions, may have only intermittent contact with other members of
the group (for example, at funerals and other such ceremonial occasions), and
more generally are living in situations where younger generations are exposed
to a considerable diversity of values and worldviews. In the terms of French
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 166) that is, they have moved from a situation
of ‘doxa’ in which the established order had not been perceived as arbitrary and
one possible order among many, but as a self-evident and natural one which
went unquestioned, to ‘heterodoxy’ in which there are many possibilities,
including those of dissent and rejection.
These factors clearly have major implications for being able to prove native title,
in terms of the legal requirements to demonstrate such matters as continuity of
the relevant society under whose laws and customs the claimants assert they
hold native title, continuing adherence to and practice of those laws and customs
through the generations since sovereignty, and the traditional nature of those
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laws and customs which can allow for adaptation but not transformation. The
kinds of changes and transformations outlined above, common across virtually
all Aboriginal groups and societies, do not mean that native title cannot be
proved or demonstrated, but make it much harder to do so. That is, proving
native title requires arguments that overcome these difficulties.
In the negotiation, design and implementation of agreements however, such
factors must explicitly be taken into account, not circumvented. For example,
there will be a need to develop sophisticated, nuanced, but practical analyses
and proposals around such matters as contemporary Aboriginal authority
structures and leadership domains. It will be critical to the long-term
sustainability of agreements that cultural enclave governance principles such
as the supposedly unchanging nature of tradition are not unwittingly built in.
Equally, it will be essential to not build in obsolescence such as traditionalist
notions of authority of elders in domains where they may demonstrably not
have such authority (see discussion below). It will also be vital to be alert to
different governance principles which may operate in different arenas—for
example, decision-making principles in relation to country, in comparison with
those necessary for viable commercial enterprises.
Sustainable agreement governance design will also require detailed attention to
be paid to the implications of the complex interplay in Aboriginal societies
between the local and individual on the one hand, and the collective or
community on the other. There is typically a pervasive public dialogue amongst
Aboriginal people around collective social forms, which nonetheless takes place
against the background of the reality of an intense localism (discussed later in
this chapter) with a stress on local group autonomy, and with ethical and political
frameworks centred on highly localised imperatives. One implication of this is
that it is likely to be problematic to assume that a small number of representatives
from, say, a native title group, will in practical terms prove a sufficient conduit
for communication between an agreement entity and the relevant group (see
also the discussion below on the politics of representation). As another instance,
it may be important in negotiations to not just focus solely on community-based
benefits, such as resources and assistance for business development, but also to
have the mechanisms for local groupings or families, or even individuals, to
access them (see also Holcombe, Chapter 7; Scambary, Chapter 8).
Agreements as intercultural institutions
Thus far, I have discussed the need to incorporate the recognition of agreements
as systems, as well as their explicitly transformative character, into agreement
governance in the negotiation, design and implementation stages. The final and
key element in agreement governance to be considered here is the necessity of
reflecting the intercultural nature of the values and practices that the Aboriginal
parties to agreements will bring to both their involvement in negotiations and
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participation in subsequent agreement implementation. However, this is not to
propose the apparently straightforward principle that agreements need to take
account of Aboriginal culture, for example through creating supposedly
culturally appropriate institutions and ways of working within agreements.
This is because while it is possible to meaningfully delineate distinctive
characteristics of the contemporary values and practices of the Aboriginal peoples
of Australian mine hinterlands, these values and practices have been produced,
reproduced and transformed through complex historical processes of engagement
with those of the dominant society which has resulted in what Merlan (1998)
terms an intercultural social field. This process has involved not just Aboriginal
people’s domination by and exclusion from non-Aboriginal society, but also
their appropriation and incorporation of many of the wider society’s values and
practices into their own, distinctive, ways of being and acting (Martin 2003,
2005a, 2005b). Even who and what Aboriginal people consider themselves to
be has been affected by the representations of Aboriginality by others (Merlan
1998).
Aboriginal societies and cultures cannot be seen as bounded and separate entities
or domains (Hinkson and Smith 2005; Merlan 2005); nowhere in Australia do
(or indeed can) Aboriginal people live in self-defining and self-reproducing
domains of meaning and practices. Rather, they draw from and contribute to
complex and contested intercultural social fields (Martin 2003). It should be
noted that while the notion of the intercultural implies both Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal people are operating within a (more or less) shared social field,
they may well be doing so from quite distinct positions, as Merlan observes
(1998: 233). A key insight of significant practical import is the challenge posed
by the notion of the intercultural to the existence of separate, disconnected
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal domains of beliefs, understandings, and practices.
It recognises that the characteristics of any particular governance arena in, for
example, a mining agreement do not draw solely from a supposedly separate
Aboriginal domain with its origins in the ‘classical’ (Sutton 2003) past, nor derive
simply from a self-contained and dominant non-Aboriginal society and culture.
Rather, each arena or phenomenon will involve values and practices which draw
from ideational and practical repertoires whose origins may ultimately lie within
either or both Aboriginal society or the wider one, and which are simultaneously
implicated in an ongoing cycle of adaptation, incorporation, and transformation
(see also Smith and Hunt 2008).
An exemplar of an intercultural phenomenon is that of Aboriginal elders. The
contemporary category of elder is not simply a phenomenon of Aboriginal
societies themselves with its roots in traditional authority structures; it has been
created in part precisely through the interactions between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal societies (Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 302–3). Elders have become
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the individuals with whom governments, agencies and resource developers
consult to ascertain the views of Aboriginal groups about issues ranging from
the protection of heritage and culturally significant sites to the protection of
children. In certain contexts, the category has even been introduced into
legislation (for example, the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Qld)). Not only, then,
has who constitutes an Aboriginal elder and the nature of their status and
authority been transformed by institutions of the wider society, but Aboriginal
eldership has in turn impacted on how those institutions interact with and
understand Aboriginal groups and communities.
Mining agreements themselves constitute intercultural institutions. They
quintessentially arise from and in turn structure and transform the nature of the
engagement of Aboriginal people and their institutions with those of the wider
society—and vice versa (see, for example, Doohan 2003; Scambary 2007, this
volume Chapter 8; Trebeck 2005, 2007a). Indeed, many Australian mining
agreements are negotiated on the basis of claimants holding or asserting native
title rights in project development areas, and native title itself is an archetypical
intercultural phenomenon. As discussed above, its logic derives from the
recognition space of native title, rights and interests whose origins lie in
traditional laws and customs, but are recognised and given force by the general
Australian legal system (Mantziaris and Martin 2000). The intercultural character
of native title arises through the processes by which the content of a particular
Aboriginal group’s or society’s relations to country under its own laws and
customs is translated into rights and interests which can be accommodated by
Australian property law—but which in turn impact on how members of that
group or society understand, practice and reproduce those laws and customs
(e.g. Glaskin 2007; Redmond 2007).
While a mining agreement as a whole needs to be understood as intercultural,
so too do its constituent entities and relationships and, more broadly, the
economic values and motivations which Aboriginal people bring to bear on their
engagement with a given mine and its associated agreement. It is not just
specifically Aboriginal institutions such as the GADC previously discussed in
relation to the GCA which are intercultural. Equally, key functional areas of the
mining company or its subcontractors such as a Community Relations division
charged with the responsibility for engaging with Aboriginal stakeholders and
oversight of agreement implementation are also potentially intercultural
institutions. Their organisational cultures (such as work practices, accountability
constituencies, styles of interpersonal relationships and more generally an ethos
which are all influenced by the values and practices of Aboriginal staff and
clients) have the potential to be quite different from those of, for example,
production units, as is the case with the mine site GCA Support Department
within CZL (Scambary 2007: 224–5; Trebeck 2005). On the other hand, Rio Tinto
Iron Ore has taken a different course with its Communities and External Relations
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division, on the basis that to be relevant it must share common corporate goals
and culture, with community relations being an integral part of the company’s
overall operating strategy (B. Hart, pers. comm. 2008).
In these core project operational areas (such as the mine itself, crushing and
beneficiation plants, and assay laboratories) factors such as production targets,
quality control, other technical requirements, and occupational health and safety
standards, limit most potentially transformative impacts of Aboriginal
involvement on what is overwhelmingly modern industrial production culture.
On the other hand, mine administrative and service operations may be more
open to other cultural influences. In the Century project, factors such as the
significant presence of Aboriginal employees (in the range of 15–20 per cent
according to Barker and Brereton 2004), political actions such as the 2002 sit-in
previously discussed, and proactive leadership by both Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal individuals have served to create a distinctive culture around
the mess and recreation and living areas which marks this project out from other
field sites discussed in this volume. In the case of the Argyle diamond mine,
however, Doohan (2003) provides examples of how the Argyle Participation
Agreement between the miner and traditional owners has allowed the latter to
‘insert their cultural forms and presence onto the mine site in a number of ways’
(see also Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner 2007,
Chapter 5). These have included Aboriginal people framing their relationships
with the miner in terms of wirnan exchange relationships, instituting regular
manthe ceremonies involving the (Aboriginal) hosts welcoming and inducting
(company staff) guests and giving them a ritual safe passage across the mine
site—which in Doohan’s view constitutes a form of a specifically Aboriginal
health and safety instruction, and social incorporation of senior mine personnel
through giving them ‘skin’ classificatory names.
Returning to the implications for agreement negotiation, design and
implementation, while a range of entities and relationships within a mining
agreement need to be understood as intercultural, the intrinsic character and
the entailments of interculturality of each will be potentially different. That is,
while the governance of entities such as an Aboriginal representative and
advocacy body, or the company’s community relations and employment
divisions, and relationships between each of these entities and the Aboriginal
stakeholders must all incorporate a recognition of intercultural factors, different
issues will arise for each in their design and implementation. The following
factors are relevant to defining the intercultural character of each arena. These
are crucial matters to be established for both design and implementation purposes:
• Is the governance that of a relationship between an entity and a collectivity,
between two entities, of relationships within a collectivity, or of an entity
itself?
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• Does the particular governance arena entail multiplex linkages or is it
relatively mono-dimensional?
• Does the institution involved have a formal, legal or administrative presence,
or is it a collectivity or a ‘natural social grouping’ of some kind?
• What is the source of authority for the relevant principles of governance
(for example, to adjudicate on conflicting viewpoints, resolve disputes, and
to establish the rules of practice)?
A schematic illustration of entities and the relationships between them to be
found in Australian mining agreements with Aboriginal people is provided in
Fig. 5.2. It is not intended to represent the formal structures of any given
agreement as Fig. 5.1 does in the case of the GCA. Rather, it illustrates governance
arenas relating to classes of entity and categories of relationships in such
agreements.9  Its aim is to disaggregate different kinds of governance arenas in
order to illustrate how the preceding proposed governance principles—the need
for agreements to be understood as systems, agreements’ transformative character,
and their intercultural nature—can be usefully brought to bear in specific
instances. That is, it aims to break down agreement governance into components
which potentially need to have their own distinctive and specific governance
characteristics to support agreement sustainability.
Fig. 5.2 Key agreement governance arenas
9  In Fig. 5.2, the line representing Aboriginal groups and communities is dotted to indicate their relative
lack of clearly defined bounds in comparison with, for example, the formal membership of a corporation.
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Because the focus of this chapter is neither on the governance of mining company
community relations divisions and the like, nor on the governance of
governments in terms of how its various agencies may operate in their dealings
with Aboriginal people through mining agreements (see O’Faircheallaigh 2006
for some discussion of these matters; also Trebeck 2007a, this volume Chapter 6),
these have been aggregated in Fig. 5.2. Effective governance in each of the six
arenas identified in Fig. 5.2, I propose, is one of the key requirements for the
long-term effectiveness and sustainability of agreements as a whole. Each arena
will have differing intercultural characteristics, and different transformative
implications—and thus potentially involve different governance principles. For
illustrative purposes however this chapter will sketch these out in only two of
these arenas of particular significance to mining agreements: first, the governance
of agreement organisations themselves qua organisations—that is, corporate
governance and the like; and second, the governance of relationships between
agreement entities and the particular Aboriginal stakeholders.
The governance of agreement structures
This section focuses on Arena 2 in Fig. 5.2, concerning the governance of more
or less formal entities such as committees and working groups as well as
incorporated bodies, although discussion here will centre on the latter. There
are now several thousand Aboriginal-controlled organisations around Australia
(Hunt and Smith 2006a: 10), ranging from virtual ‘post box’ landholding entities
to commercial and service delivery corporations with turnovers of millions of
dollars. As is the case for non-Aboriginal organisations, there is also considerable
diversity in terms of their viability or otherwise. There is a developing, if
contested, literature on theorising Australian Aboriginal organisations and
governance (for example, Mantziaris and Martin 2000; Martin 2003, 2005a,
2005b; Martin and Finlayson 1996; Sullivan 2006, 2007), and the factors that are
held to contribute to good governance and successful Aboriginal organisations
(for example, Finlayson 2007a, 2007b; Hunt and Smith 2006a, 2007; Hunt et al.
2008).
However, this section will not canvass this terrain in any detail, but will refer
to a set of key issues that bear on the design of organisations such as those
established through mining agreements. In particular, it will follow arguments
that it is necessary to separate—both conceptually and practically—the
governance of organisations themselves (Arena 2), from that of the communities
which they serve (Arena 1), and that of the relationships between them (Arena 3)
(see, for example, Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 126–8; also Martin 2003; Sullivan
2007).
Of course, Aboriginal people bring distinct values and ways of acting in the
world to their participation in organisations, which have become fundamental
constitutive elements in Aboriginal polities. Some of these pose challenges to
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the governance of Aboriginal-controlled organisations, especially those with
diverse and broad constituencies. An ‘intense localism’ (Martin and Finlayson
1996) is a particularly significant feature to be found across Australian Aboriginal
societies generally, with ancient roots in their original hunter-gatherer
predecessors. Here, priority is given to values and interests asserted at the
small-scale, locally based or even individual levels, and to individual and
local-group autonomy (Martin and Finlayson 1996: 5; Sullivan 2006: 17). While
this localism exists along with wider networks of connection and interdependence
(Myers 1986; Hunt and Smith 2006a: 24–5), strong emphasis is typically placed
on the identities and autonomy of individuals and local groupings, such as those
referred to by Aboriginal people as ‘families’ which frequently form the
‘backbone’ of organisational governance (Hunt and Smith 2006a: 10).10
Localism has important ethical as well as political implications. A person’s
strongest bonds and obligations are usually to their immediate kin and family,
and those from other groups may well be viewed with a degree of suspicion or
even hostility. A notion of the wider common good—including amongst those
who are parties to the one mining agreement—may not meaningfully exist, or
be very attenuated (Peterson 2005; Trigger 2005; Tonkinson 2007). These
overriding political and ethical commitments to immediate kin and family have
significant implications for Aboriginal members of governing committees and
boards. To take just one instance, the legal requirement for a board member to
act in accordance with their fiduciary duty to the organisation itself can directly
conflict with the ethical and political requirement that the individual concerned
act in the interests of and support immediate kin, including directing
organisational resources to them (for example, Hunt and Smith 2006a: 17;
Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 189–92).
Equally, principles underlying democratic representative institutions and other
organisational structures whereby individuals or groups cede their right to speak
for, manage, and protect their interests to others who represent them, do not
typically operate within Aboriginal groups and communities. The localism
mentioned previously is manifested in resistance by individuals and local groups
to others taking on this role—and indeed to being bound by the decisions of
others, including those who nominally act for or represent them in contemporary
institutions. This originates in part in the high value placed on individual and
local-group autonomy, and on a resistance to hierarchy outside the religious and
ritual arena. Equivalently, a person’s occupation of a formal institutional position
such as chairman or board member does not necessarily give that person the
authority or legitimacy within the relevant Aboriginal polity to speak for others.
10  Sutton (2003, Chapter 8) provides an extended treatment of post-classical Aboriginal ‘families of
polity’ as fundamental political, social and economic forms in contemporary, ‘post-classical’ Aboriginal
societies.
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All Aboriginal participants understand and acknowledge this cultural logic and
imperative by which the primary ethical and political obligations of those on a
board are to their kin and mob—and that therefore those from outside that
network can have no necessary assurance that their interests will be fairly and
equitably represented.
This is one of the key reasons why, across Australia, many Aboriginal
organisations are characterised by intense competition between different groups
and by corporate histories in which competing factions alternate in their control
of the board, or fission off to form new organisations. Political conflict in these
organisations will often be conducted through manipulation of membership and
meeting processes to establish control of boards (and therefore of organisational
resources). This destabilising ‘politics of representation’ (Mantziaris and Martin
2000: 303–5) can also be seen sometimes in the attempts by individuals and
sub-groups within the wider organisational constituency to assert control over
the means by which membership of the organisation, and thus the means by
which composition of its board, are determined.
Nonetheless, while distinctive, Aboriginal organisations are not cultural isolates
but focal sites where Aboriginal practices and values are both incorporated and
simultaneously transformed through processes of engagement—appraisal,
contestation, and appropriation—with those whose ultimate origins lie in the
broader non-Aboriginal society (Martin 2003: 5). Aboriginal organisations have
become sources of legitimacy and authority not only within the Aboriginal
domain but also the non-Aboriginal one where, in some respects, they can be
seen as the functional equivalent of the King Plates the early colonists were wont
to hang around the necks of putative leaders of local Aboriginal groups
(Mantziaris and Martin 2000: 101, 274). They have a form of dual incorporation,
whereby they are simultaneously legally incorporated under, or established by,
statutes of the general Australian law, and incorporated into Aboriginal polities
(Mantziaris and Martin 2000). Aboriginal organisations are thus necessarily and
intrinsically intercultural institutions (Martin 2003)—not culturally autonomous
Aboriginal arenas, but rather the locations of transforming and transformed
practices and values.
From this perspective, then, I suggest it is totally inadequate to leave the
construction and evaluation of organisational management principles solely to
the Aboriginal people concerned and to a domain of supposedly uniquely
Aboriginal values (Martin 2003: 9). If good organisational governance is a core
component of an increased capacity by Aboriginal people for strategic
engagement with the dominant society (Martin 2003), then it must draw not
only from the values and practices of Aboriginal people, but also from those of
the general Australian society. While the possibility of distinctive values and
practices must be accepted as a basic premise in institutional design, the essence
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of developing appropriate Aboriginal organisational governance does not lie in
supposedly resolving potentially conflicting cultural values and practices; rather,
it is to be undertaken through establishing institutional structures and principles
which are robust enough to encompass and engage diversity, competition and
conflict, and which are appropriate to the task at hand.
It is therefore not defensible to resort to an unexamined notion of cultural
appropriateness, or to one of a notionally autonomous domain of Aboriginal
culture, in determining the core principles by which effective Aboriginal
organisations should be established and operated (Mantziaris and Martin 2000:
293–4; Martin 2003: 9–10; Sullivan 2006, 2007).11 The concept of cultural
appropriateness in relation to Aboriginal organisations assumes a domain in
which Aboriginal values and practices are autonomous from those of the general
Australian society, and a domain of operations of these corporations which is
separate from the legal, political, and economic fields in which they are
necessarily situated. Neither assumption is true. As I have argued elsewhere:
The more attempts are made to reflect the complexities and subtleties of
the values and practices of Indigenous people in formal corporate
structures and processes—for example, regarding such matters as
authority and decision-making, or the various forms of the typically
labile Indigenous groupings and sub-groupings—the more there is the
risk that the formal corporate structures and processes over time will
supplant the informal Indigenous ones—a process of the juridification
of social relations. While as we have seen, the engagement of Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal people can best be understood in intercultural terms,
juridification takes this a step further, raising the problem of the
underlying social relations being distorted or dominated by the legally
enforceable expression of the same relations (Martin 2003: 10).
A corollary is that attempts to import particular aspects of Aboriginal political
culture into the management structures and procedures of an organisation run
the risk of creating organisational instability, as in the phenomenon of the politics
of representation mentioned previously. This can have highly adverse
consequences for Aboriginal people themselves, as in cases where the organisation
is delivering an essential service, or managing a multi-million dollar trust. The
objective fact is that representative structures can never truly reflect the nature
of and relationship between the fluid and diverse groupings and alliances that
characterise Aboriginal political systems. It is a common mistake, repeated across
Aboriginal Australia including by those providing advice on the establishment
of Aboriginal corporations, to focus attention largely on attempting to capture
11  Sullivan (2006, 2007) challenges the related notion of ‘cultural match’ developed by the Harvard
Project on Native American Economic Development and adopted in the work of CAEPR’s Indigenous
Community Governance Project.
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the diversity of the particular constituency in the board structure itself. It can
certainly be important to an organisation’s legitimacy with its constituency that
its board is representative, in the particular sense of being drawn from a broad
cross-section of the constituency and reflecting as far as feasible the cultural
geography of the governance environment (Hunt and Smith 2006a: 24). However,
problems will inevitably arise when the work of incorporating and responding
to the diverse interests and expectations across an organisation’s Aboriginal
constituency is left essentially to the political and administrative representative
structure of a board.
From this perspective, there are compelling arguments for establishing Aboriginal
organisations which leave as much distinctively Aboriginal social and political
process as possible within the informal Aboriginal realm where it belongs, and
do not attempt to codify it within corporate structures or organisational
governance mechanisms (Martin 2003: 10). The focus in these corporations’
design and management should be on instituting organisational governance of
a form which will maintain a viable and legitimate structure through which
services would be delivered. Mantziaris and Martin (2000: 322–7) outline a set
of principles for organisational design, which while developed for Prescribed
Bodies Corporate are of more general applicability. These are: legal certainty;
legitimacy (in the sense of having the capacity to attract the allegiance of the
group); sensitivity to Aboriginal values; sensitivity to motivational complexity;
revisability; robustness; simplicity; and transactional cost efficiency.
As Mantziaris and Martin note, there are interrelationships between these
principles, and tradeoffs between them; for example, between sensitivity to
Aboriginal values, and transactional cost efficiency.
Separate attention needs to be paid to such matters as developing procedures to
ensure effective and accountable relationships and linkages between the
corporation and the relevant Aboriginal group or community (Arena 3, Fig. 5.2;
see discussion in the following section). These are the areas where full cognisance
must be taken of the informal and pervasive governance principles operating
within the relevant Aboriginal community itself. In Sullivan’s (2007: 15–6) terms:
A developmental or service delivery organisation should not be conflated
with an institution of self-government. It needs neither a representative
structure nor should it attempt to mimic local cultural forms. The
representative structure is not required because the function of
representation continues to happen where it belongs, in the cultural
milieu of the community, and in the forms appropriate to the culture.
Attention should turn away from representative structure (in
service-delivery organisations) and towards means of communication,
information transfer (in both directions), monitoring of consent, and
effective policy input from the client/membership/constituency. This
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means seeking authority wherever it lies, whether in institutions, families
or particular individuals and encouraging sound leadership.12
This is not to argue that representative Aboriginal organisations are not necessary
to mining agreements—they are. But, it is to propose a reconceptualisation of
their character, purpose, and therefore design. The challenge is to develop and
manage distinctively Aboriginal organisations which nonetheless facilitate
effective engagement with the wider society rather than limiting it (Martin 2003:
10), and which pay particular attention to the governance of their relationships
with their constituencies. From this perspective, appropriate and effective
Aboriginal organisations would not draw their structures and operating principles
from a supposedly autonomous Aboriginal domain, but from universal standards
of good management (Sullivan 2007: 15–16). Indeed, the scale of many Australian
mining agreements is such that there is an overriding necessity for highly
competent management. While Aboriginal organisations must certainly take
account of specific values and practices of the Aboriginal people who participate
in them and whom they serve through the development of flexible organisational
cultures which are sensitive to the milieu in which they operate, to be truly
culturally appropriate Aboriginal organisations will also have to directly
engage—and even on occasion challenge and circumvent—these values and
practices. Where it is absolutely essential that Aboriginal values and practices
be taken into account is in how they do their business; that is, in the governance
of their relationships with their Aboriginal constituents and service community.
Aboriginal governance needs to move beyond concentrating on the structure
of organisations and towards the development of effective consultation,
information sharing, and permission mechanisms (Sullivan 2006: 18, 2007: 30).
Governance of relationships with Aboriginal stakeholders
My focus in this section is on Arena  3 in Fig. 5.2, the governance of relationships
between (Aboriginal controlled) agreement entities and their stakeholders. Before
proceeding to discuss this, it must be noted that major mining agreements also
include another and very important class of relationships involving the
Aboriginal stakeholders, that between them on the one hand and the resource
developer and relevant government agencies on the other (Arena 5, Fig. 5.2). A
key focus of this arena is typically on such matters as education, training, and
employment programs, which are beyond the scope of this chapter (see, for
example, discussions in Barker and Brereton 2004; Scambary 2007: 86–9, 224–6;
Tiplady and Barclay 2007; Vidler 2007). It is clear that to be effective, service
delivery in this area must proactively engage potential Aboriginal participants
through culturally aware, flexible measures adapted for their specific needs and
12  In my reading, Sullivan is here using ‘representative’ in the sense of political representation, not the
sense discussed previously of a ‘representative sample’ of constituents.
122  Power, Culture, Economy
circumstances, as instanced by the recruitment case studies for the Argyle
diamond mine in Tiplady and Barclay (2007: 24–39). Similarly, Kemp, Boele and
Brereton (2006) argue for a more proactive, externally focused, stakeholder-driven
and values-based approach by resource companies to community relations,
another aspect of governance of relationships (Arena 5).
On the other hand, the need for proactive, flexible and adaptive mechanisms
for engaging with Aboriginal people does not, in general, appear to have been
a widely instituted principle in the relationships between Aboriginal stakeholders
and the Aboriginal-controlled agreement structures such as trust companies and
special-purpose representative and advocacy bodies (that is, community
relationships in Arena 3, Fig. 5.2). As has been argued above, typical agreement
governance arrangements have left the work of reflecting community diversity
largely to formal structures like boards and committees, like those in the GCA
outlined previously. Furthermore, the common expectation of miners and
governments is that community members on these structures will act as effective
conduits of information, concerns and issues between Aboriginal people and
other parties to agreements. Implicitly, the assumption is that representative
boards and committees can act as proxies for the relevant community. Direct
engagement with Aboriginal stakeholders, it is assumed, is to be conducted
largely through community meetings of one sort or the other. Neither assumption
can be safely made.
The first assumption—that community representatives on boards and committees
will necessarily act as effective conduits for information—fails to take account
of the import of localism in establishing people’s social, political and ethical
frameworks. Even though a nominated or elected member of a board or committee
may notionally represent a particular sub-group of the agreement beneficiaries
(for example, a language group), communication may not necessarily flow across
boundaries set by immediate kin and family connections—much depends on
the individual concerned.
The second assumption—that meetings provide a key mechanism for
communication with Aboriginal people—also needs careful examination (see
also Sullivan 2006: 29-30). Meetings provide a problematic mechanism for
informing and seeking input from members of what are often dispersed and
deeply factionalised groups. This is for a number of interrelated reasons, to be
found across Aboriginal Australia and which in part reflect the highly localised
nature of Aboriginal polities discussed previously. Particularly in the case of
large, community meetings involving people from disparate groups, they are
prone to being dominated and disrupted by individuals who use them for political
aggrandisement, which can mean that it is difficult if not impossible to ensure
effective participation of those who may have equivalent rights but less political
standing. Such meetings can also provide forums that become dominated by the
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airing of grievances about the operation of the agreement as it is the only occasion
available to do so.
Meetings usually provide a poor basis for informed decision-making, particularly
around complex and technical issues. Meetings do not facilitate typical Aboriginal
decision-making processes of extended consideration and discussion, involvement
of appropriate individuals on the basis of such principles as seniority and
legitimate knowledge, and consensus building within the local groups where
such processes have force. Indeed, because large meetings aggregate local and
autonomous groups, they can disempower many people from effective
participation. Meetings are a useful and necessary mechanism by which formal
ratification of a proposal can be given by the relevant jural public (Sutton
2003)—that is, by those who can legitimately express a position on it and those
others who act as witnesses to the ratification. These meetings need to be
preceded by a considered and dispersed process of information dissemination,
consultation and consensus building, so that the meeting essentially ratifies
informed decisions that have already been reached, within the appropriate-level
subgroups such as families.
The common reliance upon representative structures together with consultations
and information dissemination through meetings as primary means of agreement
beneficiary involvement, can also lead to the development of an inherently
passive and reactive relationship between beneficiaries and the agreement entities
which provide benefits to them. In general, in Australian agreements there
appears to be little or no provision for planning or decision-making in which
the beneficiaries themselves are or can be actively involved. As a consequence,
the dominant relationship between beneficiaries and agreements has become in
a number of instances one of opportunistic rent seeking by the former. This is
because there are few formalised means by which the beneficiaries can access
benefits or be involved in agreement operations or its decision-making processes,
and so they are reduced to instrumentally seeking individual or family advantage.
Assiduous demanding of sitting fees for mere attendance at meetings is but one
example of such understandable, but arguably problematic, rent seeking.
Furthermore, the socioeconomic profiles of Aboriginal people in Australian mine
hinterlands, evidence very poor health, education level, employment histories,
and so forth (for example, Taylor 2004a, 2008b; Taylor and Scambary 2005).
This is a poor substrate on which to graft the important work of agreements in
such areas as economic development, human capital development, and other
objectives to be found in Australian agreements. Capacity development amongst
the beneficiaries therefore is an absolutely essential precursor maximising the
returns of the resources provided to leverage sustainable change in accordance
with agreement objectives. To be effective such capacity development must
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operate at the level where beneficiaries themselves also operate—primarily at
the individual and local group levels.
These factors thus suggest that the governance of Arena 3, the relationship
between agreement entities and the beneficiaries, should have as its guiding
principles:
• providing mechanisms for active participation amongst the beneficiaries at
individual and local group levels;
• replacing current reactive and passive relationships between most
beneficiaries and agreement entities with relationships based on active
participation and a sense of ownership;
• minimising opportunistic rent seeking by agreeing on structured processes
in which beneficiaries have a meaningful say in the operations of agreements,
while still maintaining appropriate mechanisms for prudential control;
• providing mechanisms (such as participatory cyclical planning processes)
by which beneficiaries can plan for their futures and the role which resources
from agreements might play in those futures at the levels which are
meaningful to them (such as family or residential group) to develop a
long-term development perspective in the agreement; and
• a pre-eminent focus on working with the beneficiaries to build their capacity
to undertake this planning.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the governance of agreements between resource
developers and Aboriginal people is a crucial aspect of negotiations, and a critical
implementation issue. This suggests that governance capacity (for both Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal parties to an agreement) should be developed as much as
possible well ahead of agreement implementation. Governance needs to be
developed and implemented with agreements considered as systems rather than
just as aggregates of disconnected entities, relationships and processes. Agreement
governance should be understood as intercultural, not as involving interaction
between discrete and disconnected Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures: it
should not be designed and implemented in cultural enclave terms.
Furthermore, there is a range of governance arenas in agreements, each of which
will exhibit different characteristics and require different governance principles
for sustainable agreement implementation. In particular, it has been argued, the
focus historically has tended to be largely on incorporating Aboriginal diversity
and distinctive values into the structures of Aboriginal organisations, while
insufficient attention has been paid to the governance of the relationships
between these entities and their constituents, clients, or beneficiaries. Finally,
and critically, the negotiation, design and implementation of agreements should
explicitly take into account the profound transformative processes involving
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Aboriginal engagement with the institutions of the dominant society and not
implicitly be predicated on idealised representations of Aboriginal society and
culture.
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6. Corporate responsibility and social
sustainability: Is there any connection?
Katherine Trebeck
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility
and social sustainability on the premise that a vital ingredient in social
sustainability is the capacity of communities to determine, or at least influence,
those decisions that impact them. Communities should be able to influence
decisions regarding any trade-offs that may affect them—for example, between
economic development and environmental conservation or between meeting the
needs of current generations and the capacity of future generations to meet their
needs. Local communities1  in particular, need to determine what is to be
sustained, how and at what expense—not only because their lives are impacted
by these decisions, but also because local communities are crucial players in
processes seeking to enhance sustainability. Corporate actions are clearly relevant
in these trade-offs, but if, as seen here, the state proves itself a poor mediator
between company behaviour and the desires of local communities, then local
communities need to confront companies directly.
It is this interface that is the subject of this chapter—how responsive companies
are to the demands of local communities and in what circumstances. It considers
what drives miners to respond to the demands of certain communities in order
to elucidate when and where communities, in all their complexity, can exert
leverage over companies to make corporate behaviours correspond more with
the desires of those affected by corporate actions. The case study of mining
companies and their relations with Indigenous communities in Australia is used
to evaluate whether the tool of ‘civil regulation’ might advance the sovereignty
of local communities, so contributing to sustainability and enhancing democracy. 
Four examples indicate that corporate responsiveness depends on individuals
inside companies perceiving and utilising the ‘business case’ for socially
responsible behaviour to pursue corporate change in the direction demanded
by particular communities. This ‘business case’, however, depends on
communities maintaining vigilance and sustaining a context that impels
companies to respond to community demands. Implications for social
sustainability arising from this will be set out in the conclusion. Before examining
1  Local communities can be seen as linked by a shared space—thus ‘communities of geography’—other
communities might be linked by a mutual concern in an issue—’communities of interest’, or by common
experience of being affected by a particular development or entity—hence, ‘communities of fate’ (see
Held 2004, who describes the world as comprising ‘overlapping communities of fate’; also Hirst 1994:
49).
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several ‘vignettes’ where civil regulation has been effective theories of corporate
social responsibility, democracy and social sustainability, and civil regulation
are outlined to frame discussion. Instances of civil regulation and corporate
change are the Century mine negotiations and sit-in, Hamersley Iron’s Marandoo
dispute, Rio Tinto’s adoption of corporate social responsibility, and the campaign
to stop the Jabiluka uranium mine.
Analysis is informed by over 120 semi-structured interviews conducted from
2002 to 2005 with all levels of company personnel and many industry observers,
regulators, bureaucrats, stock market participants, environmental and community
activists and academics, as well as consideration of corporate publications and
other quantitative sources to contextualise personal accounts. This supporting
material included annual reports, corporate statements of a company’s vision
and operating principles, websites, brochures and other publications, survey
questions and results, speeches, media releases, media reports and company
statistics.
Democracy and social sustainability
Democratisation is advanced when political decision-making becomes more
inclusive—when citizens become involved in those decisions that affect them
(Whitehead 2002).2 The capacity of communities to determine, or at least
influence, those decisions that impact them is a fundamental aspect of
sustainability. Advocates of more participatory modes of democracy, however,
often complain that contemporary configurations of parliamentary representation
are inadequate (see, for example, Barber 1984; de Tocqueville 1945; Dryzek
2000b; Fox and Miller 1995; Hirst 1994; Odd Var Eriksen 2000; Pateman 1970;
see also Rayner 1997 for a comprehensive account of the pit-falls of Australia’s
representative structure). Formal democratic political processes, invariably
parliamentary representation, are accessible to some groups more than others,
reinforcing social and economic disparities, and deepening political inequality
(Young 2000; see also Dahl 1985; Klausen and Sweeting 2003). Globalisation and
corporate power seem to be encroaching on the ability of representative
government to uphold citizens’ interests (see, for example, Bang and Bech
Dyrbery 2000; Etzioni-Halevy 2003; Korten 2001; Miller 2003). Consequently,
government action frequently does not reflect the wishes of particular
communities.
With access and influence in formal parliamentary democracy often determined
by possession of resources, Indigenous Australians are especially disenfranchised
by the contours of representative democracy. A diversity of factors—historical,
political, cultural and structural—can potentially explain why many Indigenous
communities are disadvantaged in the socioeconomic conditions they experience
2 The etymological meaning of ‘democracy’ is rule by the people.
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compared to non-Indigenous Australians (see, for example, Altman 2001b). For
example, Indigenous people are more dispersed than other Australians, many
live in remote regions with few employment opportunities, while poor education,
housing, health and income status reinforces their disadvantage. Consequently,
Indigenous Australians are significantly more likely to be impoverished than
non-Indigenous Australians—across many indicators.3 Compared to
non-Indigenous Australians, unemployment is 3.2 times higher for Indigenous
peoples and Indigenous life expectancy is 17 years lower than that for the total
Australian population (Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth
Service Provision 2005).
Such circumstances illustrate that while Indigenous people are, in theory, able
to access representative parliamentary structures on the same basis as
non-Indigenous Australians, their standard of living or outcomes from education
or health services are substantially below that of non-Indigenous Australians
(Robinson and Sidoti 2000; Stokes 2002; Westbury 2003). Despite the complex
of reasons for Indigenous disadvantage, imposed ‘solutions’ developed in distant
centralised government clearly do not meet the needs of many Indigenous
communities.
Furthermore, until relatively recently, Indigenous Australians enjoyed few
formal legal and political rights, and struggled to access many mainstream
government services. Limitations of parliamentary representation are starkly
evident in the Indigenous experience: the small number of Indigenous voters
and their geographic dispersal translates to little electoral ‘muscle’. In a
democratic system largely dominated by formal parliamentary representative
politics, many Indigenous communities have been marginalised to the extent
that they are unable to acquire political influence necessary to meet their
objectives. In addition, disenchantment with formal structures and processes of
representative parliamentary democracy has been deepened by concerted
government efforts to facilitate mining, often regardless of the articulated
opposition or concerns of local Indigenous communities (seen in the examples
below). Such government actions over-ride the wishes of local communities,
undermining the influence of Indigenous citizens in decisions that acutely affect
them.
In addition, substitution—the risk of citizenship entitlements being deliberately
reduced—is faced by some Indigenous communities where mining takes place.
Government substituting royalty or other benefits derived from mining in the
place of government provision results in a reduction of state finance for
community services (Altman, Chapter 2; Levitus, Chapter 4; Altman and Pollack
1998; Banerjee 2001; O’Faircheallaigh 2004a; Rowse 2002).4 This is made more
3  Scale of measurement used does not change this fact (Hunter 1999).
4  For suggestions on how best to avoid this situation see O’Faircheallaigh 2004a.
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complex from a democratic perspective: perceptions that existing lack of
government service delivery (or threatened reduction) might lead some
Indigenous communities to acquiesce to mining if they view mining as the only
means to obtain necessary outcomes—health and education services or
employment, for example.
The deficiencies of representative democracy thus necessitate supplementary
means of delivering democratic ideals such as self-determination and inclusion
of those affected in policy-making (Hirst 1994; see also Dryzek 1996b, 2000a;
Fliedner 2000; Goghill 2002; Rose 2002). Legitimacy and democracy should not
be considered simply as a function of the tenure of elected officers, but should
be judged according to how institutions (including non-state entities) address
the expectations of those communities they impact. This broad understanding
of democracy and governance is further warranted by apparent ability of certain
groups to attain desired behaviour from powerful socioeconomic
entities—including companies (see, for example, Dryzek 1996a; Eckersley 2000:
118; Maddox 1991; Moon 2003: 2–9; Pateman 1970; Suggett 2000).
If Indigenous communities can, using the tool of civil regulation (see Trebeck
2007a), compel companies to reflect their demands, then the sovereignty,
self-determination and sustainability of these communities has been advanced.
How this tool is manoeuvred to attain community expectations depends on
several factors, pertaining to both the communities and the company in question.
The examples below seek to elicit some of these factors to enhance understanding
of the connection between corporate social responsibility and social sustainability.
Corporate social responsibility: A definition
This chapter conceives corporate social responsibility as those company activities,
other than commercial outputs, and beyond legally required behaviour, taken
in order to satisfy social needs and demands (see Trebeck 2008a). Motivation is
of particular importance in this conception: these are activities taken in response
to community demands or with a view to addressing social needs that impact
the business. They are ultimately impelled by business needs, as opposed to
moral or ethical connotations sometimes implied by ‘responsibility’. The
pragmatic rationale of such responsiveness reflects that in order to serve
shareholder interests, attention to the demands of some groups beyond
shareholders is necessary (see, for example, Moon 2003: 2–9; Power 2003; Spar
1998). According to a recent report, this might be understood as a business
approach to social responsibility, seeking the company’s own self interest to
enhance long term value and risk reduction5  by addressing the social and
5  Non-financial risks might include health and safety risks, protecting physical assets, compliance with
regulations, product liability, brand reputation, asset vulnerability, changing markets, sabotage, human
capital and so on (see Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, 2006: 50).
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environmental operating context (a product of factors such as reputation,
employee attraction, improving market position) (see Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee 2006: 34–68). Alternative approaches to a company’s social
responsibilities include a compliance approach, a philanthropic approach, and
social primacy or social obligation approach. The compliance approach is based
on obligation to comply with the letter of the law; at the same time, companies
may benefit from complying with the spirit of the law as perceived by the general
community. Under a philanthropic approach companies give to the community
beyond their primary business. Under a social primacy approach directors pursue
ethical goals beyond the spirit of the law, often in recognition that businesses
have access to valuable resources and privileges, and therefore have a
corresponding obligation to address social problems, even if there is not a clear
benefit to the company (Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 2006:
52–3).
Civil regulation
Bendell defines civil regulations as those ‘pressures exerted by processes in civil
society to persuade, or even compel, organisations to act differently in relation
to social and environmental concerns’ (Bendell 2000a; see also Murphy and
Bendell 1999).6  A particular manifestation of civil regulation with salience for
mining companies is the necessity to obtain and maintain a ‘social licence to
operate’. While minimum levels of acceptable company behaviour are specified
in laws and regulations, social obligations are no longer discharged by simply
carrying out legal minimum duties. Companies need to be not only ‘morally and
legally acceptable, but also popularly acceptable’ (Fombrun 1997; Holme 1999;
Lane 2001; see also Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2002; Piggot 2002; Warren
1999: 214–24; White 1999: 30–43). To attain this acceptability companies must
be deemed to meet community expectations for certain behaviour, often beyond
behaviour mandated by formal state regulations. In seeking a ‘social licence to
operate’, corporate responsiveness to the demands of key communities brings
companies to act, to some extent, according to the demands of certain
communities (Moon 2003: 2–9).
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2002) highlight that the terms of a company’s
social licence can be indirectly stipulated via mechanisms offered in the law and
the economy: for example, through unofficial economic sanctions associated
with negative publicity that reduces sales, investment in the company, and the
company’s access to capital (see also Kapelus 2002: 275–96).7  As seen in the case
6  Corporate power has long been challenged by elements of society and social movements, such as the
consumer movement in the 1960s, and the environmental movement of the 1970s. The history of
business/civil society relations has been one of antagonism, until the early 1990s when partnerships
for sustainable development began to emerge (see for further description Murphy and Bendell 1999).
7  Economic enforcement mechanisms invariably entail boycotts such as by consumers, investors or
shareholders in their capacity as economic actors.
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studies below, local communities can also directly affect the commercial future
of a company by threatening its ability to attain resources, such as employees,
minerals, or access to operations using blockades, legal permissions or licences.
Community resistance can also be tacit, such as intransigence during land access
negotiations. Or community resistance can be more palpable, such as public
protest, physical occupation of a site, even sabotage. Direct action can in turn
generate wider, indirect, implications. For example, causing a project to be
delayed lowers the net present value of any future earnings steam.8  Moreover,
local communities can use particular legislation strategically to exert leverage
over companies. Similarly, formal regulations might be more rigorously enforced,
or more stringent regulations introduced, as the result of community pressure.
Many companies are consequently recognising a ‘pragmatic logic’ in meeting
community expectations given ability of local communities to impose costs on
operations (Kapelus 2002: 275–96). Good corporate community relations,
community engagement and efforts to meet community demands are the means
by which companies can improve reputation and attain acceptance: their social
licence to operate (Banerjee 2001; Cragg and Greenbaum 2002: 319–35; Parker
2002; Solomon 2000; Trebeck 2007a; Zadek 2003).
Social sustainability through civil regulation and corporate
social responsibility?
In order to explore the bearing these processes have on social sustainability in
the sense of community self-determination, several empirical examples are
outlined here to assess whether the vulnerability of companies to civil regulation
actually empowers those communities otherwise disempowered by formal
representative democracy. These cases explore how corporate responsiveness
to community pressures represents an opportunity for Indigenous people to
express themselves beyond mainstream political structures, obtaining sought
outcomes using extra-parliamentary tactics, such as a sit-in, shareholder activism,
media campaigns or tactical use of legislation.
These case studies are only ‘flashpoints’ in complex ongoing relationships
between respective mining companies and local Indigenous communities. They
are not presented as definitive accounts, but as illustrations of the potential
leverage affected communities might be able to exert over companies and of
how impetus for responsiveness gain traction within respective companies. An
understanding of why and when companies respond to community demands,
appreciating the potential and limitations of community leverage, enables more
nuanced analysis of opportunities for social sustainability.
8  Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2002) therefore find the concept of a multifaceted licence to




In the Gulf of Carpentaria in Queensland many Indigenous people have low
formal education and suffer poor health, with one of the lowest life expectancies
on average in Australia.9  Until zinc mining began at Century Mine, most
employment was through the Community Development Employment Projects
(CDEP) scheme (Martin 1998b; Williams 1999). Gulf Indigenous communities
have, however, to some degree been able to hold the operators of Century mine
to account and attain certain concessions from the miner as a result.
In the 1990s local Indigenous communities, and in particular one charismatic
individual accepted by many as representative of broader community views,
were able to impel the prospective developer and operator of Century mine,
CRA (Rio Tinto’s predecessor in Australia), to the negotiating table. Early in
negotiations for the mine’s development the High Court of Australia, in what
became known as the Mabo decision, ruled that Indigenous Australians had
common law native title rights over unalienated land over which they could
demonstrate continuous connection. Subsequent Commonwealth legislation—the
Native Title Act 1993—gave registered native title holders a ‘right to negotiate’,
though not a right of veto, over mining (see Altman, Chapter 2; Rowse 2002).
For a considerable period after 1993, the native title status over land containing
the zinc deposit was unclear, hence CRA lacked a definitive legal license to
develop Century, elevating the necessity of community agreement necessary for
the mine’s operation. Century’s management also recognised that following
instances of ‘radical and aggressive community opposition’ to Century’s
development, even if they secured legal permission to mine, without a social
licence to operate the project would remain vulnerable to sabotage.10
The Queensland Government strongly supported the project, given Century’s
employment and regional economic importance. During a difficult point in
negotiations, it even offered legislation to by-pass Commonwealth native title
legislation, which would enable the mine to proceed, regardless of any claims
Indigenous people might have under native title (Cook 1997). This option was
refused by CRA which, as outlined below, had come to understand that such
litigious tactics did not advance harmonious community relationships.
The emerging corporate strategy to seek community support came, however,
from senior employees on the ground, rather than any directive from CRA
headquarters. Recognition of Indigenous interests, and the potential implications
of Indigenous opposition to mine development, was brought to Century by
9  For example, Mornington Island and Doomadgee have very low environmental health infrastructure,
and lack sufficient housing and water supplies (T. Koch, ‘Murrandoo, the man’, The Courier Mail, 23
 November 2002, p.35; Martin 1998b ).
10  I. Williams, former Executive General Manager—Mining, Pasminco Ltd, pers. int., 4 August 2003.
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Century’s Managing Director based on his prior experience with Hamersley
Iron’s Marandoo Mine in Western Australia (discussed below).
During a protracted negotiation period company negotiators increased an initial
offer to local Indigenous communities of $70 000 cash to an eventual $60 million
package. The bargaining position utilised by Indigenous interests—by virtue
of native title legal provisions, delay tactics and the use of public
forums—rendered those seeking to ‘regulate’ the miner visible to company
managers and prominent in company decision-making equations (Trebeck 2005;
Trigger 1998). Delays impinging on commercial standing and threats to corporate
reputation demonstrated that when Indigenous communities comprehend and
penetrate contexts in which large companies operate, they can press for certain
corporate behaviour and demonstrable community benefit.
In 1997 representatives from registered native title claimants, the Queensland
Government, and Century Zinc Mine signed the Gulf Communities Agreement
(GCA). The GCA enabled the mine to go ahead despite outstanding native title
claims over the area. It committed the owner of Century to spend $60 million
(in 1997 terms) over the life of the mine on employment and training, community
development, and payments to native title parties. It pledged native title groups
to allow Century’s operation in return.
Following the signing of the GCA, CRA (by then Rio Tinto) sold the mine to
Pasminco, and Pasminco went into voluntary administration in September 2001
(eventually emerging in 2004 as Zinifex following significant balance sheet
adjustments). With the financial problems that preceded administration,
Pasminco’s concern with community relations at Century lessened – the short
term priority of financial sustainability ostensibly assumed priority, to the
exclusion of other aspects of sustainability. Insufficient effort and resources
were deployed to satisfy the expectations of local Indigenous communities, and
Pasminco’s focus was limited to compliance with strict contractual aspects of
the GCA. Responsibility for GCA implementation was subordinated to a unit
within Century’s Human Resources. It seems that as Pasminco’s financial concerns
dominated, community relations suffered. Key individuals supporting community
relations effort had left, been retrenched or were largely unable to achieve
traction in a company where individuals with authority to affect substantial
change no longer appreciated the relevance of the business case for sound
community relations.
Nonetheless, prior to November 2002, Century believed it had developed ‘good
relationships with Indigenous people in the Gulf’ (Hall and Driver 2002; Pasminco
n.d.; Pasminco Century Mine 2001). In terms of Indigenous employment, Century
has been the ‘star performer’ of the Australian mining industry: over 20 per cent
of Century’s workforce is Indigenous, the vast majority of whom are local
(Pasminco Century Mine 2003).
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For many local Indigenous people though, the mine was not seen as delivering
benefit to the region beyond employment of individuals (Hall and Driver 2002).11
There were a number of further complaints, but efforts to convey them to the
company proved futile. In November 2002, between 50 and 80 people, mainly
residents of Doomadgee (the Indigenous community closest to the mine), occupied
the mine site kitchen. The protest did not halt production, but did constitute
both an inconvenience and an underlying threat that the action could escalate
and impede operations, a particularly ominous consequence given Pasminco’s
then perilous financial circumstances. After nine days an end to the sit-in was
negotiated between those involved, Pasminco and the Queensland Government.
There seems to be recognition from both Indigenous people involved and Century
that there has been positive change in the relationship between communities
and company since the sit-in.12  One observer states that the sit-in gave the
company a ‘wake-up call’ that it needed to pay more attention to community
issues.13  It highlighted the repercussions of not being sufficiently proactive in
community relationships. Since the sit-in ‘[Century’s] eyes are back on the ball,
they now appreciate that the GCA is their “licence to operate”, and if they do
not sufficiently implement the GCA according to community expectations they
will lose this licence’.14
Hamersley Iron
In the late 1980s, Hamersley Iron (‘Hamersley’ now Pilbara Iron), a Rio Tinto
subsidiary based in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, sought to develop
the Marandoo iron ore deposit located within the Hamersley National Park,15
claiming that Marandoo was imperative to maintain supply of ore.16  Despite
lacking the trust of many members of Indigenous communities in the Pilbara,
Hamersley pursued development of the mine regardless. At this time, prior to
the Mabo decision and the Native Title Act 1993, Hamersley used adversarial
11  D. Aplin, Doomadgee resident, member of GADC, pers. int., 10 July 2003; A. Chong, former Roche
Eltin Joint Venture employee, Burketown resident, pers. int., 10 July 2003; D. Rose, General Manager
Pasminco Century Mine, pers. int., 3 July 2003; C. Waldron, Doomadgee resident, pers. int., 10 July
2003.
12  D. Aplin, Doomadgee resident and member of GADC, pers. int., 10 July 2003; P. Cameron, Gulf region
community liaison officer Pasminco Century Mine, pers. int., 13 July 2003; F. Pascoe, Indigenous
Business Leader Aboriginal Development Benefits Trust Pty Ltd, Former GCA Manager, Normanton
resident, pers. int., 11 July 2003; K. Quigley, Manager External Relations Pasminco Century Mine, pers.
int., 1 July 2003; A. Waldron Doomadgee resident, pers. int., 10 July 2003.
13  C. Reading, Community Development Officer Pasminco Century Mine, pers. int., 2 July 2003; also
J. Green, Carpentaria Land Council Doomadgee Office, pers. int., 10 July 2003; D. Rose, General Manager
Pasminco Century Mine, pers. int., 3 July 2003; S. ‘Bull’ Yanner, GCA Superintendent Pasminco Century
Mine, pers. int., 2 July 2003.
14  F. Pascoe, Indigenous Business Leader Aboriginal Development Benefits Trust Pty Ltd, Former GCA
Manager and Normanton resident, pers. int., 11 July 2003.
15  Now the Karijini National Park.
16  See B. Hextall, ‘CRA clear to mine in national park’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 November 1990;
M. Stevens, ‘Showdown at Marandoo’, Business Review Weekly, 6 December 1991.
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and litigious tactics to progress Marandoo’s development, including a media
campaign to pressure the Western Australia Government to speed up approval
processes.17  Marandoo was complicated by its location within a National Park
and environmentalist’s concerns about endangering a rare species of mouse.18
An alliance of sorts arose between environmental groups and Indigenous interests
in opposition to the mine.19
Hamersley could not proceed with development until the project obtained
clearance under Western Australia’s Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972. Doing so
required identification of Indigenous sites to prevent or minimise any site
disturbance. Hamersley asserted that anthropological and archaeological studies
conducted since 1974 found no significant Indigenous sites, and when taking
ownership of the Marandoo area in the early 1980s it also acquired clearances
obtained by the previous owners.20  Hamersley refused to conduct another
survey of Indigenous sites at Marandoo. The Western Australian Government
eventually commissioned a further study that found four sites of cultural
significance, two of which were located on top of the ore body.
The demand for further surveys and compliance with the Aboriginal Heritage
Act 1972 had significantly stalled Hamersley’s intended development time frame.
Rather than seeking to prevent the mine altogether, the main objective of many
members of local Indigenous communities largely encompassed attaining
recognition in negotiations about how Marandoo proceeded and benefits offered
to those affected (G. Benn pers. comm. 2003). Delaying Marandoo was a strategy
to pressure Hamersley to acknowledge Indigenous interests, enabling the
communities to make demands such as increased Indigenous employment in
Hamersley’s operations. Heritage legislation was the best available (legal) ‘device
to achieve this’.21
Despite resistance and concern in the local Indigenous communities about the
destruction of sites, the Western Australian Government passed the Aboriginal
17  G. Benn, Aboriginal Legal Service, pers. comm., 5 August 2003; B. Larson, General Manager External
Affairs Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 27 March 2003; J. van de Bund, former Manager Aboriginal Training
and Liaison, Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 30 June 2003; J. Watson, Western Australian Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs 1991–93, pers. int., 5 August 2003; I. Williams, former Group Project Leader Future
Mine Resources, Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 4 August 2003.
18  H. Rumley, anthropologist, pers. int., 27 March 2003; M. Steketee, ‘On the fast track to a dispute
over Marandoo’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 November 1991; I. Williams, former Group Project
Leader Future Mine Resources, Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 4 August 2003.
19 T. ‘Slim’ Parker, at Tom Price, pers. int., 3 April 2003; G. Benn, Aboriginal Legal Service, pers.
comm., 5 August 2003; J. Pettigrew, Western Australian branch of the Australian Conservation
Foundation, quoted in M. Steketee, ‘On the fast track to a dispute over Marandoo’, The Sydney Morning
Herald, 5 November 1991; C. Smith, Community Development Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 2 April 2003;
J. Watson, Western Australian Minister for Aboriginal Affairs 1991–93, pers. int., 5 August 2003.
20 T. Darvall, ‘Hamersley in Ad Offensive for Iron Project’, The Age, 2 August 1991.
21 T. ‘Slim’ Parker, pers. int., 3 April 2003; J. Watson, Western Australian Minister for Aboriginal
Affairs 1991–93, pers. int., 5 August 2003; I. Williams, former Group Project Leader Future Mine
Resources, Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 4 August 2003.
136  Power, Culture, Economy
Heritage (Marandoo) Act 1992 that excluded the area from the Aboriginal Heritage
Act 1972. The mine was constructed after a delay of two years and substantial
legal cost to both the company and local communities (Bradshaw 1998; Eggleston
2002). Pertinently, Hamersley staff have since described the protracted processes
of pursuing development as harrowing, expensive and significant enough to
change the company’s approach to community relations.22  Key company
individuals realised such disputes are not good for long-term business activities
and future mining activity in the Pilbara.
Instead, seeking to improve community relationships and prevent any future
delay to its development plans, Hamersley established an Aboriginal Training
and Liaison Unit in 1992 to increase Indigenous employment and repair company
relationships with Indigenous people in the Pilbara. When it came to the
Yandicoogina mine in 1997, in the post-native title climate, Hamersley undertook
to negotiate and reach agreement with Indigenous representatives, rather than
the legalistic and confrontational approach that characterised Hamersley’s effort
to develop Marandoo a few years earlier.
Hamersley now states that it recognises the existence of native title and the
interest it bestows on Indigenous people as ‘real stakeholders’ in lands Hamersley
uses for mining (van de Bund 1996). In recognising certain demands and
expectations of local Indigenous communities, Hamersley aims ‘to meet its
strategic goals of maintaining access to land and resources and having the
necessary flexibility in [its] operating environment’ (Hamersley Iron 2000). It
has been Indigenous leverage, potently demonstrated in the delay of Marandoo,
which drove this strategy of responsiveness, reinforced by changes to community
relations strategies adopted by Hamersley’s parent company, Rio Tinto.
Rio Tinto’s Indigenous relations
Changes in Hamersley’s approach to external stakeholders were given added
momentum by support from senior managers within Hamersley’s parent
company, Rio Tinto. Key managers discerned the potential benefits from
improved Indigenous relations, and were able to shift company policy towards
one more responsive to the expectations of relevant Indigenous entities. Rio
Tinto’s transformation from campaigning to minimise recognition of Indigenous
rights (see for example Howitt 1998), to seeking a reputation as Indigenous
Australia’s preferred development partner, has been self-described as a
‘philosophical sea-change’ (Cusack 2001). The Marandoo dispute highlighted
the prudence of this new strategy, augmented by the advent of native title.
Agreements with Indigenous interests being a matter of course in Rio Tinto
22  D. Trigger, Anthropology Department, University of Western Australia, pers. int., 25 March 2003;
B. Larson, General Manager External Affairs Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 27 March 2003; J. van de Bund,
former Manager Aboriginal Training and Liaison, Hamersley Iron, pers. int., 30 June 2003; see also Rio
Tinto Limited 2001.
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operations overseas, rising risks to reputation through non-governmental
organisation scrutiny, and violent physical protest and subsequent premature
closure of Rio Tinto’s (then CRA) Bougainville Copper Mine in Papua New Guinea
cumulatively demonstrated the prudence of increased community relations effort
(see Trebeck 2005). As Rio Tinto’s Chief Financial Officer explained, ‘the business
case [for corporate social responsibility] rests first on risk mitigation. Without
corporate social responsibility, a mining company may eventually be unwelcome
as an investor in its host environment’.23
Individual employees appreciated the imperative for change and drove its
initiation. For example, the leadership of Rio Tinto’s then Chief Executive Officer,
Leon Davis, is considered crucial in initiating change and enabling
implementation of new community relations policies. Davis has been described
as ‘spearheading’ the company’s decision to shift from legal wrangling to
negotiations with Indigenous people.24  His seniority in the company hierarchy
presented an ability to effect change quickly, underpinned by an appreciation
of the business case and personal commitment to harmonious relations with
Indigenous Australians.
In particular, Davis has been described as ‘that way inclined anyway’ towards
supporting positive outcomes for Indigenous people.25  His efforts in Indigenous
relations were in part premised on his long-held beliefs that companies can
deliver social benefit, and that Indigenous Australians deserved better treatment
from mining companies. His career included work at sites overseas where
engagement and deals with local people were routine, and also at Bougainville
in Papua New Guinea where hostility of local people forced early mine closure
in 1989. Davis describes
the loss of the [Bougainville] mine as a huge shock. It was an awful thing
to happen. BCL was a huge investment, and the diamond in the CRA
crown. Bougainville was a lesson I learnt and which I took with me.26
Following advocacy of the prudence of corporate social responsibility by Davis
and others with similar perceptions, Rio Tinto’s new position regarding
Indigenous relations was publicly stated in 1995. In a landmark speech, Davis
articulated ‘satisfaction’ with the main tenets of native title legislation, and
outlined Rio Tinto’s changed approach towards Indigenous communities near
its operations: away from a litigious stance towards development of mechanisms
to share with and compensate Indigenous people for mining activity on their
land (Davis 1995). Davis describes this move as ‘hard headed’.27
23  G. Elliot, Chief Financial Officer, Rio Tinto, quoted in World Economic Forum 2004.
24  P. Manning, ‘Poor fellow mining country’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 2003.
25  I. Williams, former Executive General Manager—Mining, Pasminco Ltd, pers. int., 4 August 2003.
26  L. Davis, pers. int., 14 February 2005.
27  L. Davis, pers. int., 14 February 2005; Davis 2002.
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Rio Tinto business units were told by the company’s Head Office that they
needed to alter their Indigenous relations approach and practice. New strategies
were mandatory, but should be structured according to local circumstances.
Middle managers, facing pressures of output quotas, make decisions according
to company policy and incentive structures, underlining the importance of
high-level directives in realising internal change. Company policies and mandates
bridge any perceived short-term costs (immediate outlays for developing
community relations), with the long-term corporate gains (enhanced company
reputation and improved land access). Public declaration of the need to achieve
positive relationships with Indigenous people also aided Rio Tinto employees
already predisposed to more conciliatory external relations.
The story, of course, is not one of universal acceptance and smooth
implementation. The external face of Rio Tinto’s corporate social responsibility
in the form of publicised programs and publications masked internal dissent
and scepticism. For example, when Rio Tinto’s Indigenous employment program
was introduced at company mine sites, there was little enthusiasm for the new
strategy and the effort it required (Mays 2003). Despite high-level decrees from
those charged with management of Rio Tinto’s external operating context, many
mid-level employees retained the perception that technical competence is the
main ingredient for corporate and personal success. Perception of the long-term
corporate interests (which often justifies community engagement) seems
fundamental to appreciating success factors as existing beyond short-term
budgetary objectives.
Jabiluka
Rio Tinto’s changing approach towards responsiveness to those with capacity
to impact mine operations constitutes the background in which Rio Tinto
acquired North Limited in 2000. North owned 68.4 per cent of Energy Resources
of Australia (ERA), which owned the Jabiluka uranium mineral lease in the
Northern Territory. The Jabiluka example illustrates the sorts of circumstances
that might prevent mining altogether. In seeking to attain a social licence to
operate, the language of ‘win-win’ outcomes is often used by miners to justify
their presence and promote what they bring to a community. This assumes that
mining will proceed and that local communities can derive outcomes sufficiently
beneficial they can be described as a ‘win’ for the communities. Such language
and its implication leaves little room for communities to reject mining outright.
The campaign against development of Jabiluka illustrates how such a rejection
can be enforced—that is, how the social licence to operate can be withheld (see
also Trebeck 2007a, 2009).
The anti-Jabiluka campaign involved the confluence of three issues: local
Indigenous opposition, Jabiluka’s location surrounded by the World Heritage
listed Kakadu National Park, and concerns over uranium mining. Protest by
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campaigners for Indigenous land rights, environmentalists, and anti-nuclear
activists encompassed legal action, efforts at education, mobilisation of national
and international opposition, physical demonstrations, shareholder activism and
parliamentary lobbying. The culmination of these components of the campaign
against Jabiluka meant that a seemingly hopeless situation faced by a small and
historically marginalised community was transcended. Jabiluka became an iconic
struggle for anti-uranium stalwarts, but anti-uranium and environmental
opposition to Jabiluka derived much potency from the discontent of traditional
owners—the Mirrar people. Key traditional owners of the Jabiluka prospect
have been unambiguous in their opposition to Jabiluka’s development in recent
times, opposition informed by concerns over the disturbance of sacred sites and
experience of the nearby Ranger uranium mine where social and environmental
impacts are considered adverse.
Campaigning by the Senior Traditional Owner, Yvonne Margarula, and the then
Executive Officer of the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, Jacqui Katona,
mobilised the international non-governmental organisation community, and led
institutions such as the European Parliament and the United States Congress to
pass resolutions against Jabiluka’s development. In 1998 Margarula attended
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
World Heritage Bureau meeting in Paris, instigating a UNESCO Mission to
Kakadu. The mission reported to the United Nations World Heritage Committee
that there were ‘significant ascertained and potential threats’ to the National
Park associated with development of Jabiluka, and recommended construction
work at Jabiluka be halted.
The Australian Government refused to adopt these recommendations and the
Department of Foreign Affairs reportedly spent six months and over $1 million
lobbying the United Nations World Heritage Committee and key decision-makers
in its member countries, ultimately leading to the United Nations not placing
Kakadu National Park on the endangered list (Banerjee 2000).
Jabiluka was opposed by many of Australia’s environmental organisations,
church, trade union and community groups. The Australian Senate passed a
resolution opposing Jabiluka’s development. An opinion poll in 1998 found that
67 per cent of Australians were against mining at Jabiluka.28  In urban centres
protest against Jabiluka grew, including large rallies and public events in all
capital and many regional cities. In March 1998 a blockade was established near
the Jabiluka site, lasting eight months and involving over 5000 people. More
than 500 protestors were arrested for trespass, including traditional owner
Yvonne Margarula. The blockade meant that the company could not access the
mine site as desired, despite being given legislative permission to mine and
28  Quoted in C. Miller, ‘North shareholders protest over Jabiluka’, The Age, 4 June 1999, p. 7.
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supported by strong government backing. By flying employees and equipment
to the site by helicopter ERA was, however, able to complete construction of
the mine decline and retention pond in 1999.
ERA and its parent company North thus faced prolonged opposition to
development of the Jabiluka mine. Annual General Meetings and company
headquarters became ‘combat zones’ where anti-Jabiluka campaigners targeted
shareholders and company management.29  In March 1999, the Melbourne
premises of North were blockaded for four days. Activists also lobbied major
North investors directly. Various financial institutions were sent anti-Jabiluka
material, and in 1998 there was a national day of action targeting North’s main
bank, Westpac, for its involvement. By June 1999 almost $7 million worth of
North shares had been divested. Insurance company NRMA, for example, stated
publicly that the reason for selling its North shares was concern about Jabiluka,
deeming the project to be financially, politically and environmentally risky.30
Alongside the disinvestment by some financial institutions, there was strident
shareholder activism. The Wilderness Society obtained North’s share register
and contacted over 67 000 shareholders, informing them about Jabiluka and
instigating the formation of a shareholder pressure group, North Ethical
Shareholders. In October 1999 an Extraordinary General Meeting was held at
the instigation of North Ethical Shareholders. Although the proposals put by
the North Ethical Shareholders were defeated, the event attracted significant
negative publicity for North and required diversion of management time to
dealing with the activists.31
It seems, given North’s strident pursuit of Jabiluka’s development and its reaction
to protests, that the company was almost impervious to many elements of the
anti-Jabiluka campaign. Construction at the Jabiluka mine took place regardless
of traditional owner objections. Arguably, if elements of the campaign such as
urban protest and international institutions opposing the mine did not achieve
their objective, they at least bolstered traditional owners in their manoeuvring
against Jabiluka.
A significant lever that traditional owners wielded was the location of the mill
for Jabiluka ore and an access road between nearby Ranger and Jabiluka.
Traditional owners, by virtue of a clause in a 1991 lease transfer agreement
(transferring ownership from Pancontinental to ERA), held an effective veto
over milling of Jabiluka ore at the Ranger mill. The cost of building a mill to
process Jabiluka ore at the Jabiluka site was over $200 million, a cost ERA hoped
to avoid by trucking ore to the existing Ranger mill 22 kilometres away. In the
29  J. Rose, pers. int., 29 March 2004; D. Sweeney, anti-nuclear campaigner, Australian Conservation
Foundation, pers. int., 1 April 2004.
30  Cited in The Wilderness Society and The Mineral Policy Institute 1998.
31  J. Rose, ‘Blame it on the Rio Tinto moment’, The Australian Financial Review, 12–16 April 2001, p.10.
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context of then poor uranium prices, the veto over doing so, effectively
necessitating construction of a new mill at Jabiluka, made the economics of the
Jabiluka project far less attractive to ERA and North.
There were two phases in the campaign to stop development of Jabiluka—before
and after 2000 when Rio Tinto acquired North, and with it majority ownership
of ERA. Rio Tinto would seek to avoid mining without community consent,
whereas North seemed to rely on government sanction to mine, regardless of
whether local communities sanctioned this or not. Rio Tinto’s position was that
although the Northern Territory and Commonwealth Governments supported
the mine, this was insufficient, as consent was also needed from traditional
owners. Paradoxically perhaps, being a large international company with an
important brand, making a concerted public effort to move away from historic
poor performance, and seeking to cultivate positive reputation amongst
Indigenous communities more broadly, Rio Tinto was seemingly unwilling to
weather the reputational attacks that North ostensibly tolerated. The potential
cost to Rio Tinto’s reputation of proceeding with Jabiluka in the face of local
opposition was increasingly evident as adverse market conditions for uranium
in the few years after acquiring ERA made Jabiluka relatively marginal to Rio
Tinto’s overall commercial strategy—as one observer said, the Rio Tinto brand
was ‘suffering much grief for a little mine’.32  For example, in September 2002
Rio Tinto’s stake in ERA was worth $172 million, less than 1 per cent of Rio
Tinto’s total net present value.33
In late March 2001, Rio Tinto’s Chief Executive Officer indicated that the
company would not support development of Jabiluka unless there was a
substantial alteration of community attitudes, alongside improved uranium
prices (Clifford 2001).34 This moderate concession did not placate the
anti-Jabiluka campaign. At Rio Tinto’s Australian Annual General Meeting the
following month protestors held a ‘die-in’ and company shareholders were forced
to step over ‘dying’ protestors.35  At Rio Tinto’s London Annual General Meeting
the next year, a statement on behalf of traditional owners was presented, rejecting
mining on Mirrar land and demanding that Rio Tinto leave the area. In September
2002 Rio Tinto Chairman Sir Robert Wilson strengthened his company’s position
not to mine Jabiluka without acceptance from traditional owners; he also stated,
for the first time, that the site would be rehabilitated and the mine’s entrance
32  D. Sweeney, anti-nuclear campaigner, Australian Conservation Foundation, pers. int., 1 April 2004.
33  B. Hextall, ‘Rio keeps door open’, The Australian Financial Review, 6 September 2002, p. 65.
34 Wilson, for example, highlighted the lack of viability of Jabiluka mine as an important
consideration—admitting ‘we don’t see the development as being viable in any case’ (quoted in I.
Howarth, ‘Rio Tinto concedes defeat on Jabiluka’, The Australian Financial Review 4 April 2002, p. 59;
and J. Rose, ‘Blame it on the Rio Tinto moment’, The Australian Financial Review, 12–16 April 2001,
p.10).
35  Organisations included Friends of the Earth, the Mineral Policy Institute, Greenpeace, and the
Australian Conservation Foundation.
142  Power, Culture, Economy
sealed.36  Until this declaration, the Mirrar had understood that despite their
protests the Jabiluka mine could still go ahead without their approval once
Ranger was no longer operational. An agreement (the Jabiluka Long Term Care
and Maintenance Agreement) has subsequently been developed between ERA
and traditional owners and their representatives, regarding rehabilitation and
maintenance of the Jabiluka site and future consultation over development.
An important element of the Jabiluka campaign, with parallels in both Hamersley
Iron’s experience at Marandoo and negotiations for Century mine, was the role
of government. In each case both state and Commonwealth governments sought
to facilitate mine development, including passing special legislation or ignoring
United Nations recommendations. Government approved development of Jabiluka
in spite of protests by traditional owners, as well as wider opposition.
Government support for Jabiluka has been on ‘national interest’ grounds, with
the Prime Minister citing the imperatives of globalisation as necessitating
Jabiluka’s development.37
Some commentators have portrayed Rio Tinto and ERA’s position of not mining
without local community consent, and the anti-Jabiluka campaign that drove
this strategy, as a ‘David and Goliath’ win for the Mirrar people. Katona observes
that it demonstrates how:
a bunch of women from the bush, the majority of whom were illiterate,
spoke English as a second or third language, stuck to their guns, and
took on the mining company, and hunted them down … Wherever the
mining company was speaking publicly we were able to have agents or
representations made … directly to the face of the company to … let
them know that we were not going to be beaten....38
It shows what leverage is necessary to capture corporate attention and response:
ability to impact the commercial position of the company, whether in the short
term through economic levers or over the long term via influence on company
reputation.
Discussion and conclusion
These case studies suggest that uptake of corporate social responsibility depends
on responsive individuals in the company, especially senior management, being
receptive to the pressures for responsiveness; namely those that appeal to
commercial interest. Once a company has accorded a community group or
organisation ‘stakeholder’ status, the degree to which their demands are
acknowledged and addressed is a function of how managers perceive stakeholder
36  ‘Jabiluka in Mirrar hands’, The Northern Star, 6 September 2002, p. 23.
37  Prime Minister Howard cited in G. Milne, ‘Howard’s in the red over Brown and Greens’, The
Australian, 7 December 1998, p. 15.
38  ABC Radio National, Late Night Live, 21 August 2003.
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power (to impact on the firm), the legitimacy (of the group or its claim) and
urgency with which the demands are pressed (Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld
1999; Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997). While urgency seems difficult to delineate
from power (beyond how acutely demands for response impact on shareholder
value), responses seen in the case studies suggests that power is the most relevant
element in this equation. It was those communities able to affect the company’s
capacity to operate which were accorded most corporate attention. The immediate
response to the sit-in at Century mine, after little response from the company to
written attempts at communicating aspirations, starkly demonstrates this, as do
the various elements of the anti-Jabiluka campaign.
Moreover, comparison of North and Rio Tinto’s handling of the anti-Jabiluka
campaign, and in particular reaction to traditional owner opposition, illustrates
divergent criteria for stakeholder legitimacy: North adopted Western-centric
‘majoritarian’ notions of who speaks for land (Trebeck 2005), while Rio Tinto
accorded value to authority based on traditional ownership according to
Indigenous political systems and sought to respond to the concerns of these
community groups in particular.
The case studies also demonstrated how interpretation of community demands
for corporate social responsibility is often shaped by the values held by a
corporate executive, or their experience of a crisis where the company’s social
licence to operate was jeopardised (Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld 1999; Parker
2002; Webley 2001). Orlitzky and Swanson (2002) model this as how ‘attuned’
executives are to the demands of relevant stakeholders. For example, when a
crisis (such as delay of Marandoo or closure of Bougainville mine) demonstrates
capacity of certain stakeholders to impede company operation, individuals within
the company who are pre-disposed to corporate social responsibility, even for
‘moral’ reasons, gain leverage for their views, while recalcitrants might come to
appreciate the business case for it. Personal commitment to corporate social
responsibility for moral reasons thus co-exists alongside the business case that
drives prudent support for corporate social responsibility.
While a moral motivation might be sufficient in some cases and for some
individuals, because the raison d’être of companies is profit and commercial
continuity there is a need to understand and communicate the business case for
corporate social responsibility internally to achieve change in corporate
responsiveness to community demands. Only when the strength of a business
case is evident will resources be dedicated to implementing corporate social
responsibility (McLaren 2002; Parker 2002). Thus, if an individual or group is
completely ineffectual in relation to a company, then there is unlikely to be a
persuasive business case for the company to respond to the interests of these
entities, save for a sense of moral duty held by some individuals within a firm.
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The examples of Century, Hamersley Iron, Rio Tinto and the anti-Jabiluka
campaign support the contention that key individuals within organisations,
notwithstanding any personal moral motivations, ultimately rely on business
case arguments to gain internal traction for change and operational support for
corporate social responsibility initiatives. In turn, however, the effectiveness of
otherwise austere structures and policies comes from individuals. These
individuals may be driven by either an appreciation of the business case,
company policies, promotion and pay incentives, or moral commitment to
improved Indigenous relations (Trebeck 2005).
That civil regulation often hinges on key individuals can, potentially, constitute
risk. When such (arguably ‘enlightened’) individuals leave or when incidents
that initially highlighted the need for corporate social responsibility recede in
relative prominence in management attention then the drive and vigour of
implementation is likely to abate. For example, for a time corporate social
responsibility was ostensibly deemed relatively less important than the eventual
catastrophic financial situation of Century’s parent company. Developing
structures to internalise corporate social responsibility might reduce the burden
of advocacy away from a few individuals. Equally, however, structures
themselves are insufficient: frameworks and programs to deliver corporate social
responsibility are of little use if those charged with implementation do not do
so with enthusiasm, understanding and appreciation of the necessity of their
task. This was evident in the way some committees created to implement the
GCA at Century were mismanaged, becoming counter-productive and a cause
of community discontent that eventually impelled, in part, the 2002 sit-in
(Trebeck 2005).
Civil regulation then is successful when community actions (or deliberate
inactions) recognise that the most effective way in which to shape company
behaviour is via financial gain or loss, thereby creating a business case for desired
corporate change. It is individuals in the company who must recognise this
business case, as occurred when management attention to the need for sound
community relations became focused by incidents such as Bougainville’s forced
closure, the Marandoo dispute, the advent of native title, Century’s sit-in and
the anti-Jabiluka campaign. Here, a shift in the balance of external influences
brings Indigenous demands to the fore by—directly or indirectly—threatening
financial performance. When such civil regulation consequently gains corporate
response there has invariably been a convergence of personal commitment and
commercial imperative.
Given that companies are neither uncomplicated nor internally homogeneous,
community pressures for corporate social responsibility will affect respective
elements of a company differently. Adding to this complexity, both the
organisation itself and individuals within it, function within a diverse social
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system (Keskinen, Aaltonen and Mitleton-Kelly 2003). Companies are porous
entities, with individual employees having their own external networks that
inform their actions and motivations. Once the objectives of individuals within
companies are accumulated, and external stakeholders accounted for, companies
can be seen as assemblies of relationships with respective audiences, requiring
specific corporate responses and actions. This was evident, for example, in the
divergent expectations of corporate behaviour held by the financial sector,
compared with those of local communities, seen during Pasminco’s financial
difficulties.
There are frequently structural causes of such divergence. Employees at mine
sites—where much corporate social responsibility is made manifest—often have
strict job requirements that encompass output quotas, directing their priorities
towards immediate production targets. Business units are faced with
contradictory signals from headquarters, with consequent dilemmas regarding
priorities: they must deliver production targets, reduction of costs and manage
industrial relations, while also being expected to implement more intangible,
costly community relations initiatives with their inherently longer-term outcomes.
Time and production constraints in pursuit of profit often override other
pressures. If corporate social responsibility initiatives are deemed expensive
relative to other objectives, they are unlikely to be entered into, unless mandated
by headquarters. Those at headquarters are charged with navigating the
company’s external environment for the longevity of shareholder value, whereas
managers at mine sites appreciate less the geographical cross-subsidisation of
reputational capital.
In addition, an essential element in the notion of civil regulation is the section
of civil society doing the ‘regulating’. Findings from the case studies suggest
that there are several characteristics of civil society that might undermine the
capacity of civil regulation to deliver beyond isolated instances. The
representativeness of civil society—how those organisations demanding change
from companies reflect the actual needs and demands of those in whose interests
they purport to act—is vital. The greater the deficit in organisations’
representativeness, the greater the likelihood that results of civil regulation will
be skewed away from the interests of those affected. Such distortion, where
outcomes do not reflect the actual wishes and expectations of communities,
undermines any advancement of citizen sovereignty over companies.
The nature of the ‘civil regulators’ is an area for further research. It is worth
suggesting, however, that it is in the company’s interest to understand how any
organisation actually relates to and represents its constituents—relationships
will ultimately be undermined if citizens feel they are disenfranchised by
engagement taking place between companies and certain elements of civil society.
The structure of Century’s GCA reflects dilemmas associated with civil society
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organisations. Part of the discontent that led to the 2002 sit-in at Century Mine
was a feeling amongst some local Indigenous community members that they had
not been sufficiently accounted for in the GCA, referring to themselves as ‘the
forgotten Waanyi’ and eventually seeking alternative means (the sit-in) by which
to achieve their demands.
Given these (and other) caveats, civil regulation and increased community
participation in corporate decision-making is insufficient to attain the stated
aims of particular communities (Bendell 2000a; Trebeck 2005; see also Maddox
1991). This limits the scope for social sustainability potentially realised through
corporate social responsibility. Moreover, necessity of the business case highlights
a role for civil society in maintaining vigilance and sustaining the context that
prompts companies to consider communities. Inevitably the capacity of civil
society to sustain this vigilance will be shaped by factors underpinning a
community’s sustainability, while corporate social responsibility itself can
increase the sustainability of a community (see Trebeck 2007b). Emerging from
this complex multi-directional relationship is evidence that the success of civil
regulation to deliver community wishes in some contexts, as illustrated above,
does illustrate that social sustainability can be advanced by utilising various
levers to alter corporate operating frameworks.
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7. Indigenous entrepreneurialism and
mining land use agreements
Sarah Holcombe
Introduction
In the Pilbara region of Western Australia, the focus of this chapter, the mining
boom—or the ‘ramp up’ in production as it is referred to within the industry—is
such that negotiations for land access have intensified and annual payments to
the Indigenous organisations examined here have increased threefold since 1997.
These organisations are the Gumala Aboriginal Corporation (Gumala) and Gumala
Investments Pty Ltd (GIPL); set up to manage the Yandicoogina Agreement
(YLUA). This chapter critically examines the mechanisms through which
Indigenous beneficiaries are able to articulate to a Land Use Agreement (LUA)
as individuals, with specific attention to possibilities for entrepreneurial activity.
The range of possibilities for direct and tangible benefits from agreements is a
key area of Indigenous concern. Because of the complexity of the land use
agreements examined for this project, this chapter will only focus on Rio Tinto’s
YLUA in the Hamersley Ranges of the Pilbara. Indigenous ‘beneficiaries’ operate
in a politically volatile and economically expansive context in this area of
engagement with the mining sector and the organisations developed to manage
the agreements.1
To closely consider a range of articulations with the YLUA, it seems apposite to
provide a series of examples of the ways in which particular individuals have
engaged with opportunities and, conversely, individual critiques of structural
limitations on engagement within the YLUA. To some extent, these examples
will be biographical. Indeed, a few Indigenous people in the Hamersley region
have published biographies, several with the assistance of Rio Tinto and
organisations established to manage agreements. One of the biographical ‘case
studies’ discussed in this chapter will be that of Lola Young (2007). The other
individuals discussed will, for ethical reasons and to retain anonymity, be referred
1  I would like to thank members of Gumala based in Tom Price and the surrounding homelands, and
those members residing in Port Hedland, Wickham, Roeburne and Karratha who spent time speaking
with me for this project during 2003 and 2004; with special thanks to Darren Inji, and Slim Parker.
Thanks also to staff in the Tom Price Gumala office, especially Bill Day (during that time and more
recently) and Larry Softley, who supported this project during field research. Thanks also to Mark
Simpson and staff of Rio Tinto’s Aboriginal Training and Liaison Unit in Dampier. More recently,
discussions have been held with Gumala project officer Don Gordon and the new Gumala Chief Executive
Officer Steve Mav, who have been keen to articulate the new generation Gumala that this paper has
only begun to grapple with. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of Gumala staff.
Finally, I contacted all four of the case study individuals in this chapter, providing drafts to them and
best efforts have been made to encourage all of them to vet their stories.
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to by pseudonyms. These brief accounts of individual engagements with the
industry are included towards the end of the chapter, after consideration of the
context within which individuals are enabled to operate. While
entrepreneurialism is a focus of this research, it encompasses the ways in which
individual beneficiaries to the Agreement can benefit, rather than solely
examining possibilities for developing business enterprise.
Fig 7.1 The Pilbara region, Western Australia
Source: Cartographic Services, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU.
There are a range of structures and mechanisms through which Indigenous
‘beneficiaries’ to the YLUA can engage with its financial benefits. Many of these
benefits are indirect or process oriented—ranging from gaining sitting fees from
committee membership and, presumably, having some element of investment
over allocation of resources, to working on heritage clearances for the Company.
While this analysis is concerned with the YLUA, and relevant elements of the
Agreement structures will be outlined below, the broader economy of the region
is such that individuals may be party to more than one agreement with different
mining companies. Indeed, some individuals sit on such a range of committees
that their attendance at meetings is a full time occupation. Other more direct
and secure means for financially engaging with the YLUA include employment
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for organisations that were established to manage it; elderly and infirm people
gaining regular ‘top-up’ monies from the Foundation (no longer operating), to
being employed on the mine site (though this is open to anyone Indigenous,
non-Indigenous, local or global) and in associated operations; working on specific
cross-cultural programs provided to non-Indigenous mine staff; and
self-employment in small mine-related contracting businesses.
An Indigenous entrepreneurialism
The use of the term ‘entrepreneurialism’ is informed by Indigenous Canadian
experience where social sustainability and the recognition of political rights has
been a more evident outcome of entrepreneurial activity than economic
sustainability (Peredo et al. 2004). This alternative understanding of
entrepreneurialism is useful in analysing the motivations of many Indigenous
Australians’ attempts at entrepreneurial activity through the land use agreements
under consideration here. Non-market driven modes of entrepreneurialism also
need to be canvassed. Recent research in Australia by Hindle and Lansdowne
(2005), that attempts to draw together Australian and American Indian
perspectives on Australian Indigenous entrepreneurialism, also suggests that
entrepreneurship here should be understood as encompassing more than
economic imperatives. They define Australian Indigenous entrepreneurship as:
the creation, management and development of new ventures by Aboriginal
people for the benefit of Aboriginal people. The desired and achieved benefits
of venturing can range from the narrow view of economic profit for a single
individual to the broad view of multiple, social and economic advantages to
entire communities… (Hindle and Lansdowne 2005: 132).2
In light of this it is appropriate to reconsider notions of success or failure and
indeed the criteria under which ‘business’ applications are considered—for
instance, within the framework of agreements. Certainly this lack of support for
developing individual and family businesses was raised as a significant issue for
Indigenous beneficiaries of the YLUA in the Review of the associated Gumala
Investments Pty Ltd and the Trusts (Hoffmeister 2002). Foley, another researcher
in this area in Australia, also found that the definition of success for Indigenous
Australian entrepreneurs is ‘based on subjective notions derived from the
entrepreneurs themselves, and is not solely restricted to financial criteria’ (Foley
2006: 1, see also 2003).
2  I am cautious in using this research, however, as it seems to have focused on developing an erratic
and confusing method utilising a number of ‘theories’ whereby a ‘formal paradigm’ is sought to determine
whether entrepreneurial business ventures can claim to be Aboriginal or not. Amongst other issues the
claim for ‘global relevance’ is peculiar as the interviews were restricted to Australia and the United
States. No examples of Aboriginal enterprise are canvassed and nor it seemed were Aboriginal enterprise
operators spoken with.
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Foley focuses on Indigenous entrepreneurs who are the owners and managers
of stand-alone commercial enterprises in urban environments because they
comprise the majority of Indigenous entrepreneurs in Australia. Although Foley
focuses on mainstream commercial success, importantly he problematises the
tension within Indigenous policy between community development and the
development of the individual (2006: 5). He notes that there is little recognition
of the socioeconomic category of the individual Indigenous entrepreneur and
that policy funding structures have a blanket approach toward Indigenous
‘communities’ (Foley 2006: 5–6).3  Indeed, this issue of the way in which the
Indigenous ‘community’—as an encompassing category within the YLUA—is
embedded in the ‘community development’ discourse was discussed at length
in a previous paper (Holcombe 2006). It is important, nonetheless, to observe
this issue again as a restrictive and limiting factor that discourages
entrepreneurialism.
There are legal limitations on the Trusts set up under the YLUA and the
‘community benefit package’ (as the agreement is also referred to) as they impose
both corporate expectation and constraint on Indigenous action. This chapter
proposes that major resource companies incorporate strategies in land use
agreements that enable individual Indigenous people, who are party to
agreements, to develop the capability to deal with the potential opportunities
that these agreements present. At the same time it proposes a broader definition
of ‘opportunity’. A central contention is that mobilising individual agency to
strengthen capacity to be socially productive may not necessarily lead to
mainstream economic productivity, but rather to producing community and
family economies. Such local informal economies tend to be marginalised by the
dominance of large scale resource development and the focus on mainstream
employment in the industry and in government policy (see Holcombe 2006).
How is this active engagement facilitated or hampered by the structures set up
to disburse the benefits? Such structures are not neutral frameworks that allow
an innocent expression of Indigenous interaction. They are deeply informed by
a development discourse and are themselves a major arena of development in
remote areas; these structures need to be understood in those terms. According
to the United Nations, the fundamental purpose of development is ‘…to enlarge
people’s choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over
time... People often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not
immediately, in income or growth figures…’ (Haq n.d.).
3  Foley focuses on an urban/remote divide: typifying and contrasting urban individuals as against
remote communities. However, he tends to use the concept ‘community’ un-problematically as assumed
places of shared interests. I would argue that ‘communities’ can’t be assumed in remote areas either.
There is a considerable literature critiquing the community concept, see especially Gusfield (1975) and
Cohen (1985) and for (Central) Australia, Holcombe (2004b).
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It seems important to recall the fact that, in the Pilbara for instance, only 30 per
cent of Indigenous adults participate in the mainstream labor market and, of
these, 22 per cent work in the mining industry (Taylor and Scambary 2005:
28–37). These findings suggest that focusing on alternatives may be a pragmatic
way to think more broadly about the scope of the YLUA and what it can
realistically deliver. Likewise, the encouragement of diverse alternative economies
would also seem to be critical to any post-mine life in these remote regions and
encouraging entrepreneurs is an element of planning for this future. As human
geographers such as Gibson-Graham (2002) and Howitt (2001) have found,
alternative economies encompass heterogeneity and run counter to the notion
that there is a homogenous community of interests that is served by a uniform
capitalist economy (see also Community Economies Collective 2001). Certainly,
the manner in which the term ‘community’ is embedded in the YLUA presumes
a unified and shared set of communal Indigenous interests—and consequently
the diversity of these interests becomes submerged (see Altman, Chapter 2;
Scambary, Chapter 8).
This research is informed by the human development approach pioneered by
economist Amartya Sen (Sen and Anand 1994; Sen 1999) and further refined by
normative philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2001). This approach has been used
as a conceptual framework by the United Nations Development Program since
1990 ‘to inform policy choices in many areas, from poverty reduction to
sustainable development to gender to globalisation to governance’ (Fukuda-Parr,
Lopes and Malik 2002: 1). Research by the World Institute for Development
Economics, especially by Sen (Sen and Anand 1994; Sen 1999) and Nussbaum
(2001), has found that the principle of ‘each person as an end’ needs to be the
fundamental basis for ‘development planning’. In this human rights based
approach to agreements as development, instead of asking questions about
people’s satisfactions (which are subjective and may be conditioned), the
questions are about what they are actually able to do or to be, as it is in this
space that social equality and inequality are best raised (Nussbaum 2001: 12).
For instance, the dominant approach to assessing quality of life previously
focused on Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, ‘treating the maximisation
of this figure as the most appropriate social goal and basis for cross-cultural
comparison’. However, such assessment has to investigate the distribution of
this wealth and income; as encapsulated in ‘who has got the money and is any
of it mine?’ (Nussbaum 2001: 60).
This approach to issues of the distribution of wealth and benefits invites
examination of the way the $60 million plus benefit package of the YLUA affects
individuals: where and how does this money get distributed and can
‘beneficiaries’ say any of it is theirs or that they had a role in deciding how it
was spent or invested? The question that this then begs is whether the
organisations set up under the YLUA are creating an enabling environment for
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the Indigenous stakeholders they are purported to benefit; are they encouraged
to be agents?
Weighing up immediate tangible benefit—requests of cash or seed money for a
family or individual enterprise—against long term or nascent benefit is a complex
balancing act and there are not any simple solutions, or none that are directly
transferable across different regions. Nevertheless, this is a tension that has been
found to exist in relation to other agreements and patterns have formed around
this difficult balance (see Altman, Chapter 2). In the YLUA the balance is heavily
weighted in favor of long term future investment and financial risk minimisation,
and does not give enough credit to potential or immediate entrepreneurial
possibilities or investment in promoting these opportunities. Indeed, this was
the major thrust of the findings of the Review of the Trusts and GIPL (Hoffmeister
2002). As will be discussed, however, in the six years since this Review there
has been a shift toward diversification and small scale business development.
As Gumala—one of the two key organisations set up to manage the
agreement—has noted, they are an organisation in the process of transforming
themselves.
According to the YLUA not less than 40 per cent of the available income should
be invested and not less than 30 per cent spent on education and training, and
business development. In fact it was found that most of the available income
was invested, approximately 40 per cent more than targeted (Hoffmeister 2002):4
as of June 2007 there was approximately $40 million being held by GIPL (Bill
Day, pers. comm. June 2007). This business philosophy weighted toward long
term investment may be, in part, a risk aversion strategy.5
However, this approach to investment can limit the potential of the money to
build human capital, or, as the first non-Indigenous Director of Gumala
Enterprises (GEPL) (and Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation Chief Executive
Officer (CEO)) noted, ‘if the money is not being spent it’s not doing good’ (pers.
comm. 2004).6  Aristotle’s prescient observation seems pertinent here, ‘wealth
is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake
of something else’ (Aristotle 350 BC). The ‘something else’ may be understood
through the concept of fungibility, recently bought to prominence in Australia
by Noel Pearson (Pearson and Kostadikas-Lianos 2004; see also Bourdieu 1986;
Coleman 1988)—being the transaction or transformation of one form of capital
4 The figures referred to here from the 2002 Review are: $4.7 million were spent on investments to $1.4
million on education, training and business development.
5  Another reason for the increased long term investment, to be examined below, was that insufficient
proposals for business enterprises were put forward in the first five years. As the Review makes clear,
this is indicative both of the lack of support for developing such proposals and the perceived (and
actual) constraints on what constitutes an acceptable proposal.
6 The Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation is a philanthropic organisation that provides after school
mentoring and homework facilities for Aboriginal high school students in towns in the Pilbara region
and other supportive roles. Rio Tinto is also a partner through their Futures Fund.
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into another.7  In this case a more significant proportion of the financial capital
from the YLUA could be available to be transformed into human, social and
cultural capital.8  Moving beyond the focus on the agreement as primarily an
economic asset is a step toward this approach.
It seems that this is the approach being increasingly adopted by Gumala, as is
possible within the confines of the YLUA. Gumala grappled with the findings
of not only the first five-year Review (Hoffmeister 2002), but now the second
Review which was finalised in August 2008.
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation, the Trust and Business
arms
‘Gumala’ is an Aboriginal word in the Bunjima Language meaning ‘all together’.
This ideology was important in binding three language groups—Bunjima,
Innawonga and Niaparli (who maintain native title in the region of the Yandi
mine and associated infrastructure)—together in the YLUA.9  However, holding
them together has been a major challenge with ongoing tension between elements
of each group, not least because there now are over 750 Aboriginal beneficiaries,
party to the YLUA. Some of these tensions, recent and historical, will be discussed
below.
There are four bodies that operate under the YLUA: Gumala Aboriginal
Corporation based in Tom Price, its business arm GEPL, the Gumala General
Foundation, and Gumala Investments Pty Ltd (GIPL). GIPL was established to
act as the Trustee of the General Foundation, which receives payments of between
$2 million and $5 million per annum from the YLUA.10  Importantly, the Trustee
is independent of Gumala and has ultimate decision-making powers in all matters
relating to the Foundation. A Foundation for the elderly and infirm was
7  Pearson and Kostakidis-Lianos (2004) argue that Aboriginal land-holding structures and property
rights, such as native title, are not readily fungible into economic assets. In fact they state that land
rights are ‘dead capital’ because they cannot be leveraged to create capital. They give the example of
setting up a private enterprise on Aboriginal Land as a ‘virtual impossibility’ (Pearson and
Kostakidis-Lianos 2004: 2). However, it must be pointed out here that the agreements under consideration
in this paper were negotiated under the Native Title Act 1993 —hence leverage was gained through
Aboriginal property rights and the outcome is an agreement. Such an agreement is a very significant
economic asset. Likewise, under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976,  the right of
consent provisions also provide significant economic leverage.
8 There is a vast literature on the concept of social capital with the World Bank, in particular, bringing
the concept into prominence with their interest in understanding the local impediments to development
in considering the social as opposed to the economic face of adjustment (Woolcock and Narayan 2000).
Critiques of the concept (Fine 2003; Hunter 2004; Renzio 2000; also Woolcock 1998 before joining the
World Bank) have noted that there is a marked neglect in how social capital is actually created, that it
is a catch all category designed to capture any asset that does not fall under the conventional categories
natural, physical and human. These authors also focus on the definitional chaos of the concept.
9 The orthography used here for these language groups follows the Gumala spellings. Note, however,
that there are a range of alternatives. The orthography preferred by the Wangka Maya Pilbara Aboriginal
language centre based in Port Hedland is as follows: Banyjima, Yinhawangka and Nyiyaparli.
10 This annual amount is currently closer to $5.5 million (Darren Inji, pers. comm. June 2008).
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established to provide benefits to those so defined for the first five years. It no
longer operates. Apart from managing and maintaining the capital base of the
General Foundation, GIPL considers project funding requests from Gumala.
Gumala is charged with consulting members of the beneficiary group, and
developing, researching and preparing proposals for investments and community
projects, as the on the ground Indigenous organisation. Gumala is thus the
manager of GIPL and the sole shareholder of GIPL as Trustee. GIPL comprises
six directors, three directors who are independent and three directors who are
traditional owners as representatives from the three language groups.
Many of the issues in the following discussion are drawn from the 2002 Review
of the Trusts (also known as Foundations) and GIPL, along with interviews
conducted over 2003–04, with members of Gumala across the Pilbara and, more
recently, telephone interviews with some of these same people. Although the
Review was not of Gumala or its business arm GEPL, a number of the Review
findings directly engage with issues associated with their operations. Many of
the issues of concern raised in the 2002 Review remain pertinent, although a
number of the recommendations have been acted upon. There are several
apparent reasons for the continuing relevance of the 2002 Review findings. One
of these was described as the lack of communication between the two key
bodies—Gumala and GIPL—and between these bodies and their members.
Indeed, in early to mid 2007 Gumala attempted to liquidate GIPL to, as one
commentator noted, ‘get their hands on the booty’ (Bill Day, pers. comm. May
2007). At June 2007 this ‘booty’ was worth approximately $20 million (Siopsis
J 2007). GIPL Trustees and other supporters applied for and won an injunction
against their liquidation and, to avoid protracted legal costs, a mediated
settlement was reached. This issue, to be discussed further below, is raised here
to situate some of the tensions between these organisations and to place at the
forefront this issue of the contested access to the benefit stream.
The Review found that most available income was invested and that considerably
less was spent on program areas, especially education, training and business
development.11 While at that time GIPL and the Gumala CEO stated that there
had not been enough proposals, members said that they found it hard to put
proposals forward and to understand the approval process. It seems that the
most ‘business ready’ and ‘job ready’ tended to be most advantaged and the
approach continues to be that business proposals must have a prospect of making
a profit. Gumala business development funding had done little for groups who
were not previously business ready. A key recommendation was to establish a
11  Indeed, the tensions inherent in this pattern of investment and expenditure; getting the balance
right, have a long history. These issues are not unique to this Agreement, but rather were apparent in
the earliest royalty associations and trusts set up to disburse mining monies in the Northern Territory
(see Altman 1983). What is perhaps different here is both the scale of the Agreement and the Indigenous
expectation.
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business development assistance scheme within 12 months of the Review to be
situated within Gumala (Hoffmeister 2002). A Business Development Officer was
employed for a short period, but at that stage it was not successful and was
discontinued. A Business Loans Guarantee Program has also been operating, but
with little success. In late 2008, the Business Loans Guarantee Program was in
the process of being transferred from GIPL to Gumala in order to facilitate greater
utilisation. Since the first Review, members’ businesses which have been
supported include a cattle station, an earthmoving enterprise, a cultural awareness
business, a fabric and garment design enterprise and a bush products enterprise
(see Lola Young’s case study below).
Exactly what sort of ‘business development’ was to be supported was found to
be a major area of uncertainty and dissatisfaction for Gumala members
interviewed for the Review. The Gumala newsletter at that time highlighted
that, ‘All funds from the General Foundation must go towards community
development projects and NOT INDIVIDUALS’ and further that, ‘All language
groups are encouraged to submit proposals, as outlined in their community
action plans’ (Gumala News, December 2001, capitals in original). Without having
the benefit of sighting any ‘community action plans’, it seems that members
would be justified in their confusion about what constitutes a successful proposal.
It was noted that individual and family business development proposals were
rejected when they were put forward. In the 2002 Review the Trustee indicated
that a cautious approach was taken in only supporting projects with a high
probability of success. Such projects were expected to have a ‘community
benefit’. This raises the question of how benefits to individuals and families are
distinguished from broader community benefits. This distinction would be
especially blurry where these individuals and families are living on
homelands—that is, small communities. At least two family/individual business
have been supported.
In interviews held with Gumala members, the issue of not funding individual
or family enterprise was seen as not only extremely limiting, but as a potential
liability. Interviewees’ understanding was, that an entrepreneurial individual
could only be allowed to work with others in the local homeland who may or
may not be interested in the project, despite others, such as non-Indigenous
people, being able to input greater skills. A general comment was that an
entrepreneurial individual did not want to have to rely solely on their family
or those in the local homeland for success. This is consistent with Gumala
members noting in the 2002 Review, that supporting individuals in small business
is a key to securing economic independence. Likewise, it is arguable that
encouraging such individuals as role models may have wider ramifications. This
is the approach adopted by the United Nations Development Program, discussed
earlier, and accepted internationally as a means of growing employment
possibilities within a community.
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Cash payments to beneficiaries cannot be granted under the Trust structures.
This is for some, who are critical of this approach, as much a political and rights
issue: believing that they have a right to manage their own finances, cash
payments or otherwise, like other Australians. Many of the Gumala members
interviewed found the lack of choice patronising, and there was little
understanding that the charitable status of the Trusts was a reason for not
granting such payments. Gumala members were well aware that the neighboring
IBN (Innawonga, Banyjima, and Niapali) Agreement with BHP Billiton, also of
comparative scope and majority overlapping membership, does provide limited
annual cash payments to members. If membership of Gumala is viewed as part
of a mosaic of LUAs in the region, this feature of the IBN Agreement could be
understood as assuaging, to some extent, the call by those individuals who are
members of both.12
The ‘community development’ that is occurring is homeland (outstation)
infrastructure development and support for associated cultural activities. Six
homelands in particular, located mainly in the mine hinterland, are the recipients
of these monies. Projects supported include roadworks, tractors and sheds,
medical rooms, a community bus and a breakfast and homework centre, and one
homeland received funding for essential services. This activity—supporting
small dispersed settlements on land where particular families have rights by
customary law—seems to be almost universally regarded as adding value to
people’s lives and was widely discussed by Gumala members as positive. The
‘priorities for the future’ listed as part of the 2002 Review noted an emphasis
on returning to country with the assistance of community development projects
and the preservation of law and culture; but also included business development
loans for individuals. Accordingly, community development was not understood
by Gumala members as excluding small scale business development.
There is the risk that the money being spent by Gumala on essential services
could have been spent instead on fostering small scale business. As
O’Faircheallaigh (2004a: 43) suggests, ‘If mining payments are used to pay for
basic social services [that are citizenship rights] then opportunity’… to utilise
a significant economic asset cannot be utilised to overcome economic
disadvantage. A case can be made that the development of these homelands has
been an example of ‘substitution funding’, whereby the expenditure from mining
12  Calls by many Gumala members for individual entitlements in the form of cash payments can also
be considered as another form of entrepreneurialism, taking into account that a fundamental feature of
entrepreneurialism is an individual, as opposed to a collective, approach to engaging in financial
opportunities. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that such compensatory or cash payments may be regarded
as passive, whereas entrepreneurial activity is necessarily active. However, for my purposes here, the
immediate expenditure issue needs to be understood in light of the framework of constraint that the
YLUA places on individual capacity to choose, as both a political and social right. Therefore, it can be
considered as falling under the Aboriginal Canadian definition of entrepreneurialism (Peredo et al.
2004), as a broader definition than that offered by Hindle and Lansdowne (2005) and Foley (2006).
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payments has substituted for government funds that were spent elsewhere. The
result is no net increase in spending on services in these communities (see
O’Faircheallaigh 2004a: 43). This issue of ‘substitution funding’, potentially
jeopardising access to commonwealth or state-funded programs because of mining
agreement monies, is not a new one. Pre-native title, this risk was most notable
where significant financial benefits were negotiated in the context of land rights
legislation in remote areas (see Altman 1983: 112, 1985a). Gumala was also not
unaware of this risk and in 2004 the then CEO and Senior Project Officer both
spoke of the value of projects that leveraged government resources. Such projects
included the medical rooms at one homeland that were built by YLUA funds,
as the government would not provide capital infrastructure funds, but would
provide recurrent resources for staffing; and the homework centre at a homeland
where the infrastructure was supplied by Gumala, but the computers and
network were subsidised by the federal government ‘networking the nation’
program. The risk of substitution funding remains significant and requires
ongoing strategic management (see Altman, Chapter 2; Levitus, Chapter 4). In
view of this, Gumala and GEPL employed a Grants Officer in August 2008 to
ensure that they leverage grant money and sourced available opportunities.
As suggested by the discussion above, the 2002 Review found general
dissatisfaction about the Trustee and the GIPL manager handling funds for
education, training, and business development. A number of the criticisms to
emerge from the 2002 Review revolved around the perception that GIPL was
constraining opportunities for accessing the YLUA monies. Members were
concerned that the Trustees were too far away, several resided in Perth, and
knew little of their concerns and needs. In an earlier paper I have indicated that
some Gumala members perceived ‘that they have insufficient control over how
the money in the Trust is distributed’ (Holcombe 2004a: 9–10). Part of the reason
for this is the decision-making structure of GIPL. There are three non-Indigenous
and three Indigenous representatives (one from each language group) on the
Board of Trustees, on three-year terms and meeting twice annually. In 2004,
however, they were only having one face-to-face annual general meeting, to
save costs. This sense of disconnection from the decision-making process may
be inevitable, however lack of transparency in the decision-making process and
slowness of decision-making were cited as significant in the 2002 Review.
The 2002 Review found a need for more cooperation between the Boards of GIPL
and GEPL (as the Gumala Enterprise arm), and for better information
dissemination, communication and consultation by the GIPL Manager and Trustee
with Gumala members and Gumala officers. The issue of GIPL having ultimate
decision making power over Trust funds while Gumala as manager could only
pass on funding proposals, did not sit well with some Gumala members and
especially the then CEO. This tension between Gumala and GIPL came to a head
in 2007 when Gumala attempted to sack the GIPL Trustees and appoint a
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liquidator who would enable compliant trustees to then transfer the remaining
$40 million investment fund to Gumala. For its part, GIPL maintained that it had
concerns related to the manner in which financial controls were exercised and
the lack of proposals being put forward by Gumala (Siopsis J 2007). GIPL lodged
an injunction against its liquidation on the basis that there had not been a full
vote of members and Gumala (as manager of the Trust) had breached its fiduciary
duties to the beneficiaries in its lack of openness. The court ordered a mediated
settlement and shortly thereafter the Gumala CEO, who had held the position
for approximately five years, resigned. A new CEO was appointed in January
2008 and a restructured Gumala committee was established.13
Finally, a number of the 2002 Review recommendations have been acted upon.
For instance, the Review recommended that children of Gumala members be
supported through the provision of scholarships for secondary school, higher
education, and for post-school vocational training. A number of children now
attend Perth secondary schools on scholarships. In 2006, the business arm of
Gumala, GEPL, invested in the Karijini Eco Retreat tourism venture, where there
are currently 10 local Indigenous people employed over a nine month tourist
season. This approach to business development acknowledges that diversification
beyond the mining industry is a strategy to distribute risk.
In early 2008,14  with a new Governing Committee and a new Chief Executive,
Gumala made major changes in its structure by increasing numbers of staff,
creating an integrated relationship with GEPL, and implementing fundamental
changes in relation to business development. These include the expansion of
existing corporate businesses and the development of others, such as a major
accommodation project in Paraburdoo for Rio Tinto staff, contractors and tourists
and a proposal for a large business complex in the centre of Tom Price with
shops, offices, training facilities, accommodation and new corporate head quarters
for Gumala. A new strategic plan is also being developed so that GEPL can seize
upon the opportunities created with the Pilbara mining boom.
To cater for individual circumstances a Members’ Support Unit has also recently
been established with extra staff to deliver direct benefits through various
programs. These include sport and recreation, financial support for funerals and
headstones, emergency assistance, a pensioner program, critically ill patient
support, health and wellbeing programs, dental and ancillary health, computers
13 This committee restructure was also partly due to an Australia-wide Office of the Registrar of
Indigenous Corporations development that reduced the size of committees for Aboriginal corporations
by half. Gumala had previously required 18 elected members, six from each language group. Now the
requirements are three members of each language group, giving a maximum of nine. Although smaller
boards/committee may be more efficient and cost effective, this may be at the expense of transparency,
and real and perceived exclusivity.
14 The detail in this paragraph and the following paragraph was provided by Gumala (D. Gordon, pers.
comm. 10 October 2008).
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for students, a scholarship scheme (discussed earlier), and home loans. Seven
trainees have been employed at the Gumala office, while GEPL is also expanding
its Indigenous workforce.
Individual Indigenous engagement
To illustrate something of the diversity of Indigenous engagement with mining
interests, biographical details of several individuals are discussed below. This
material covers not only consideration of some small and large scale business
activity, but also process-oriented engagement that speaks to a political and
cultural agenda, rather than solely financial motivation.
Case 1: PN
PN is an articulate young to middle aged Niaparli woman who resides on her
family outstation in the Hamersley Ranges. In 2004 she was community President.
At that time she was a member of seven committees, boards and working groups,
including Gumala, GEPL, the Pilbara Native Title Service (PNTS) Regional
Committee, the Yamatji Marlpa Barna Baba Maaja Aboriginal Corporation
(YMBBMAC) Governing Committee,15  the Niaparli (native title) working group,
and the Rio Tinto Central Negotiating Committee.16  Her membership of these
organisations, involves a strong element of ‘keeping a finger on the pulse’ of the
regional socioeconomic politics. In a 2005 PNTS press release, PN spoke strongly
about Rio Tinto’s need to maintain standards of corporate social responsibility
and to negotiate retrospectively, given the expansion of mines that were
developed prior to the Native Title Act 1993 without traditional owner
approval.17 The level of commitment to monitoring the massive industry presence
is apparent.
At the time of interviewing PN and compiling the above membership list, it
seemed one, extreme, end of a spectrum of engagement—the pointy end of the
process side of the mining boom. However, this type of engagement seems to
suit many Indigenous people and is not necessarily uncommon. What is perhaps
striking about PN’s membership commitments is the level of activity. While
some individuals feel a clear need to engage politically with such a powerful
industry group, there is a flexibility to attending meetings which caters to other
15 This governing committee oversights the policy direction of the YMBBMAC. This is the organisation
that acts as the native title representative body for the Pilbara region, as well as the coastal region
around Geraldton to the south west. It incorporates the Yamatji Land and Sea Council and the PNTS.
16 The Central Negotiating Committee was formed in 2003 to engage collectively with Rio Tinto Iron
Ore (RTIO) in developing a regional framework through which to negotiate a coordinated approach to
the ongoing expansion of the industry and the new and evolving agreements. In 2006, the Central
Negotiating Committee developed into a private company owned and controlled by 10 Pilbara traditional
owner (language) groups. With an office in Roebourne, chaired by Slim Parker, the Marnda Mia Central
Negotiating Committee ‘aims to build coordinated, institutionalised capacity for local Indigenous families
and groups and provide a strong local voice’ (see Rio Tinto media release, 26 September 2007).
17  ‘Pilbara Aboriginal meeting condemns Rio Tinto’, PNTS media release, 31 May 2005.
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Indigenous priorities such as funerals and ceremonies. If one is unable to attend,
for whatever reason, a proxy can usually be appointed. Attending regular
meetings in regional towns and cities also caters to patterns of mobility, suiting
the mix of responsibilities that individuals have to both families and localities.
Sitting fees of $500 per day for some of these committees makes this permanent
part-time range of commitments to various organisations sustainable for
participants (although presumably each person has to manage potentially complex
tax implications). Some Gumala members have argued that committee
memberships can be understood as part of a ‘mining welfare economy’ that
tempts individuals to remain available at the expense of gaining full-time
employment. Other permanent part-time work also includes heritage surveys
and the monitoring of infrastructure works: the expansion for iron ore extraction
requires almost on-going survey work. In relation to Rio Tinto Iron Ore (RTIO)
operations,18  in 2006 alone in the Pilbara there were 2578 Aboriginal consultant
days over 96 surveys, with further expansion expected in the following years
(RTIO 2006: 32).
Case 2: Lola Young
Lola Young, aged in her 60s, lives in Tom Price. Young founded Wakuthuni,
probably the first homeland in the Hamersley ranges, in 1990. An excision was
negotiated with the Rocklea pastoral lease owners at the time with the assistance
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC); the lease is
currently owned by RTIO. Young was one of the first members of Gumala and
during 2004 was also a member of the Innawonga working group. Last year her
biography was published with the assistance of Pilbara Iron (part of RTIO)
(Young 2007).
As a knowledgeable Innawonga elder, Young has a high regard for the cultural
value of land and maintaining attachment to it. When referring to the best
methods for teaching children she has stated that ‘every long weekend we need
to get and teach them. If we teach them from outside of our land we get no strong
inside feeling from them. You can feel it really strong when you are talking from
your own land’ (in Olive 1997: 99). Young has been involved with establishing
two local businesses which clearly speak to this priority of cultural maintenance:
Wanu Wanu and Ngumee-Ngu. The Wanu Wanu Aboriginal Corporation was
established in 1997 with support from Hamerlsey Iron’s (now Pilbara Iron)
Aboriginal Training and Liaison Unit as a cross-cultural training business:
Hamerlsey Iron employees could stay overnight in the Wakuthuni homeland as
part of a suite of cultural awareness training. It was to extend to cultural and
eco-tourism, but was de-registered in 2004. At the time, there was discussion
18 The RTIO operations—through Pilbara Iron— operates seven mines (including Yandicoogina) and
associated infrastructure.
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about linking the proposed cultural and eco-tourism project in the neighboring
Karijini National Park (that Gumala was planning on supporting) to Young’s
Wakuthuni walking tour.
The Ngumee-Ngu Aboriginal Corporation (the name of which derives from
Young’s ‘bush name’—Ngamingu) was established in 2002, with the support of
Gumala (Young 2007: 84). The objects of this corporation are listed as: ‘to become
self sufficient; to care for the country, the corporation and the people; to build
homes within the homeland and to provide economic; social and cultural services
to the community’ (Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations 2008).
Young’s biography features local knowledge about flora and its medicinal
qualities, and the business includes the manufacture and sale of bush medicines
based on this knowledge. The products have been sold at the annual Mount
Nameless festival in Tom Price. These businesses are concerned with social and
cultural cohesion and maintenance, rather than being driven principally by
financial motives—although that is an aspect. Likewise, inter-generational
transfer of knowledge is cited by Young as important—she works with her
grandchildren on the production of the bush medicines (Young 2007: 83). The
biography contains a CD of six songs performed by Young; songs learnt from
her parents and from the spirits of her country (Young 2007: 160).
Case 3: ID
ID is a young to middle aged man who resided on his family homeland in the
Tom Price region during 2003 and 2004. At that time he was the Secretary of
the Gumala Committee, the Secretary of the GEPL Board, a member of the
Innawonga Working Group, and a committee member of the Pilbara Fund (a
program sponsored by the Pilbara Development Commission in Western
Australia).19  He had early involvement as an activist against the Rio Tinto
Marandoo mine development into the Karijini National Park20  and was part of
the early push toward developing cultural and eco-tourism in the Park. To this
end ID was actively involved in establishing the Karijini Aboriginal Corporation
in 1991 to facilitate a local Indigenous tourism operation in the Park. The first
object of this Corporation was listed as, ‘to support the social development of
its members in all ways’, followed by ‘to help bring about the self-support of
19  ‘The Premier announced the $20 million Pilbara Fund on 26 July 2004 to accelerate investment in
the community and Government infrastructure throughout the Pilbara, particularly in the areas of
health, education, recreation, culture and Government housing. The primary objective of the Pilbara
Fund is to add to the welfare of all people of the Pilbara and to make the region a better place to live
and work. It is intended that the Fund will facilitate the social and economic development of the Pilbara
through funding projects that will enhance the long term sustainable future of the region’ (Pilbara
Development Commission 2008).
20  For detail about this dispute see ‘On the fast track to a dispute over Marandoo’, M. Steketee, Sydney
Morning Herald, 5 November 1991, p. 10; ‘Showdown at Marandoo’, M. Stevens, Business Review
Weekly, 6 December 1991, p. 76.
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its members by the development of economic projects and industries’ (Office of
the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations 1990).
The Karijini Aboriginal Corporation was de-registered in 2004. However, these
ideals have flowed into the development (by Gumala’s business arm, GEPL) of
the Karijini eco-tourism enterprise outlined above. As a GEPL Board member,
ID was active in ensuring that tourist infrastructure be developed and formal
arrangements be finalised for the camp grounds all under Indigenous control.
As he noted himself, ‘…as a valuable tourist industry … we can show off the
Aboriginal culture with the aim of preservation and protection’ (in Olive 1997:
205). Land related enterprises have been a signature of ID’s business pursuits.
In 2004, his small business sold up to 300–400 kangaroo tails a month. Under
the YLUA, Rocklea Pastoral Lease (owned by RTIO) was to be returned to Gumala
members. This ‘handover’ had not occurred in 2004, and I am uncertain as to
the current situation. Nevertheless, given the early Indigenous engagement with
pastoralism in this region there is a certain romance in returning to this era of
stock work, now dramatically overshadowed by the mining industry, which
now owns the majority of Pastoral leases in the Pilbara region. Indeed, most
Indigenous people under the age of 50 would not have been exposed to the
culture of station life (see Holcombe 2006: 81).21
ID developed a business proposal to utilise a herd of cattle already marked for
slaughter (known as ‘killer’ cattle) for a local meat supply, requiring associated
yards and fencing between two of the homelands near Tom Price. This project
was not necessarily intended to make a profit and was reliant on the Community
Development Employment Program (CDEP) for part time wages. ID indicated at
that time that the project was not well received by Gumala. It would seem the
proposed business had potential to grow, would assist in training young men
for stock work, and offer a steady supply of meat to community residents with
limited resources. This sort of enterprise is driven by a desire to return to the
land, and to develop an alternative informal or domestic economy.
ID could be described as a political and cultural entrepreneur: as a strong
supporter of a unified Gumala he was closely involved in the injunction against
Gumala opposing GIPL’s liquidation. As ID has noted, ‘I have always been a
fierce supporter of land rights ever since I knew what land right’s was about
(in Olive 1997: 204).
At the time of the field research, the three individuals above had chosen not to
be involved with the IBN Corporation, even though there were clear financial
incentives to do so. This Corporation covers the BHP Billiton mine (known as
‘Area C’) which is an immediate neighbor to the RTIO Yandi mine. Without
21 When compulsory schooling for Indigenous children was introduced in Western Australia in the
late 1960s and early 1970s there was a major relocation of Indigenous workers in the pastoral industry
to the towns (see Holcombe 2006: 81).
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wishing to unduly idealise the reality, this speaks to the deeper issue of group
identity and the fault lines within which the regional polity is constructed. The
membership rights of these three individuals to the IBN Corporation would be
unquestioned and immediate, given their relationship to the native title groups
through which the IBN Corporation is constituted—the Innawonga, Banyjima,
and Niapali.22  However, a brief consideration of the way in which the IBN
Corporation was established may explain their decisions.
When the LUA was being negotiated for the Area C mine, Gumala was well
established and there was an expectation by many Gumala members (based on
my interviews conducted in 2003–04) that Gumala would be the organisation
that would negotiate the Agreement, which would aid its growth as a regional
Indigenous organisation. Certainly there was, theoretically, 100 per cent overlap
in membership of the two Agreement groups.
The concept of an overarching organisation that centralises, and thus
standardises, negotiations was in some ways a forerunner to the Central
Negotiating Committee that has now become the Marnda Mia Central Negotiating
Committee (see earlier footnote). However, the inaugural Chairman of Gumala
left when his position was not renewed, and he pursued the role of CEO of the
new IBN Corporation. The significant contestation between the two organisations
indicates the competition for the hearts and minds of the membership, as well
as competition for Indigenous workers—both organisations have Indigenous
contracting services (Gumala runs Gumala Contracting and IBN Corporation runs
Indigenous Mining Services) that compete for staff.
The decisions of the three individuals discussed above are not principally
motivated by financial gain; rather, their agendas articulate closely to an
entrepreneurial paradigm that is underwritten by cultural and political values.
As ID has stated, ‘I am a strong believer in Aboriginal culture. What a lot of
people don’t realise is that Aboriginal culture is moving fast and adapting’ (in
Olive 1997: 203). These three short biographies, and indeed this quote, seemed
to me to typify the types and levels of engagement that members of Gumala have
with the Agreement. That is of those individuals, who choose to engage,
maintaining autonomy in a manner that resonates with an Aboriginal agenda
remains a significant prerogative.
Case 4: SC
The first Chairman of Gumala, SC is a more mainstream or classic entrepreneur.
SC trained as a boiler maker and had worked for BHP Billiton for nine years by
the time he became Gumala Chair. When he was not reappointed Gumala Chair
for a second term, he developed the IBN (Innawonga, Banyjima, and Niapali)
22 The IBN Corporation was an outcome of a Land Use Agreement (LUA) with BHP Billiton, as Gumala
was with RTIO.
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Corporation to manage the Agreement for the neighboring BHP Billiton mine.23
This dynamic fissure and fusion of organisations, illustrated in the de-registration
of several of the corporations discussed above, is a backdrop to the pattern of
leadership. New organisations are established as existing ones cease to serve as
the vehicle to progress the founder’s aims and ideologies. As I have noted
elsewhere, the negotiation of the YLUA was described as ‘learning curve’ for SC
(Holcombe 2004a: 12). When an opportunity arose to develop another
organisation, it was taken and the IBN Corporation was developed.
The structure of this Corporation differed significantly to that of Gumala and it
is clear that the inaugural CEO transferred some lessons from his experience
with the YLUA structures. Like the YLUA, two Trust funds were established
under the IBN Corporation. However, unlike the Yandi Trusts, one of the IBN
Corporation Trusts, the Financial Assistance Trust, did allow cash payments to
members, as it was designated as non-charitable. As noted above, the issue of
cash payments was significant for some Gumala members (see also Holcombe
2004a: 12–13).
Another significant difference in the IBN Corporation structure was the
incorporation of four discrete bodies representing the language groups of the
native title claim.24  Each group has their own administrative support and funding
stream. With parallels to the issue of cash, the independence of each language
group has been an ongoing source of tension for some groups within Gumala.
The 2002 Review found that amongst each language group some individuals
sought to devolve the current structure to language group corporations.25
However, agreement could not be reached so no action was taken. Some of this
dissatisfaction lay behind the Gumala attempt to liquidate GIPL in 2007, discussed
above.
A third significant difference between Gumala and the more recent IBN
Corporation was the centralised authority structure that was developed by SC,
as the inaugural CEO. Instead of two bodies—one that manages the Trusts (GIPL)
and another operating arm (Gumala)—the IBN Corporation is structured so the
CEO and the Board of Directors have oversight over both the IBN Corporation
as Trustee and the operating arm (the contracting business Indigenous Mining
Services). There is no separation of powers between the advisory body and the
decision making body. This has been a critical issue for the IBN Corporation and
member concerns about accountability and transparency.
23  Note these language spellings are those used by the Corporation.
24 These are the Banyjima, Niapali, Miluranpa Banyjima and the Minadhu Innawonga groups—the two
different Banyjima groups are also known as the Top End and Bottom End Bayjima groups. Note that
these are the spellings used by the IBN Corporation.
25  However, there was also awareness amongst members of the significant cost implications of this
administrative duplication.
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The four individuals in the case studies briefly discussed here are not necessarily
doing anything extra-ordinary. Rather, within the limitations imposed they are
negotiating their needs and in some cases pushing the boundaries.
Conclusion
Focusing on the issue of entrepreneurialism brings the tension between collective
or communal rights and the rights of the individual into stark relief, although
this chapter has not explored this tension in Aboriginal political process.
Reconciling these apparently opposing Aboriginal values and practices is a key
challenge in utilising the mainstream opportunities that the agreements offer
(see Martin 1995, 2001). Mining agreements could be about offering choice and
acknowledging the diversity of expectation within the Aboriginal stakeholder
group, rather than operating as an experiment in social engineering. In the
context of the LUAs discussed here, Indigenous entrepreneurialism is not just
about engaging in the ‘real economy’, but also about enabling and encouraging
individuals in all their heterogeneity to pursue a diverse economy. As an
Aboriginal ‘beneficiary’ of the YLUA, Keith Lethbridge, suggested ‘company
structures … [should not only] be to generate money’ (Ethical Investor 2004:
33), and it may be added, not just to be directly supportive of the mining industry
(see Scambary 2007, Chapter 8).
The 2002 Review into GIPL and the Trusts showed that where Aboriginal
businesses are supported, they have had to be low risk and show a direct
‘community benefit’ (Hoffmeister 2002). Such businesses tend to be in industries
that service the mine economy (see Hamersley Iron 2000). Rio Tinto’s Aboriginal
Training and Liaison Unit provides examples of the ‘diversity and scope of
business opportunities that are made possible by the Hamersley program’, all
are supportive of the industry. Two businesses—Wanu Wanu (discussed above)
and Ngurra Wangkamagayi—run cross-cultural training courses to Hamersley
Iron (now Pilbara Iron) and other companies; Ieramugadu gardening services
provide contracting maintenance to Hamersley’s port operations in Dampier;
GEPL which operate a contracting arm (earth moving); and Gumala Eurest which
operates camp accommodation and associated services.
Although clearly this is where most business opportunity exists in this region,
such mainstream ‘opportunity’ is only taken up by 30 per cent of Indigenous
adults (Taylor and Scambary 2005: 28). This suggests that looking beyond the
life of the mining industry is a fanciful exercise when the pressing issue now is
‘how can more Aboriginal people benefit from an LUA in terms that suit them
rather than the industry?’ As indicated above, these terms may be less driven
by economic imperatives, than by cultural and political ones. Some realism is
needed here in regard to diversifying the range of benefits that can be gained
from LUAs, as it seems that the majority of those imputed to be ‘beneficiaries’
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in fact benefit very little, if at all, unless they are directly employed by the
Company or sit on the range of committees to undertake the process work.
While an important component of LUAs is to enable engagement with the
mainstream economy through employment and training programs, choice should
not be limited to this. Nevertheless, such mainstream opportunities need to be
more inclusive of the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. More of the agreement
capital could be allocated to building diverse forms of capital—human, social
and cultural—to encourage entrepreneurialism in its many forms. The issue of
whether business development proposals are specifically driven by the market
should not be the only consideration in approving proposals, and nor should
the size of the benefit group or community. Importantly, establishing a business
development assistance scheme emerged as a means to enable a greater range of
individuals, not only those that are business ready, to access a greater range of
opportunity. Because the success of an individual is not an isolated achievement,
the provision of scholarships to schools of the parents’ choice, for instance, is a
crucial element of this. It seems that the Rio Tinto WA Future Fund with the
Graham (Polly) Farmer Foundation, and Gumala’s new program, offers some
scope here.
Limitations on choice create social pressures and fissures which highlight
contestation over value and need, and Aboriginal notions of success. To capture
these values, a broader consideration of ‘opportunity’ needs to be canvassed.
This concept of opportunity, perhaps like ‘capacity building’, is currently based
on channeling Aboriginal interests toward engagement with the mainstream and
formal economies, primarily through the uptake of employment in the mine
economy. When individuals are targeted by agreement programs, it tends to be
in terms of specific training for skills appropriate for employment in the mining
sector, and aiming at full-time employment. Engaging with this employment
regime or meeting the guidelines for businesses funded under the trust structures
is premised on ‘opportunity’, which refers to the opportunity to change—that
is, to change value systems, if one is not already ‘business ready’ for instance
(Holcombe 2006).
This issue of what might constitute Indigenous entrepreneurialism is perhaps
nascent in remote Australia, as is the notion of community economies in these
regions. Nonetheless, it is clear that an emergent hybrid economy is evolving
in the mine hinterland region of the Pilbara. By leveraging the right to negotiate
under the native title act and striking land use agreements, individuals are less
focused on harvesting game (the customary economy) and more driven to
harvesting heritage, through site clearances for mine works, and the development
of homelands. While not every Gumala member seeks to reside on a homeland,
or indeed has the customary right to establish one, neither do all Gumala members
chose to, or are enabled to, work in the mining industry. Getting the balance
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right in the YLUA between catering for the range of expectations of outcomes
is of course unique to it, as it is to other agreements. The purpose of this chapter
has been to re-direct or refocus attention onto individuals and the ways in which
they are able to articulate with the Agreement through the transformation of
economic capital into social, cultural and political capital. The development of
the Marnda Mia Central Negotiating Committee is a powerful example of the
Agreement acting as one lever, of several, to build political capital. Likewise,
local economies which revolve around cultural and eco-tourism, the manufacture
of bush products and so on, also deserve space and should not be overlooked,
even in the context of a regional mining boom. I return to an earlier quote: ‘if
the money is not being spent, it is not doing good’. This chapter has hopefully
opened up the field of discussion in this space about what ‘good’ might mean
as it is applied to a remote nascent entrepreneurialism.
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8. Mining agreements, development,
aspirations, and livelihoods
Benedict Scambary
In a time of global economic and climate uncertainty the expansion of resource
exploitation projects in Australia is unprecedented. The consequent value of
the minerals sector to Australian prosperity is in stark contrast to the economic
poverty experienced by many Indigenous Australians, particularly those residing
in mine hinterlands. This contrast is evident despite the existence of beneficial
agreements between Indigenous groups and the mining industry, and in some
cases the state, concerning the very mining that is generating such extraordinary
profit. Indigenous poverty is only minimally ameliorated by such agreements
(O’Faircheallaigh 2000, 2003a, 2004a, 2006; Taylor 2004a; Taylor and Bell 2001;
Taylor and Scambary 2005). This chapter draws on doctoral research of three
agreements to highlight that poor agreement outcomes arise from the limitations
that agreements impose on Indigenous livelihoods and aspirations (Scambary
2007). The agreements considered by this research are the Ranger Uranium Mine
Agreement in the Kakadu Region of the Northern Territory, the Yandicoogina
Land Use Agreement (YLUA) in the Central Pilbara of Western Australia, and
the Gulf Communities Agreement (GCA) in the southern Gulf of Carpentaria in
Queensland. All three agreements are considered best practice by the mining
industry, the state and select Indigenous leaders, for their perceived capacity
to deliver substantial and sustainable benefits to Indigenous people. However
a combination of the scale of Indigenous disadvantage and the mainstream
development parameters of the agreements themselves limit the attainment of
sustainable outcomes for Indigenous people associated with all three agreements.
This chapter argues that a fundamental limitation of these mining agreements
is their incapacity to engage with and augment the diverse livelihood objectives
of Indigenous people. This motivates ambivalent responses to mining on the
part of Indigenous people. The invisibility of Indigenous cultural dispositions
is further compounded by a growing policy emphasis on mainstream economic
engagement, which entails many negative assumptions about Indigenous people
and their capacity for economic engagement. Such assumptions are in tacit
opposition to Indigenous cultural dispositions that ultimately underlie notions
of identity and a claim to rights on the basis of cultural difference.
Indigenous people’s experiences of initiatives promoting ‘sustainability’ in the
context of mining agreements are primarily associated with royalty and
compensatory payments directed at attaining community benefit. In modern
mining agreements ‘community benefit’ packages broadly entail employment
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and training programs, business enterprise development programs, payment of
limited cash compensation, and heritage protection. Successes and failures within
these realms are ad hoc within each of the agreements, with all three falling well
short of their objectives to overcome Indigenous disadvantage via the creation
of economic opportunity (see below). The reasons for this are numerous and
complex, but include:
• the challenge of reconciling mainstream economic development initiatives
(that seek outcomes almost exclusively in terms of economic engagement
associated with the local mine economy) and Indigenous cultural prerogatives
(that arise from, and construct, personal and group identity and are often
expressed as livelihood aspirations)
• the level of accord between defined agreement beneficiaries and local
Indigenous conceptions of relatedness
• the ability of Indigenous organisations arising from the agreements to
represent the diversity of their memberships
• the effects of statutory and agreement defined conditions on the flow of
benefits to intended beneficiaries
• the tendency of the state to retreat as a service provider with the arrival of
private capital, and
• the extent of Indigenous autonomy over agreement benefits.
The Agreements
The structures of the Ranger Mining Agreement, the YLUA, and the GCA are
complex and define the space for Indigenous ‘productive activity’ within their
contexts. Generally all three agreements provide for compensatory and
‘community benefit’ packages—trust funds and royalty equivalent payments,
programs of employment and training, business development, education, and
cultural heritage protection. Whilst all three agreements fall within the mining
industry’s sustainable development approach, critical differences emerge between
the agreements that include the role of land councils and native title
representative bodies (NTRBs), the intended purpose of funds arising from
agreements, and issues of governance associated with agreement structures.
The Ranger Uranium Mine is located on Mirrar Gunjeihmi country within Kakau
National Park in the Northern Territory. Approximately 50 per cent of Mirrar
Gunjeihmi country is encompassed by the Ranger and nearby Jabiluka uranium
mining lease. The Ranger Mining Agreement, pursuant to s.44 of the Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) (ALRA), is between the
Northern Land Council on behalf of traditional owners and the Commonwealth.
Analysis of the Ranger mine’s nearly 30 years of history is instructive for
understanding relationships between Indigenous people and the modern mining
industry in Australia more broadly. Many conclusions can be draw from the
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impacts on the local Indigenous polity from the construction of a dedicated
mining town (Jabiru), Indigenous employment and training schemes, and the
emergent administrative framework designed to balance competing interests.
The establishment of the Ranger mine was enabled by the recommendations of
the Ranger Uranium Environmental Impact Inquiry (the ‘Fox Inquiry’) which
also considered—and recommended favourably—the establishment of Kakadu
National Park, and the recognition of land rights for Indigenous people (Fox,
Kelleher and Kerr 1977). Whilst noting the opposition of the Mirrar Gunjeihmi
people to the establishment of the Ranger mine, the Fox Inquiry sought a
compromise between competing land interests in the region.
The recommendations of the Inquiry established arrangements to ameliorate the
impacts of mining on local Indigenous people including the provision of economic
benefits through the payment of royalties under the ALRA, and the
implementation of complex land tenure arrangements. Notably the mining town
of Jabiru that was established to service the mine became a restricted access area
in order to minimise interaction between local Indigenous people and the mining
community. The arrangements established by the Fox Inquiry are sometimes
referred to as a ‘social contract’.
The administrative arrangements established by this ‘social contract’ remain
vexed 30 years after the establishment of the Ranger mine. Historically Ranger
has had low rates of local Indigenous employment. Despite the payment of
royalties under the terms of the Ranger Agreement the Indigenous share of the
mine economy is minimal. This is a common pattern at all three mines considered.
The impacts on Indigenous people of large-scale development follow the pattern
set by Ranger (Taylor and Scambary 2005).
The YLUA is an Indigenous Land Use Agreement between Hamersley Iron (now
known as Pilbara Iron) and the Yinhawangka, Banyjima, and Nyiyaparli1  people
of the Central Pilbara. The agreement is not registered with the National Native
Title Tribunal. The agreement has a regional focus and concerns an area of
approximately 26,000 square kilometres (Senior 2000), encompassing much of
the traditional land interests of the three language groups, and a substantial area
of Pilbara Iron’s mining and exploration tenements in the region. Notably the
Yandicoogina deposit is also the subject of mining tenements held by rival iron
ore miner BHP Billiton. The Yinhawangka, Banyjima and Nyiyaparli people are
parties to a separate agreement with BHP Billiton concerning the BHP
Billiton-owned Yandicoogina Iron Ore Mine.2
1 The orthography used here accords with that reommended by the Wangka Maya Pilbara Aboriginal
Language Centre. However, numerous spellings of these language group names are in use in the region.
2 The Mining Area C Agreement between Yinhawangka, Banyjima, Nyiyaparli people and BHP Billiton
establishes the IBN Corporation with the same membership as Gumala.
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The GCA is a Future Act Agreement pursuant to s.29 of the Native Title Act 1993
(Cwlth) (NTA), and is between the State of Queensland, Century Zinc Limited
(CZL) and the Waanyi, Mingginda, Gkuthaarn and Kukatj people of the southern
Gulf of Carpentaria. The GCA predates the ‘Wik’ amendments to the NTA of
1997, also known as the ‘ten-point plan amendments’.3
The central features of the YLUA and the GCA, like the Ranger Agreement, are
preferential concessions relating to provision of employment and training;
Indigenous business development; heritage protection and financial recompense
for mining; and heavy emphasis on integrating Indigenous people into the mine
economy.
However, the dollar amount of the YLUA and GCA, approximately $60 million
over the anticipated 20-year life of both mines, is significantly less than royalty
payments made by Ranger mine operator Energy Resources of Australia (ERA)
through a complex set of arrangements to the Aboriginal Benefits Account (see
below) (O’Faircheallaigh 2003a).4
Total royalties paid by ERA and distributed to the Aboriginal Benefits Account
since the commencement of mining in 1980 are $207.7 million (see also ACIL
Economics and Policy Ltd 1993: 17; ACIL Economics and Policy Pty Ltd 1997: 3;
ERA 2006). ERA erroneously states that the company has paid this amount to
Indigenous interests (ERA 2006); in fact they are paid to the state, which then
distributes mining royalty equivalent amounts to Indigenous interests and the
Northern Territory Government. Traditional owner groups only receive 30 per
cent of these payments via royalty associations that have been incorporated to
receive such funds. The Gagadju Association was the nominated organisation
to receive such payments from 1979 to 1995. From 1996 to the present the
Gunjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation has received all royalty payments from Ranger.
There has been much conjecture over the distribution and expenditure of royalty
payments throughout the history of the Ranger project. It is commonly assumed
that traditional owners personally receive large sums of money. Over time this
assumption has resulted in the non-provision of government services on an
equitable needs basis to Indigenous people in the Kakadu region (Kakadu Region
3 The ‘ten point plan’ amendments, were in direct response to the High Court’s decision in The Wik
Peoples v The State of Queensland & Ors; The Thayorre People v The State of Queensland & Ors [1996]
HCA 40 (‘Wik decision’), which found that native title could coexist with pastoral leases. In the event
of any conflict the High Court found that the rights of pastoralists would prevail. The intention of the
amendments was to seek a compromise for conflicting interests, with Prime Minister Howard claiming
that ‘The fact is that the Wik decision pushed the pendulum too far in the Aboriginal direction. The
10 point plan will return the pendulum to the centre’ (Amended Wik 10 Point Plan, Media Release,
8 May 1997). The amendments had significant beneficial impacts for land access for the mining industry,
and were undoubtedly influenced by the Australian Mining Industry Council’s sustained campaign for
blanket extinguishment of native title rights and interests.
4  For a description of the complex of royalty distributions arrangements of the Ranger Agreement see
Altman 1983: 56–61.
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Social Impact Study 1997a; O’Faircheallaigh 2004a), and allegations of profligate
expenditure by individuals and organisations alike. Such views are a historical
legacy of the Queensland Mines Ltd (QML) Agreement, which related to the
nearby Nabarlek uranium deposit. Negotiated after the Ranger Agreement, the
QML Agreement saw the distribution of cash payments to members of three
associations prior to any distribution of Ranger money in 1979.
The community benefit package of the YLUA was envisaged to include
approximately $60 million in cash payment to the Gumala Aboriginal Corporation,
representing the 430 members of the Banyjima, Nyiyaparli and Yinhawangka
peoples, over the anticipated 20 year life of the Yandicoogina mine. However,
increased production in response to world demand for iron ore make it likely
that the mine will have a 10–15 year lifespan, and Gumala will be paid
significantly more than the anticipated $60 million.
In addition a range of training, employment, heritage protection and business
enterprise development initiatives are contained in the agreement, and there are
provisions for the staged return of Rocklea station which is owned by the mining
company. ‘Community’ benefits from the agreement are primarily administered
via the Gumala Aboriginal Corporation in the form of trust funds known as the
General Trust and the Elderly Infirm Trust, the latter ceasing after the first five
year period of the agreement. Gumala has developed a business enterprise unit
known as Gumala Enterprises Pty Ltd (GEPL), and has entered into joint business
ventures in transport, equipment hire and camp management services in the
Pilbara region. The trusts are designed to provide assistance to the membership
through the delivery of programs such as investments, culture, law, community
development, business development and education. The capacity of the trusts
to make financial payments to individual members is restricted by the charitable
nature of the trusts. In the first five years of operation the trusts received
approximately $15.3 million from Hamersley Iron. The lack of direct access to
these funds for Indigenous parties to the agreement due to trust arrangements
has led many Gumala members to perceive that they have no control over the
compensatory benefits derived from the YLUA. Such dissatisfaction is
encapsulated in the comment from Banyjima man BF, at the time of fieldwork,
when he stated that ‘We have the richest trusts, but the poorest people’. As such
the existence of substantial trust funds and the poor and declining socioeconomic
status of Indigenous people who might lay claim to them is considered an
indictment by many of the capacity for agreements such as the YLUA to achieve
any substantial economic development or sustainable outcomes for Indigenous
people.
The GCA is a complex document that commits the five native title groups, CZL,
and the Queensland Government to a relationship that is designed primarily to
facilitate the mining and transportation of ore from the Century mine. In addition
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the objectives of the GCA for Indigenous people include the reduction of welfare
dependence, and the promotion of economic self-sufficiency, better health and
education standards, access to country, and community and cultural
development. Undoubtedly, such aims flow from Indigenous people’s symbolic
approach to negotiations, and their desire to achieve appropriate recompense
for past injustices, including dispossession of traditional lands and subsequent
enduring poverty (Blowes and Trigger 1998: 109). Existing Indigenous
disadvantage in the region poses serious challenges for realising these goals
(Martin 1998a: 4). Failure of the GCA to attain any substantial improvement in
the relative disadvantage of Indigenous people, particularly the Waanyi language
group, is the subject of intense efforts of the Carpentaria Land Council Aboriginal
Corporation to seek amendments to the agreement (Flucker 2003a, 2003b). Such
attempts include the conduct of a review of the GCA by the Waanyi Nation
Aboriginal Corporation, which followed a nine-day occupation of the mine
canteen in 2002 by approximately 200 Waanyi people (see also Martin, Chapter 5;
Trebeck, Chapter 6).5  Like the YLUA the GCA contains provisions for the
incremental return of pastoral land holdings owned by CZL.6
Arguably the most successful element of the GCA is the average 15–20 per cent
employment of local Indigenous people at the Century mine, an employment
ratio that eclipses the national average of 4.6 per cent Indigenous employment
in the mining industry (Barker and Brereton 2004). In the life of the mine
approximately 550 people from the Gulf of Carpentaria have been employed,
and between 100 and 120 Indigenous people at any one time between 2001 to
the present (Barker and Brereton 2004). Predominantly, Indigenous people are
employed in the mine pit as truck drivers and operators, but significant numbers
5  In 2002, after a meeting held at Bidanggu outstation to discuss a review of the GCA, approximately
150 Waanyi men, women and children drove to the Century mine site, announced their presence at the
site office, and then occupied the mine canteen. The Queensland Government ordered the mobilisation
of the police special squad to the mine site, but was thwarted in its initial efforts to dislodge the protestors
by declarations in the media by Waanyi spokespeople that the protestors were unarmed and mainly
elderly people and children. Intense negotiations began between the general manager of the mine and
the protestors. The sit-in lasted for nine days and severely disrupted the meal routines for the
approximately 400 strong fly-in-fly-out workforce. In addition, the unprecedented move to occupy
part of the mine site sent shock waves through the business community and threatened to halt production
at the world’s largest zinc mine (‘Aborigine protest threatens zinc mine’, K. Meade, The Australian, 19
November 2002). The sit-in exposed the mine to serious financial risk which could have been critical
for the continuation of the operation given that Pasminco (the operating company at the time) was
experiencing financial difficulties at the time. The sit-in arose through dissatisfaction with the perceived
limited scope and lack of independence of ‘The Five Year Review of the GCA’ undertaken by the Gulf
Aboriginal Development Company Ltd, Pasminco and the State of Queensland.
6 Turn Off Lagoon has been returned to Waanyi People, and in 2007 CZL retains a 49 per cent stake in
Riversleigh and Lawn Hill Stations. Lawn Hill Station is a commercially lucrative pastoral enterprise
carrying 50 000 head of cattle. Both Lawn Hill and Riversleigh stations are managed by the Lawn Hill
and Riversleigh Pastoral Holding Company, which currently sublets the properties to non-Indigenous
commercial pastoral enterprises and also conducts a pastoral training program in association with these
two stations. In addition the Gangalidda people, who are not parties to the GCA, have received title to
Pendine and Konka Stations.
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are also working in mine administration and service areas associated with the
mining camp. Reasons for such high Indigenous employment overall include
the operation of Community Liaison Offices in the communities of Doomadgee,
Normanton, and Mornington Island, funding by the State of Queensland for
mine related TAFE training, and the proactive employment strategies of the
major contractor, the Roche Eltin Joint Venture, which operates the mine pit.
The three agreements considered here arise from different legislative and
administrative regimes. Differences between the agreements also relate to the
local circumstances in which each of the agreements were negotiated. The YLUA
and the GCA emphasise the economic engagement of Indigenous people, rather
than the payment of royalties as with the Ranger Agreement. However cash
payments are made in both the YLUA and the GCA, although they utilise the
‘real economy’ discourse and emphasise participation in mainstream economic
activity.
Across all three agreements significant numbers of intended agreement
beneficiaries are unable to participate in programs of employment, training or
business development due to their status in relation to development-defined
socioeconomic indices. Many Indigenous people who have land interests affected
by major mining developments are precluded from participating in the mine
economy by chronic health issues, limited education, a criminal record, substance
abuse issues or old age (Taylor and Scambary 2005). The status of Indigenous
Australians against standard social indicator areas including health, housing,
education, and labour force participation are indicative of levels of poverty that
deserve the moral outrage reserved for the Federal Government response to the
incidence of child abuse in Indigenous communities resulting in the Northern
Territory emergency intervention.
However, such moral outrage denies the agency and productive capacity of
many Indigenous people that arises from an extensive range of skills and
knowledge that lie outside the mainstream economy, and that inform Indigenous
responses to poverty. Whilst the under-resourcing of services to Indigenous
people is one reason for poverty that prevents participation in the mainstream
economy, its day-to-day alleviation is often sought through the use of natural
resources and the accompanying corpus of knowledge. Scarce government
assistance has been inadequate for decades, entrenching Indigenous disadvantage.
In many locations this places extreme pressure on the livelihoods of Indigenous
people through institutional exclusion and excessive coercion to participate in
the ‘mainstream’. The denial of access to land and infrastructure essential to the
conduct of customary activities and beliefs has added further constraints on
Indigenous livelihoods.
Almost universally Indigenous people seek to shape their economic engagement
by utilising their skills as Indigenous people, rather than highlighting the
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capacity and skills deficit identified by standard social index assessments. This
raises the possibilities for alternative forms of engagement by reference to diverse
Indigenous aspirations for the future. In the context of mining agreements such
aspirations are characterised by a desire for agreements that engender more
innovative economic relationships, in both mainstream economic opportunities
and in enhancing customary sector economic activity (Altman 2005a).
Modern mining agreements arise from legislative frameworks such as the ALRA
and NTA that privilege the continuation of Indigenous traditions in the
recognition of rights to land, and provide mechanisms to negotiate agreements
with resource developers. However, resulting mining agreements de-emphasise
the cultural prerogatives of Indigenous people in favour of mainstream economic
development initiatives, predominantly within the mine economy. The capacity
and desire of Indigenous people to engage in mine employment and training is
influenced by diverse life histories resulting in considerable diversity of
residence, access to their traditional lands, education standards, health standards,
and customary knowledge and experience.
Indigenous policy and mining agreements
In the 1990s Indigenous policy in Australia changed significantly as the tenets
of economic liberalism were adopted, increasing the role of the private sector in
Indigenous affairs both in terms of philanthropy and in ways consistent with
‘practical reconciliation’. This process has continued in the new millennium
with the abolition of representative structures such as the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the introduction of ‘mutual obligation
frameworks’, and most recently with the Federal Government’s intervention
into the administration of Indigenous welfare, land, and moral life of Indigenous
people in the Northern Territory. Diminishing state capacity and growing
demands for state services (Quiggin 2005: 22) have been felt acutely in remote
and regional parts of Australia—the areas where mines exist and significant
numbers of Indigenous people live. In this context mining agreements with
Indigenous people vest considerable ‘state-like’ powers in the industry in relation
to defining social policy and delivery of services in select remote and regional
areas of Australia. This sits uncomfortably with the industry as corporations
resist the pressure to fulfil the role of service delivery (Mining Minerals and
Sustainable Development 2002) which is traditionally the domain of the
state—creating uncertainty for Indigenous people residing in mine hinterlands.
In 1991 the Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
recommended that, in light of the extent of Indigenous disadvantage identified
in the course of the enquiry, ‘Reconciliation of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
communities must be an essential commitment on all sides if change is to be
genuine and long term’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1991). The report urged
bilateral support for its recommendations and in the same year the Council for
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Aboriginal Reconciliation was established as a statutory authority under the
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991. The legislation also set the terms
for a process to be conducted over a ten-year timeframe to advance formal
reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. The critical
endpoint for this formal process was set to be the Centenary of Federation in
2001.
Initial articulations of the policy of reconciliation were focused on a rights-based
approach and accompanied by events such as the High Court’s judgment in
Mabo No. 2, and the subsequent passage of the NTA which established a national
framework for the recognition of pre-existing Indigenous rights in land. Previous
Indigenous policies also came under scrutiny—such as that of forcibly removing
Aboriginal children from their families in the context of the Stolen Generations
Inquiry.7
A change of government in 1996 ushered in a different approach to reconciliation
that focused on the attainment of ‘statistical equality’ under the rubric of
‘practical reconciliation’. The Howard government claimed that the symbolic
rights-based approach of the previous administration had been unsuccessful.
Practical reconciliation seeks to address Indigenous disadvantage in relation to
tangible indicator areas such as housing, health, education and employment
(Altman and Hunter 2003), whilst downplaying the ‘rights’ or symbolic
reconciliation agenda of the previous administration.
The policy shift to practical reconciliation is evidenced by the amendments to
the NTA in 1998 which significantly reduced the extent of rights recognised
under the legislation. These amendments were designed to create certainty of
tenure for pastoral and mining interests, in light of competing claims of prior
Indigenous ownership.
Following the abolition of ATSIC in 2005, ‘mainstreaming’ became the dominant
term for the change in direction of Indigenous policy due to its emphasis on the
delivery of services via already established government departments and state
mechanisms, and the de-emphasis of existing Indigenous service delivery and
representative organisations (‘the Indigenous sector’). Features of mainstreaming
include the attempted coordination of service delivery across State and Federal
agencies, and an emphasis on shared responsibility agreements at the local level
based on principles of mutual obligation. A premise of mainstreaming is the
notion that ‘passive welfare’ has had a devastating impact on Indigenous
Australians (Rowse 2006: 169). The main proponent of this view is Indigenous
leader Noel Pearson, who asserts a four-point plan for the development of a ‘real
economy’ on Cape York Peninsula in Queensland. Pearson’s plan entails access
7  In 1995 the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission established the National Inquiry into
the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, also known as the
Stolen Generations Inquiry, which conducted hearings nationally throughout 1995–96.
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to traditional subsistence resources, adaptation of welfare programs into
reciprocity programs, the development of community economies, and engaging
in the real economy (Pearson 2000: 83). The last aspect of Pearson’s
plan—engagement in the real economy—has been assimilated into Indigenous
policy frameworks of both the state and the private sector as equating with
middle Australia objectives of mainstream economic engagement. Principle
indicators of such engagement are culturally informed and include gainful
employment and private ownership of property.
Accompanying this policy shift, or perhaps informing it, there has been a
disciplinary shift in policy development away from the humanities and in
particular, anthropology, towards economics (Altman and Rowse 2005: 159).
Altman and Rowse question whether the variant objectives of Indigenous policy
‘achieve equality of socioeconomic status or […] facilitate choice and self
determination’ (Altman and Rowse 2005: 159). They indicate that the former is
the focus of economically-informed social policy, which downplays ‘difference’
in favour of equality, whilst traditionally the latter has been based on the advice
of anthropology and its emphasis on ‘cultural difference’. In this sense culture
is something that ‘aggregates people and processes, rather than integrates them’
(Cohen 1993: 195–6).
The emerging tension in Indigenous policy is central to mining agreements—in
particular, how the influence of economic liberalism on practical reconciliation
excludes (or at best de-emphasises) the cultural imperatives of Indigenous
economic agency. As Altman and Rowse note ‘This approach ignores a point
made by anthropology: that to change peoples’ forms of economic activity is to
transform them culturally’ (Altman and Rowse 2005: 176).
Mining agreements are one way in which mainstream economic participation of
Indigenous people is pursued. While modern agreements promote an ethos of
economic participation, they are also subject to considerable variation in the
involvement of the state. For example, the Queensland Government is a party
to the GCA, and the Federal Government is a party to the Ranger Agreement,
whilst the Western Australian Government is not a party to the YLUA. In all
three cases the state’s primary concerns are to ensure the unimpeded development
of mineral resources, and minimise liabilities arising from the impairment of
native title (O’Faircheallaigh 2006: 9) and, in the case of the Ranger mine, the
ALRA. Limited programs such as the Working in Partnership program are funded
by the Federal Government to promote greater participation of Indigenous people
in the mining industry (Department of Industry Tourism and Resources 2006).
More recently, Closing the Gaps initiatives promote ‘place based training
initiatives’ with the resource sector as part of broader strategies to increase
economic participation and to address the divergent life expectancies beween
Indigenous Australians and the wider population.
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Tension exists between the mainstreaming approach to Indigenous affairs and
the substantial Indigenous sector that acts as an interlocutor with the state in
the delivery of services (Rowse 2006). Organisations that were established under
the ALRA and NTA are critical to the negotiation of agreements. NTRBs are
federally funded to represent the interests of Indigenous people within a
geographic area under the terms of the NTA. In the Northern Territory, land
councils established under the ALRA have assumed responsibility for
representation of the native title interests of their constituents within their
geographic boundaries, and are also recognised as NTRBs. With the NTA 1998
amendments, NTRBs have experienced a substantially increased workload due
to increased complexity in the operation of the Act, and the introduction of
strict time frames associated particularly with negotiation processes. Other
agencies integral to the carriage of processes under the NTA, including the
Federal Court of Australia and the National Native Title Tribunal, have received
substantial funding increases to address this increased workload. However,
NTRBs have experienced an overall decline in funding, and increased
intervention by the Federal Government in the discretionary use of funding.
O’Faircheallaigh notes that this has reduced the capacity of these organisations
to represent the interests of their clients adequately (O’Faircheallaigh 2006:
11–2). Increasingly, the mining industry and other third party developers are
funding NTRBs, and Indigenous people directly to fast-track processes associated
with the NTA in order to reach timely development outcomes (Minerals Council
of Australia (MCA) 2006). Although such direct funding is aimed at pragmatic
outcomes, it raises the serious prospect of a conflict of interest in adversarial
negotiations over land use (Morgan, Kwaymullina and Kwaymullina 2006).
A submission to the Commonwealth Government by the peak mining industry
organisation, the MCA, notes that 60 per cent of mining operations in Australia
are adjacent to Indigenous communities (MCA 2006: 25).8 The same submission
notes that NTRBs ‘provide a critical platform for industry to negotiate mutually
beneficial outcomes’ and recognises that ‘NTRBs have been chronically
under-resourced in fulfilling their legislative functions in representing Indigenous
interests’ (MCA 2006: 30). Such a shortfall in resourcing, ‘has delayed the
negotiation of mutually beneficial agreements and forced mineral companies to
meet the resourcing gap’ (MCA 2006: 30).
As the mining industry seeks to promote the development of ‘sustainable regional
communities’ beyond the life of the mine (MCA 2006: 23), and via the negotiation
of agreements with Indigenous people, the inadequacy of state services in the
provision of community infrastructure and social services is increasingly
hampering such efforts (MCA 2006: 25; see also Holcombe, Chapter 7). The
industry has criticised the government for the increased onus upon it to provide
8  ‘Communities’ in this sense refers to the physical locations where Indigenous people reside.
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such services in the absence of social service provisioning (Mining Minerals and
Sustainable Development 2002). A key conclusion is that mining agreements on
their own are largely incapable of effecting significant mainstream economic
outcomes for the majority of Indigenous people who are parties to them.
O’Faircheallaigh’s recent study of approximately 45 mining agreements in
Australia suggests that the limited success of such agreements flows from the
NTA’s weakness as a statutory regime for negotiation (O'Faircheallaigh 2000,
2003a, 2004a, 2006; among other papers that make up the study; see also Altman,
Chapter 2; Martin, Chapter 5).
Development, aspirations, and livelihoods
The development ethos that informs the current policy direction in Indigenous
affairs, and is a keystone to the formal engagement between the mining industry
and Indigenous people in the context of agreements, defines Indigenous people
as underdeveloped. Esteva (2005: 7) signals this corollary to post-war
development discourse and grounds ‘the burden of connotations that it carries’
in the language of evolution, growth and maturation. In his historical account
of the emergence of development, Esteva emphasises the hegemonic nature of
a capitalist project to alleviate perceived poverty and underdevelopment in a
colonising and homogenising manner.9  Esteva (2005: 18) asserts that the social
construction of development is integral to an autonomous economic sphere and
the generation of scarcity:
Establishing economic value requires the disvaluing of all other forms
of social existence. Disvalue transmogrifies skills into lack, commons
into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into
burden, wisdom into ignorance, autonomy into dependency. It
transmogrifies people’s autonomous activities embodying wants, skills,
hopes and interactions with one another, and with the environment,
into needs whose satisfaction requires the mediation of the market.
Esteva’s rejoinder to the coercive dependencies that he identifies as being
produced by development and the market economy, is to draw attention to the
strategies of the ‘common man’ at the margins of economic hegemony, to
re-embed economic practice in culture, and develop a ‘new commons’. Esteva
(2005: 21) envisages a cultural revival of sorts, and a reclamation of the definition
of needs in the name of reducing scarcity. Culturally embedded education and
healthcare, he asserts, removes the need for absent teachers and schools, doctors
and hospitals and reaffirms the multiple strategies for survival entailed in
Indigenous cultural knowledge and relationships to the environment (Esteva
2005: 20–1). Esteva’s work serves as a useful reminder of how alternative modes
9 There is a broad literature criticising ‘development’ (see for example Crush 1997; Escobar 1995; Hobart
1993; Mehmet 1995; Nederveen Pieterse 1994).
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of economic interaction might privilege the skills and capacities derived from
Indigenous knowledge systems, in lieu of the skills and capacities conventionally
valued by Western industrial measures.
Like Esteva’s new commons, critical analysis of the development paradigm has
generated a post-development discourse that beckons consideration of non-market
economic relations and customary activities as legitimate forms of economically
productive action. Gibson and Graham’s notion of a ‘diverse economy’ is
premised:
…on unhinging notions of development from the European experience
of industrial growth and capitalist expansion; decentering conceptions
of economy and deessentialising economic logics as the motor of history;
loosening the discursive grip of unilinear trajectories on narratives of
change; and undermining the hierarchical valuations of cultures, practices
and economic sites (Gibson-Graham 2005: 5).
The Gibson and Graham study of the municipality of Jagna in the Philippines
identifies a diverse economy consisting of ‘a thin veneer of capitalist economic
activity underlain by a thick mesh of traditional practices and relationships’
(Gibson-Graham 2005: 16) that ground what they term the ‘community economy’.
They explain this community economy as:
Those economic practices that sustain lives and maintain wellbeing directly
(without resort to the circuitous mechanisms of capitalist industrialisation
and income trickle down) that distribute surplus to the material and
cultural maintenance of community and that actively make a commons
(Gibson-Graham 2005: 16).
Reference to this approach is not to suggest that a return to the primordial past
is desired by Indigenous people, but rather that the alterity of Indigenous
culturally grounded economic activity is maintained despite the colonial
experience. From research conducted over a 25 year period with Kunwinjku
people of Western Arnhem Land, Altman has developed a model for the analysis
of the interdependencies of the market, the state and the customary components
of the economy (Altman 2005a: 36). Altman’s hybrid economy recognises the
‘intercultural’ context of the economy in remote areas where the products of
customary activities supplement resources from other sectors. Hunting, gathering
and fishing often significantly supplement household and community production
and consumption (Altman 1987; Bomford and Caughley 1996; Griffiths 2000),
and are supported indirectly by the state, for example in the form of Community
Development Employment Projects payments. The production and sale of
Indigenous art is informed by cultural knowledge, facilitated by government
funded art centres, and driven by profits from a lively international art market
(Altman 2005a: 38). Other examples of hybridity include the commercial use of
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wildlife, cultural tourism, and bio-diversity management (Altman 2005a).
Underlying the growing importance of this last factor is increasing global concern
for the state of the environment, particularly in terms of climate change and
dwindling water resources. The majority of Indigenous Australians reside in
urban and metropolitan areas. However approximately 26 per cent of Indigenous
Australians, or 120 000 individuals reside ‘on what is increasingly referred to
as the Indigenous estate, an area that covers about 20 per cent of the Australian
continent or about 1.5 million square kilometres mainly made up of
environmentally intact desert and tropical savanna’ (Altman, Buchanan and
Larsen 2007). Increasingly, Indigenous people in these regions are engaging in
programs of biodiversity management that utilise Indigenous knowledge systems
in the control of exotic weeds and feral animals. Traditional fire management
practices particularly in the tropical savannas are being adapted to pastoral
management, biodiversity protection, and innovatively in privately negotiated
carbon abatement programs (Northern Land Council 2006). Government bodies,
such as the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Services and the Australian
Customs Service, are forming partnerships with Indigenous people living in
remote areas and employing them to undertake important activities including
border control and disease management. Such activities are formalising the
hybrid economy model espoused by Altman, through increased public sector
funding for bio-diversity projects.
Within the current policy debate in Australia that is increasingly asserting the
failure of self-determination approaches over the last 30 years, economic
liberalism and the pursuit of practical reconciliation has found support for greater
market integration from influential Indigenous spokespeople such as Noel Pearson
and Warren Mundine. Pearson’s ‘real economy’ model highlights a disjuncture
between post-colonial Indigenous cultural dispositions and Indigenous society’s
capacity to attain development outcomes. Central to Pearson’s argument is the
concept of ‘welfare poison’, which he maintains has undermined traditional
society and authority and instituted a destructive dependence on the state
(Pearson 2000a, 2000b).10  Pearson’s four point plan for the establishment of the
‘real economy’ shares a number of tenets with both Gibson-Graham’s diverse
economy, and Altman’s hybrid economy (Altman 2007a; Gibson-Graham 2005).
But, as Altman notes, Pearson’s emphasis upon engagement with the market
economy has gained prominence and provides ‘moral authority’ to the
‘pro-growth’ discourse of Indigenous development. The intervention of the
Commonwealth Government in the Northern Territory through the acquisition
of communally owned land, infrastructure, and capital items that are purchased
with government money and the introduction of income management schemes
for Indigenous welfare recipients has extended the moral authority of the state
10  ‘Misguided policies a toxic cocktail’, N. Pearson, The Australian, 24 October 2000.
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into unprecedented involvement in the daily lives and affairs of Indigenous
people. Such an outcome is paradoxically contrary to Pearson’s vision of reducing
the institutional involvement of government in the lives of Indigenous people.
The invisibility of the customary economy masks the value that is derived from
the exploitation of land based resources by Indigenous people residing on their
traditional estate—and exercising agency in determining their own future.
During the 1970s many Indigenous people moved away from government and
mission settlements to their traditional lands. The ‘homeland movement’ was
primarily a north Australian phenomenon and was enabled to some extent by
policy and legislative developments. Altman (1987) notes that decentralisation
assisted in the revitalisation and continued practice of hunter-gatherer
technologies and practice. Increasing mineral prospecting, particularly in Arnhem
Land in the Northern Territory, and the desire to protect sacred sites was also
a motivating factor in decentralisation (Gray 1977).
While the approaches of Gibson-Graham, Pearson and Altman present different
understandings of non-market economic activity, overall their work can be
characterised as taking a livelihood approach to economic development (de Haan
and Zoomers 2005). The term ‘livelihoods’ refers to the diverse activities in which
Indigenous people engage in order to sustain themselves. Livelihoods include
tangible economic activities associated with the cash economy including paid
employment, welfare and commercial enterprise; and resources from the
customary sector derived from activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering.
Livelihoods are reliant on networks of relatedness of people to kin and country
and entail a complex of obligations defined by a corpus of Indigenous law and
custom. In this sense livelihoods encompasses intangible aspects of social life
that are reliant not only on physical resources, but also on symbolic resources
associated with relatedness to and knowledge of country. These resources are
drawn upon constantly in the mediation of the authority of Indigenous
individuals within groups, and in the assertion of the distinctiveness of
Indigenous identity to the broader world. Livelihood pursuits entail aspects of
productive agency aimed at deriving forms of value that are not reducible to an
economic analysis. That is, the effort expended in accessing, maintaining and
utilising symbolic resources yields definitive constructions of personal and group
identity.
Livelihoods are described generally as a range of activities associated with the
customary sector, including fishing, hunting, gathering, the production of art
and craft, the conduct of ritual, and the maintenance of family and kin relations.
Livelihood aspirations emerging from fieldwork undertaken in relation to mining
agreements are expressed in terms of the resources perceived to arise from such
agreements. They include a range of activities premised on access to and
management of land and the development of supportive and representative
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organisations. Contrary to current policy assertions, access to land is a key
Indigenous aspiration. Thus any statement about the centrality of land based
relationships and responsibilities is a political assertion of a means of redressing
scarcity and social dysfunction associated with living in regional urban
environments. In the central Pilbara, Indigenous residents desire access to land
for the establishment of family-based ‘communities’, and the access to resources
that residence upon one’s own country brings. In the Kakadu region the
establishment of a number of outstations was facilitated by the Gagudju
Association, which emerged as a successful Indigenous organisation in the context
of the establishment of Ranger mine and the declaration of Kakadu National
Park. Converse to this positive outcome, Mirrar Gunjeihmi people express their
opposition to the development of the nearby Jabiluka deposit in terms of loss
of land and hence cultural identity (Gunjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation 2001).11
In the southern Gulf of Carpentaria access to land, for living-areas and rangelands,
is also a key aspiration.12
Associated with Indigenous aspirations for access to country are aspirations for
a multitude of resources to support such access. Vehicles to get there, funds to
build houses, to buy generators and to sink bores, represent some of these
tangible and associated aspirations. Access to cash resources to purchase
equipment is sought from multiple sources including mining agreement trust
funds, government grant funding, and in many cases through labour force
participation, or business enterprises.13  Indigenous aspirations identified can
be grouped into a number of general areas that emphasise the interdependencies
of models such as those outlined above. The maintenance of family and kin
structures reinforces relatedness and rights to land and defines membership,
exclusivity and authority within the Indigenous polity, and supports political
assertions of cultural distinctiveness. Representative Indigenous organisations
present a resource in assertions of rights arising from cultural distinctiveness,
particularly when made against the state, and the mining industry. Such
organisations are integral in claims to land under relevant statutes, negotiations
relating to land access, and in the establishment of partnerships in enterprise
development that generate resources required for a broad range of livelihoods.
Intra-Indigenous politics and conflict can compromise the efficacy of such
organisations to achieve outcomes for their constituents, but also highlight the
need for innovative governance design in order to accommodate processes for
11 The Ranger mine town of Jabiru and the Jabiluka leases occupy nearly 50 per cent of the Mirrar
Gunjeihmi clan estate (Fox, Kelleher and Kerr 1977: 266; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
1999: 77).
12  In order to secure its mineral interests in the area, the GCA designates that CZL incrementally return
significant land holdings to native title holders (Martin 1998: 6), with CZL maintaining a 1 per cent
stake to ensure the availability of this land for future exploration.
13  All three mining agreements considered here have programs that encourage and facilitate enterprise
development.
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resolution and management of disputes. A key factor that emerges from
examination of mining agreements is the impact that different definitions of
‘community’ associated with mining agreements can have on the stability of
agreement-based Indigenous organisations (see below).
Family and kin structures are intrinsic to the range of pursuits associated with
the Indigenous customary economy. Customary rules and norms associated with
social relationships influence rights to hunt, fish and gather and to utilise land
resources. Such rules and norms are reinforced through the myriad symbolic
resources associated with a sentient landscape, and, more formally in many areas,
through the conduct of ceremonial activity. Such activities generate a range of
social values that identify Indigenous people. Notably, significant numbers of
Indigenous people engage in mainstream economic activity without apparent
detriment to their sense of identity. For example, a number of Century mine
employees indicated their aspiration to obtain ‘rangelands’14  upon which to
hunt and live and regarded their employment as a strategic path to gaining the
necessary resources to realise this goal. Clearly there is significant diversity
within and across the field sites analysed that has not been addressed by the
current mainstream approach of the state or the mining industry thus far.
The assumption made here is that value is derived by Indigenous people and
groups through culturally informed productive action and serves to create and
reaffirm cultural identity, ‘which is the fundamental expression of their being’
(Throsby 2001: 11). At this point it is useful to consider the terms productivity
and value, culture, and cultural identity in more detail. Indeed this fundamental
expression is the basis for ‘a productive life’ (or a good life) and is much greater
in its scope than suggested by representations of Indigenous agency in mining
agreements. As Povinelli notes:
Aboriginal notions of work, labor, history, and authenticity are assessed
and, in many ways, forged by hunter-gatherer discourses and by Western
law, but Aborigines' real-life activities and dialogues also critique and
challenge the reified categories of ‘hunter-gatherer theory’ and produce
identity not in any way reducible to them (Povinelli 1993: 27).
Whilst interaction with the mining industry represents only one segment of
Indigenous lifeworlds, this forum offers potential benefits, in particular resources
that can support and augment the customary economy, by establishing its
material and, indeed, symbolic worth through the assertion of cultural difference.
However, as a corollary, Indigenous agency is also motivated by a desire to
minimise the cost that such engagement may present to expressions of cultural
identity. Multiple understandings of how value can be derived underpin the
14 The term ‘rangelands’ is used in the Gulf region to refer to tracts of land that are available for the
pursuit of livelihood activities such as hunting and fishing to the exclusion of other activities such as
mining and pastoralism.
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choices made by Indigenous Australians and determine the types of productive
action taken.
The distinction Altman and Rowse (2005) make between approaches to Indigenous
policy grounded in economically informed views emphasising equality and
sameness, and approaches based upon anthropologically informed views that
emphasise diversity and choice, are indicative of the broader disciplinary
relationship in which the role of culture is only recognised within economic
systems when it can be commodified. As Throsby suggests, the dominant
neo-classical paradigm in economics, which constructs economics as being
without a cultural context, is not culture-free. Indeed the economy is a system
of social organisation (Throsby 2001: 8–9). Economists employing neoclassical
modelling to account for culture, do so only within economic terms and as such
‘remain remote from an engagement with the wider issues of culture and
real-world economic life’ (Throsby 2001: 9). Throsby argues that questions of
value are intrinsic to both economics and culture and that they provide a
mechanism for the recognition of ‘cultural value’. Throsby’s definition of cultural
value consists of a range of typical characteristics or components including the
aesthetic, the spiritual, the social, the historical, the symbolic, and the authentic
(Throsby 2001: 28–9). However, whilst cautioning that economic and cultural
value must be kept distinct, and that economics has a limited capacity to recognise
cultural value in its entirety, he urges that it is ‘in the elaboration of notions of
value, and the transformation of value either into economic price or into some
assessment of cultural worth, [that] the two fields diverge’ (Throsby 2001: 41).
Indigenous people make assessments of cultural value in accordance with their
own traditions, heritage, and institutions. Assessments of cultural and economic
value diverge in the context of mining agreements, and are reflected in the
structures of the agreements that define the types of available choices Indigenous
people can make about the nature of their engagement. Assessments of cultural
and economic value then inform emergent relationships between Indigenous
people, the mining industry, and the state.
Holistic notions of culture that encompass all facets of the way people do things
inevitably encompass economic practice. Many determinist accounts of culture
draw relationships between the cultural imperatives of pre-capitalist societies
and economic activity. For Throsby ‘cultural capital’ captures the value of a
‘cultural product’ (or cultural productivity per se), in both its tangible and
intangible forms, while recognising the economic and cultural importance of
such a product.
The term culture has a myriad of meanings and implications in the popular and
academic lexicon. It is useful however, to consider culture in terms of an
aggregation of individuals into groups on the basis of shared ‘attitudes, beliefs,
mores, customs, values, and practices’ (Throsby 2001: 4). It assumes that a group’s
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use of ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ to convey meanings is important to the production
of its cultural identity (Cohen 1993), and in the sanctioning of the behaviour of
individuals both in relation to the group and also external to it. Difference and
diversity within the group is implied by the use of the term ‘aggregation’, which
also serves to distance this definition of culture from populist renderings that
blur the distinctiveness of cultural groups by assuming homogeneity within
them.
Cultural identity implies that an association of individuals is defined by a set of
common characteristics, and that the group is reliant on symbolic transactions,
and mutual identification. As with culture, cultural identity depends upon
symbolism, derived from everyday life, and productive action—as Povinelli
asserts in relation to the Belyuen (Povinelli 1993). Individuals are ‘active in the
creation of culture rather than passive in receiving it’ (Cohen 1993). As Cohen
notes the action of individuals in developing culture, has implications for the
politicisation of cultural identity. He asserts that cultural identity is a matter of
autobiography in that ‘when we consult ourselves about who we are, it involves
more than a negative reflection of who we are not’ (Cohen 1993: 198); it also
entails context specific judgments and choices, that reflect mutual understanding
of signs and symbols. This kind of activity is designed to assert inward
identification with a group, and distinction from other cultural identities.
The invisibility of the customary economy when perceived through mainstream
notions of the ‘productivity’, or productive labour, of Indigenous people in the
‘customary sector’ (Altman 2001a: 5) limits the value that can be derived both
by the mining industry and Indigenous people from their mutual engagement.
To explain, Indigenous productivity is steeped in cultural continuity and is an
integral mechanism for the production of cultural identity (Povinelli 1993). The
value of Indigenous productivity in the customary economy is realised through
multiple activities including quantifiable pursuits such as hunting and gathering,
and the production of art (Altman 2005a); and in less quantifiable activities such
as development and maintenance of outstations, engagement in family or kin
relations, conduct of ceremony or by engaging with a sentient landscape in the
production, reproduction, and reinterpretation of cultural identity, as Povinelli
notes by ‘just being there’ (Povinelli 1993: 31). The quantifiable activities Altman
outlines are not productive in a purely economic sense, rather as Povinelli
observes:
it is a form of production in the fullest cultural and economic sense of
this term, generating a range of sociocultural meanings and
political-economic problems and rewards. Hunting and gathering grounds
Belyuen Aborigines' relationship to the Cox Peninsula and, vis-à-vis
other ethnic groups in the region, [and] defines their Aboriginality
(Povinelli 1993: 26–7).
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Such cultural value can only be truly realised by those who produce it, and
those who receive it. However, manifestations of the nature or essence of cultural
value are readily identifiable in the chains and modes of interaction between
Indigenous people and the mining industry. For example, statements about the
lack of desire to work for the mining industry in the Pilbara and which are
supported with statements about the damage that mining does to the country,
or the preference to work ‘for my community instead’, clearly demonstrate a set
of priorities, the pursuit of which entails assessments of value, or cost. Similarly
in the Kakadu region the Mirrar Gunjeihmi people mounted an international
campaign against the development of a second uranium mine on the Jabiluka
lease adjacent to the Ranger Uranium Mine lease.15  Opposition to the
establishment of the Jabiluka mine by the Mirrar Gunjeihmi is clearly articulated
in terms of the cost that has been incurred by them as a result of the Ranger
uranium mine. The anti-Jabiluka campaign in 1998 invoked the authority of
Indigenous identity in opposition to the threats and constraints presented by
mining to their cultural autonomy. Similarly at the Century mine the success of
local Indigenous employment programs demonstrates not only Indigenous access
to employment, but also local Indigenous people’s desire to work there.
When considering cost and value, it is important to determine what motivates
people in making a choice about the terms and nature of their engagement.
Throughout this chapter the link between Indigenous productive action and
cultural identity is implicit; this relationship is not necessarily quantifiable in
economic terms, Nonetheless it is observable in the relationships between
stakeholders associated with mining agreements.
Cohen notes that a minimal condition for the politicisation of cultural identity
is individuals’ realisation that ignorance of their culture undermines their
integrity, and that such marginalisation creates power imbalances with respect
to the marginalisers (Cohen 1993: 199). He notes that culture is expressed
symbolically, and as such has no fixed meaning, and that may make it invisible
to others. Both Povinelli and Merlan note that Indigenous culture is represented
in Australia in popular discourse through legislative and policy frameworks
(Merlan 1998; Povinelli 1993). Politicised cultural identity mitigates against
reified notions of Indigenous identity, by drawing on a symbolic repertoire to
assert distinctiveness. Politicised cultural identity also strives to protect and
maintain the body of symbolic resources required for the continued construction
and reinterpretation of culture, and which reified notions of Indigeneity are
perceived to threaten. For example, in the Pilbara some individuals perceived
full-time work in the mining industry as jeopardising the attainment of
Indigenous aspirations for the future by placing barriers between them and
symbolic resources central to their identity as individuals and as Indigenous
15  For detail on the Jabiluka campaign by Mirrar Gunjeihmi see Trebeck, Chapter 6).
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people. Working a twelve-hour shift means distance from family and country
and its symbolic value. Conversely, Pearson’s claim of the destructiveness of
‘welfare poison’ assumes the erosion of culture that such dependency has inured,
and views the real economy as a means of re-establishing the role of individual
responsibility.
Relationships between Indigenous parties to agreements and the industry are
never definable purely in terms of Indigenous people’s desire or lack of desire
to engage in programs provided under the rubric of ‘community benefits’. In
struggling to maintain links between the present and the mythic and historical
past, in the pursuit of aspirations for the future, many older people suggest that
young people should both engage with the mine economy, and fulfil obligations
of a cultural nature. The need to garner resources from multiple
sources—including wage labour, compensation, business development, and
engagement in Indigenous cultural and social life—are seen by many Indigenous
people as essential in maintaining and augmenting cultural identity. A parallel
can be drawn between Richard Davis’ observations in relation to Indigenous
pastoralists in the Kimberley when he states that ‘commercial pastoralism allows
Aborigines the capacity to accrue the social and cultural capital that has
historically rested with white pastoralists whilst maintaining a radical alterity
to them’ (Davis 2005: 58). Such alterity is demonstrated by BL, a Kaiadilt man
from Bentinck Island in the Gulf of Carpentaria, who, whilst working at Century
mine, also maintains a radical opposition to a cyclone-mooring buoy associated
with the Century port facility at Karumba, and constructed on a sacred site
within his traditional estate.16  Reconciliation of Indigenous alterity with
participation in the mine workforce is highlighted in the statement made by a
Gangalidda worker at the Century mine, when he stated his goal as ‘helping my
people achieve their white dreams but staying black to do them’.
The incorporation of Indigenous values within a mining context is difficult, but
clearly not insurmountable. A major obstacle to such incorporation is the
industrial disposition of the mining industry that struggles to accommodate
cultural diversity within its corporate framework. Similarly, the incorporation
of mainstream economic values in Indigenous lifeworlds is difficult, but not
insurmountable—the principle obstacles being institutional exclusion that creates
incapacity to engage through the fostering of a skills deficit, and by placing
barriers between individuals and their cultural identity that the majority of
Indigenous people find unacceptable.
However, Indigenous people continually seek to influence both industry and
the state to accept modes of engagement that allow for the augmentation of
16  See 'Mad about the buoy', D. Marr, The Good Weekend, 18 August 2001.
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Indigenous identity, and hence the derivation of value from cultural, political
and economic arenas of Indigenous life.
Adverse relations between the mining industry and Indigenous people arise
from fundamentally different interpretations of land and its resources. Many
Indigenous people associates with his study characterised ‘country’ as sentient
and meaningful, producing socially embedded management practices that yield
both tangible and symbolic resources. This contrasts with a non-Indigenous
view of landscape that through the exploitation of its resources, becomes socially
embedded, and therefore meaningful. Both views contain judgements about the
productive value of land, and in turn the knowledge and capacity required to
attain such value. However, the two views are not incontrovertible. A clear
example of this is the 1946 Pilbara pastoral workers’ strike which saw
approximately 800 Indigenous pastoral workers simultaneously walk off 25
pastoral properties. The strikers sustained themselves through the prolonged
industrial action by engaging in lucrative independent mining activity. The
miners organised themselves collectively into successful corporations that
accounted for traditional land affiliations and decision making processes.17
Wilson characterises the strike and the emergent mining operations as the ‘Pilbara
Aboriginal social movement’, which he states was implicitly a claim to citizenship
rights (Wilson 1961: 97), occurring within a broader context of Indigenous
struggles for recognition and rights (see Attwood 2003). State policies of
protectionism and assimilation have enabled the historical dominance over
Indigenous interests—firstly of the pastoral industry, and later the mining
industry—a situation that endures in the current era. This subordination of
Indigenous interests, as highlighted by the Pilbara pastoral strike, obstructs the
visibility of Indigenous agency in deriving value from the land, and suppresses
the possibilities of the divergence of notions of cultural and economic value in
the context of mining agreements, but also more broadly.
The reluctance of the industry to assume responsibilities of service delivery is
an increasing source of tension in the tripartite relationships entailed in mining
agreements, and one that suggests an emerging nexus between Indigenous
consent to mining and access to non-discretionary citizenship rights. In the
context of mining agreements, trust funds and in-kind support from the mining
industry are increasingly funding Indigenous health, housing and education
programs in order to produce the competencies required for mine employment.
This emerging role of the industry is converse to the Indigenous sector which
is the target of funding cuts, increased scrutiny from government oversight,
and devolution of functions to mainstream government departments. Given the
17  A key figure in the strike movement was Don McLeod, controversial as an activist and for his links
with the Australian Communist Party. Some accounts credit McLeod with masterminding the strike
movement and subsequent successful mining collectives that grew out of it, though Wilson (1961, 1980)
gives a more nuanced account of McLeod’s influence.
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historic dominance of mining interests over Indigenous interests a key
consequence of agreements such as the YLUA and the GCA is the inculcation of
Indigenous people residing in mining areas into the narrow agenda of mineral
development.
In the context of the three agreements considered, the relationships between
the mining industry and regional land councils and NTRBs can be characterised
as fraught. Such relationships arise from the historic opposition of the industry
to the statutes under which these organisations operate, and the constraints they
place on mineral development. Amendments to statutes such as the ALRA and
the NTA have favoured the industry in its pursuit of security of tenure for
commercial mining operations. Past representations by the mining industry of
land councils and NTRBs as recalcitrant, anti-development, and self-interested
in debates about the workability of legislative mechanisms were reflected in the
Howard Government’s mainstreaming approach of seeking to bypass intermediary
Indigenous organisations in service delivery (Vanstone 2005). However, ongoing
management of the agreements considered here, and the relationships that they
engender, suggest a clear role for such organisations, and the development of
specific and local expertise to represent Indigenous people in dealings with the
mining industry. This is despite the varying roles played by such organisations
in the three agreements, and the varying support they currently draw from their
Indigenous constituents.
The representative and governance expertise of existing organisations is variable
across the three regions, and is influenced by the relatively recent establishment
of many NTRBs and land councils (for example, the Pilbara Native Title Service),
and diminishing levels of resources available through state funding
(O’Faircheallaigh 2006). Also, the adversarial relationships between land councils
and NTRBs and the mining industry have led to situations where representative
organisations are bypassed or heavily criticised, as in the Century mine
negotiations.
An enduring example of organisational dysfunction that has influenced modern
mining agreements is that of the Kunwinjku Association and the Nabarlek
Traditional Owners’ Association emerging from the QML Agreement (1979–95)
with the Northern Land Council concerning the Nabarlek uranium mine in
western Arnhem Land. Research documenting the poor governance of these
associations, and unclear definitions of agreement recipients, indicates that
significant sums of money derived from the agreement were wasted (Altman
and Smith 1994; Kesteven 1983; O’Faircheallaigh 1988). The most recent of these
research publications is the review of the Nabarlek Traditional Owners’
Association undertaken by Altman and Smith (1994) on behalf of the Northern
Land Council, and subsequently published. Altman and Smith’s research notes
a number of factors that are still relevant, including: the finite life of mines and,
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hence, financial flows to Indigenous people; the limited capacity for strategic
responsiveness to organisational capacity shortfalls of Indigenous agencies by
government departments, the mining industry and Indigenous representative
organisations; and legislative ambiguity in the purpose of mining money to be
compensatory or benefit sharing payments, hence public or private, in their
application. Such factors indicate, as does this chapter, that consideration of
poor governance and poor accountability in the context of mining agreements
extends beyond the Indigenous sector to include the mining industry and the
state. Altman and Smith note that the Northern Land Council was subject to
intense and perhaps excessive scrutiny for its role in the QML Agreement
compared to other stakeholders, but commend the organisation for sponsoring
and allowing publication of the research ‘in the interests of learning from the
mistakes of the past’ (Altman and Smith 1994: 1). Such reflexivity is rare in the
assessments of mining agreements by stakeholders. Though this example is dated
and singular, it nonetheless is transparent and demonstrates the potential and
desire of Indigenous organisations in furthering engagement with external
parties—a capacity that has in many cases been obscured by the oppositional
stances by the state and the mining industry to the discourse of Indigenous
rights that inevitably accompanies the representation of Indigenous interests.
Altman and Smith’s (1994) research occurred on the cusp of a new agreement
era emerging from the passing of the NTA, and coincided with the new approach
of Rio Tinto to work with the new legislative framework (L. Davis 1995), an
approach subsequently adopted by the industry.18 The business case for the
new approach is influenced by the maintenance of corporate image through the
portrayal of mining companies as good corporate citizens (Trebeck, Chapter 6).
Obtaining a social licence to operate is premised on companies working in
partnership with communities in the areas in which they operate and the
generation of community benefit. The Nabarlek case is considered a worst-case
example, and one which if repeated might reflect poorly on mining companies
as contributing to Indigenous social dysfunction. The new approach of attaining
Indigenous community benefit through mining agreements entailed a reactionary
response to the perceived wastage associated with the royalty regime under the
ALRA, which is extrapolated from Nabarlek to apply generally to all mining
agreements under the ALRA. The post NTA practice of tying compensatory
payments to specific purposes defined in mining agreements as ‘community
benefits packages’, mitigates against Nabarlek type situations, but also reduces
Indigenous autonomy over funds derived from what are essentially commercial
18  However, this new cooperative approach did not deter the industry from strenuous lobbying for
amendments to the NTA in 1998 to provide commercial certainty over the pastoral estate that covers
40 per cent of Australia, resulting in the ‘ten point plan’ (see footnote 2 above).
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negotiations under the NTA.19 The dominant role of the mining industry in
setting the terms of modern mining agreements was enabled by the unexpected
High Court decision in Mabo No. 2; subsequent uncertainty under the new NTA
legislative regime; its national focus; and the absence of Indigenous organisations
in many parts of Australia that could assume the mantle of being representative
bodies under the NTA.
Community
Expertise to identify people whose land interests and lives are impacted by
mining development is reliant on knowledge of local tenure systems, political
and social allegiances. Land councils and NTRBs, despite any current
shortcomings, are ideally institutionally situated to fulfil this role and subsequent
representation of Indigenous interests in negotiations with resource developers.
Associated with all three agreements considered here are incongruous definitions
of the relevant community that arise from initial assessment of land interests
impacted or affected by the mine. The renegotiation and realignment of the
community of benefit by Indigenous people themselves at all three locations has
emerged over time. At Ranger mine the Gagudju Association was created to
represent the interests of all Indigenous people affected by the mine. Membership
of this association was expansive. However, over the life of the agreement
relationships amongst the membership have forced a renegotiation of the
community of impact and the emergence of a new organisation—the Gunjeihmi
Aboriginal Corporation—with a discrete membership comprising of the land
owning group subject of the Ranger and Jabiluka lease areas. In the Pilbara, the
Gumala Aboriginal Corporation represents an alliance between three language
groups. This alliance is threatened by the negotiation of discrete mining
agreements outside the Gumala coalition, but within the country of, and on
behalf of the membership of the three language groups; and the increasing
assertions of language group autonomy over substantial funds held in trust by
Gumala. In the southern Gulf of Carpentaria the Indigenous parties to the GCA
are members of four language groups. However, the Wellesley Islands Sea claim
concluded that Gangalidda people, who are not formally a party to the GCA,
had succeeded to the country of Mingindda people, who are a party to the GCA.
It follows then that legal definitions of the affected community have been altered
significantly.20
19  A parallel can be drawn with the restrictions placed on agreement derived expenditure in the 1982
agreement between Pancontinental and the Northern Land Council concerning the Jabiluka prospect
(Altman 1983).
20  A corollary to the inflexibility of the respective agreements to accommodate change membership
dynamics is the changed corporate identity of mine operators as a result of corporate takeover at all
three locations.
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The assumption that initial definitions of the community will encompass the
unity of the group for the life of an agreement is inevitably challenged by
influences internal to the group, and also by extraneous pressures, as noted
above. This is particularly so where community definitions were initially
expansive as at Ranger, or entail coalitions as in the Pilbara. Indigenous regional
land interests and the intra Indigenous relationships and politics they entail are
dynamic and context specific. The process of defining the region of impact of
mining varies from region to region and mine to mine and is affected by a number
of considerations including: the extent of Indigenous knowledge of local land
interests, particularly in urban and regional areas; the scale of development as
in the Pilbara; or the potential environmental impacts as in the southern Gulf
of Carpentaria and in Kakadu National Park. The YLUA and the GCA statically
define the community, and despite five year reviews of both agreements, there
appears little scope for reflecting local re-assessments of the relevant community.
However, re-definition of the community risks the loss of relevance and efficacy
of static agreement structures and organisations in the attainment of agreement
outcomes. The decline of the Gagudju Association is a clear example of the
adverse impact of the assertion of discrete rights and interests. Inadequate
consideration of discrete land interests in the GCA was also a factor in the 2002
Century mine sit-in, demonstrating that mines themselves are not enclaves
isolated from the lives of Indigenous people. The mining industry’s management
and understanding of the complex Indigenous politics associated with land
interests and access to benefits is limited. The absence of organisations that
possess the relevant specialist expertise to represent Indigenous interests risks
drawing the industry further into realms outside its core commercial functions,
and raises the potential for conflict.
Undoubtedly the lack of definition of discrete land interests of Indigenous groups
party to mining agreements, and the incumbent lack of visibility of rights and
interests arising from localised land tenure, limits the workability of agreement
governance, and ultimately agreement outcomes. This is not to suggest that
agreements cannot be reached on a regional basis, but rather that such agreements
must account for local land interests that they encompass in order to maintain
their relevance and regional legitimacy.
The objectives of mining agreements to attain regional economic development
outcomes are also constrained by the financial scale of the multi-year agreements
themselves. In 2003 the Gunjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation received
approximately $1.17 million of the approximately $7.6 million annual payment
of Ranger Uranium Mine royalties paid to the Aboriginal Benefits Account.
Individual payments accounted for approximately $500 000; when divided
between the approximately 240 royalty recipients, this resulted in an annual
payment of approximately $2400 per person (see also Altman 1997: 180). A
further $20 000 was allocated for whitegoods, furniture and other household
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items across the membership. The remaining $1.5 million was allocated to a range
of social services for the membership and the region, including aged care facilities,
purchase of one community vehicle, and infrastructural and consumable
outstation support (including repairs, maintenance and fuel for generators for
example). Money was also allocated for investment and administration for the
Corporation itself (Gunjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation 2003).
Whilst there are four language groups who are party to the GCA, the objectives
of the agreement seek to positively influence the socioeconomic status of
Indigenous people living in the region. The regional Indigenous population is
estimated to be 6000 (Earth Tech 2005: 20), whilst an estimate of the membership
of the language groups is approximately 900 people. A crude calculation of the
$60 million value of the mine over a twenty year period gives an annual
expenditure of between $500 and $3300 per person per annum. This does not
account for at least $30 million of the agreement funds being dedicated by the
State of Queensland to the development of mine/regional infrastructure such as
the mine access road. Consideration of this would halve these figures.
Similarly the YLUA provides for approximately $60 million for 430 people over
the anticipated 20 year life of the Yandicoogina mine, though these funds are
tied to stringently controlled trust funds that are not generally accessible to the
membership.
Programs of employment and training, business development, heritage and
environmental protection target compensatory benefits at tangible outcomes.
Indigenous support for these programs is premised on the economic and social
advantage that they represent, but also on the accessibility of such programs to
the intended agreement beneficiaries. Inaccessibility of such programs diminishes
their relevance in the repertoire of available resources, and generates ambivalent
responses. At the Century mine, Indigenous employment is viewed as a successful
outcome from the agreement, but one which was undermined by the poor
workforce representation of local/mine adjacent Waanyi people, and compounded
by dysfunctional agreement structures culminating in the confrontational/activist
2002 sit-in at the mine canteen discussed above. In the Pilbara, the perception
of there being no clear progression into employment at the conclusion of training
programs, poor land access, and lack of access to trust funds generates Indigenous
ambivalence. At Ranger, the request by Mirrar Gunjeihmi to ERA not to employ
Indigenous people at all reflects their anti-mining stance, but also a desire to
avoid the negative social consequences associated with an influx of Indigenous
migrants. Mirrar Gunjeihmi opposition to the development of the Jabiluka
prospect also reflects an assessment of cost incurred in terms of reduced cultural
autonomy and enhanced social dysfunction as a result of their experience of the
Ranger mine. The perception that mining agreements bring prosperity to
Indigenous people is promulgated by the mining industry and the state to reduce
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opposition. However, the documented experience of Indigenous people impacted
by the Ranger mine is that cost shifting from the state to both the regional
recipients of ‘areas affected’ payments and the mining company ERA has resulted
in the region being arguably economically and socially worse off than nearby
comparable regions of the Northern Territory (Kakadu Region Social Impact
Study 1997a; Taylor 1999). The withdrawal of the state in the delivery of what
should be non-discretionary citizenship rights in the Kakadu region should be
cautionary, both to the attainment of mainstream economic objectives implied
by modern mining agreements, and the mainstream ‘closing the gaps’ approach
of current Indigenous policy.
Conclusion
Many people who participated in this research maintain that they have seen
little benefit from mining agreements. This is largely due to their relative
socioeconomic status (see for example Taylor and Scambary 2005). This is not
to deny the in-kind assistance and programs that mining companies have engaged
in at all three regions. Rather it suggests that the anticipated outcomes associated
with the agreements, and arising from varied and complex negotiating processes,
have not eventuated. In the Pilbara for example, the existence of a substantial
trust fund associated with the YLUA is viewed positively, but the current
inability of the Gumala membership to readily access funds creates the
widespread perception that they have little autonomy within the agreement to
determine the shape of their future. Conversely, in the Gulf of Carpentaria, poor
corporate governance associated with the GCA and unstable recipient
organisations do not assist in the creation of a capital base, and similarly
undermine intended agreement outcomes. The history of the Ranger mine and
associated Indigenous organisations highlights the loss of autonomy of the Mirrar
Gunjeihmi through the dispersal of their authority in the administrative
frameworks designed to minimise the impacts of mining. However, through the
interplay of local identity politics associated with Ranger mine and later the
Jabiluka protest, the Mirrar Gunjeihmi have re-emerged as powerful actors in
the region. This has had consequences for other regional interests, especially
the neighbouring Bunidj and Murrumburr people, through the dilution of their
authority in the organisations and institutions associated with mining in the
Kakadu region.
Despite the provision of mainstream economic opportunities, access to land
remains a critical issue at all three sites considered. In the Kakadu region the
Ranger and Jabiluka leases occupy approximately 50 per cent of the Mirrar
Gunjeihmi estate. Whilst the YLUA and the GCA make provision for the return
of pastoral land holdings of the respective mining companies, the outcomes and
equity of such provisions are unclear to many. Title to a number of leases in the
Gulf of Carpentaria has been granted, though the continuation of commercial
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pastoral operations on Lawn Hill Station is seen by some to preclude Indigenous
use of the area. In the Pilbara, the timeframes for the return of leasehold land is
unclear. The desire to access land for livelihood and religious pursuits is a central
finding of this research and one that suggests the need to broaden the terms of
engagement entailed in mining agreements.
Tangible livelihood outcomes are economic, and are considered by many
Indigenous people to be reliable in comparison to the risks of dependency
associated with obtaining resources through engagement with the market and
the state. Symbolic resources are also derived through the conduct of livelihood
activities and are central to the maintenance and construction of distinct
Indigenous identities. The symbolism of everyday life is drawn upon in the
inward assertions of identification with a group of people, and outwardly in the
assertion of difference to other cultural identities. Examples are provided from
all three field sites of the continued practice of livelihoods associated with the
customary sector. Whilst the yield of livelihood practices has not been quantified
here, the nature of cultural value that is derived from such activities is manifest
in the choices individuals make about their lives and their limited level of
engagement with the mine economy. Assessments of costs and benefits are
considered in terms of economic gain, but also in terms of personal and group
identity. As such, cultural value derived is only truly perceptible to those who
produce it. However, this is not to suggest that poor outcomes against agreement
objectives are reducible to the choices Indigenous people make about the nature
of their engagement with the mine economy. Rather, the choices people make
are to a large extent dictated by the opportunities that are available. This chapter
has highlighted the structural obstacles to mainstream economic engagement
presented by poverty, social and economic exclusion, and structures arising
from the agreements themselves that define narrow terms of engagement. Like
the pastoral industry before it, the obstacles to cultural autonomy that are
presented by the presence of the mining industry also impact on the customary
sector. Access to land—for the purpose of establishing residence, or accessing
resources, or maintaining links to important sites in the sentient landscape—is
a key aspiration across the three field sites, and is integrally linked to the range
of tangible and symbolic resources that land access provides.
The possibility for a convergence of economic value and Indigenous cultural
value is clearly reflected in the dual aspirations of Indigenous people across the
breadth of this study to enhance both their market engagement, and engagement
with the customary sector. Across Northern Australia the recognition of cultural
value in financial terms is emerging in innovative partnerships that emphasise
Indigenous land management practices. Extensive networks of Indigenous ranger
groups are already involved in projects associated with the maintenance of
biodiversity, disease control, border control, feral animal and weed management,
fire management, and green house gas abatement. Such projects recognise and
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enhance the value of Indigenous knowledge and capacity deriving from
relationships to land, and have the potential for developmental outcomes in
terms of the generation of economic resources. The benefits to Indigenous people,
aside from those arising from fee-for-service arrangements, include the
opportunity for the continuation of cultural traditions, the maintenance of
heritage, and the maintenance of distinctive identities.
The possibility for the application of ‘community benefit’ packages associated
with mining agreements in areas of land management is noted in this chapter,
particularly given the extensive pastoral land holdings of mining companies.
This is not to suggest that programs of mainstream engagement aimed at the
mine economy should be abandoned, but rather to suggest a possible area in
which the application of community benefits can be fruitfully augmented. Further
innovation is required in the forms of engagement between the mining industry
and Indigenous people to promote Indigenous empowerment and autonomy.
Central to this is the recognition of who Indigenous people are, and respect and
accommodation for the diverse range of knowledge and skills they possess.
The aspirations of Indigenous people associated with the Ranger mine in the
Kakadu region, the Yandicoogina mine in the central Pilbara, and the Century
mine in the southern Gulf of Carpentaria are multiple and diverse. Emerging
from the broad scope of this research are numerous Indigenous narratives
concerning distinctiveness, authenticity, equality, autonomy and responsibility.
These narratives reach beyond the local relationships with the mining industry
and state entailed in mining agreements, and draw upon the historic experiences
of Indigenous people to demand both citizenship rights and symbolic rights.
Indigenous struggles to seek redress of social and economic exclusion draw upon
normative modes of social transaction and cultural process that rally against
reified representations of indigeneity, and suggest ongoing cultural
transformations. Such transformations are reflected in strategies and aspirations
for the future that seek to innovatively resolve conflicting notions of productivity
and value through positive assertions of Indigenous distinctiveness within the
broader realm of an Australian national identity.
Through examination of three mining agreements it is clear that Indigenous
people residing in mine hinterlands engage and respond to global influences
while at the same time engaging with the customary. A clear example is the
Century mine workers who drive haulpac trucks in the mine, but still draw
upon the tangible and symbolic resources of their country in the construction
of identity and the maintenance of tradition. This chapter has drawn on research
associated with three mining agreements across Australia to demonstrate how
agreement outcomes are constrained by the very limitations that they place on
the agency of the Indigenous people they seek to engage. This chapter suggests
that successful engagement between the mining industry and local Indigenous
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people who reside in mine hinterlands is dependent on accommodation of existing
Indigenous skills and knowledge. Examples abound from across all three locales
of Indigenous people successfully striving to engage in multifaceted ways with
the mainstream economy, and the mine economy, whilst not compromising their
innate cultural identity. Poor understanding of Indigenous capacity by the state
and the mining industry perpetuates dichotomous relationships with Indigenous
people. Such relationships, combined with the historic under-funding of services
by the state, and the lack of recognition of the citizenship rights of Indigenous
people, limits the capacity for economic and social engagement, and compounds
Indigenous poverty.
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